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Ninety-three years ago, in

Lochner v. New York,1

the Supreme

Court struck down a maximum-working-hours law for bakers as an
impermissible invasion of employer-employee liberty of contract
and, by implication, of the employer's property rights in his
business. Lochner came to symbolize, and was vilified for, a vision
of state power as rigidly circumscribed by the operation of
judicially-determined laws of social ordering.2 By the late 1930s,
the Court had changed course and accepted that the states' police
power - or, in the case of Congress, the commerce power encompassed even protective regulation of the parameters of the
private employment contract.3 Within the modem legal academy,

"Lochner"

has

become

an

epithet

used

to

characterize

an

outmoded, over-narrow way of thinking about state and federal
economic regulation; it goes without saying that hardly anybody
takes the doctrine it represents seriously.4
1. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
2. See, e.g., OWEN M. Fxss, TROUBLED BEGINNINGS OF THE MoDERN STATE, 1888-1910,
at 4-7, 157-65 (1993); Stephen A. Siegel, Lochner Era Jurisprudence and the American
Constitutional Tradition, 70 N.C. L. REv. 1, 2-4 (1991); Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy,
87 CoLUM. L. REv. 873, 873-74 (1987). Historians of Lochner-era jurisprudence have
differed as to the precise origin of perceived limits on state power. Compare, e.g., Fxss, supra,
at 46-49, 158-59 (arguing that the state's limited powers derived from its limited purposes
under Lockean social contract theory) with, e.g., Siegel, supra, at 78-90 (arguing that
Lochner-era jurists viewed state power as constrained by traditional co=on-law principles
derived initially from natural law) with, e.g., Michael Les Benedict, Laissez-Faire and Liberty:
A Re-Evaluation ofthe Meaning and Origins of Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism, 3 L. & HisT.
REv. 293, 298 (1985) (arguing that perceived limits on state power were grounded in classical
economic notions of "liberty" and prohibited only "class" or interest-group legislation) with,
e.g., ARNOLD M. PAUL, CONSERVATIVE CRISIS AND THE RuLE OF LAW (1960) (arguing that
Lochner represented naked judicial activism on behalf of the propertied elites). For purposes
of this Article, however, it is sufficient to note that all four explanations rest, ultimately, on a
belief in the primacy of private property and private ordering, and in the illegitimacy of social
actions that appeared to redistribute property or wealth.
3. See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937); West Coast Hotel Co. v.
Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937); see also Fiss, supra note 2, at 6-8, 181; Benedict, supra note 2, at
305-14.
4. See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW§§ 8-5 to -7 (2d ed.
1988) (describing the doctrinal and political reasons for the Lochner doctrine's demise). But
see RICHARD EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN
277-82 (1985); BERNARD H. SIEGAN, ECONOMIC LIBERTIES AND THE CONSTITUTION 23, 11025 (1980) [hereinafter SIEGAN, EcoNOMIC LIBERTIES]; Norman Karlin, Back to the Future:
From Nollan to Lochner, 17 Sw. U. L. REv. 627 (1988); Bernard H. Siegan, Rehabilitating
Lochner, 22 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 453 (1985) [hereinafter Siegan, Rehabilitating Lochner];
Christopher T. Wonnell, Economic Due Process and the Preservation of Competition, 11
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 91 (1983); Note, Resurrecting Economic Righrs: The Doctrine of
Economic Due Process Reconsidered, 103 HARV. L. REv. 1363 (1990); see also Anthony S.
McCaskey, Comment, Thesis and Antithesis of Liberty of Contract: Excess in Lochner and
Johnson Controls, 3 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 409 (1993) (advocating an intermediate level of
economic due process protection). Cass Sunstein has argued, however, that central elements
of the Lodmer Court's analytic framework underlie much current thinking about individual
rights. See Sunstein, supra note 2, at 875.
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In fact, however, the economic vision embodied in
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Lochner

is

alive and well on the digital frontier. Its premises - the sanctity of
private property and freedom of contract, the sharply delimited role
of public policy in shaping private transactions, and the illegitimacy
of laws that have redistributive effects - undergird a growing body
of argument and scholarship concerning the relative superiority (as
compared with copyright) of common law property and contract
rules for protecting and disseminating digital works.5

In their

contemporary incarnation, these premises are embedded in the
rhetoric of economic efficiency. In place of social contract theory,
their proponents argue from purportedly neutral, scientific truths
about the way markets in general, and information markets in
particular, operate.
These truths, I shall argue, are nothing of the sort. Rather, they
are "just-so stories" that mask the need for first-order social welfare
choices about the sort of information society we want to have.
Their proponents, whom I christen the "cybereconomists," argue
that the most efficient legal regime, measured by its success at
inducing the creation of digital works and increasing consumers'
access to information, is that which permits copyright owners to
maximize control over the terms and conditions of use of their
digital property.6

However, the economic case they build is

5. See CHRISTOPHER BURNS, !Ne., COPYRIGHT MANAGEMENT AND THE NII: REPORT TO
THE ENABLING TECHNOLOGIES COMMITTEE OF THE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN
PUBLISHERS 17-21, 29-36 (1996); Tom W. Bell, Fair Use vs. Fared Use: The Impact of

Automated Rights Management on Copyright's Fair Use Doctrine, 76 N.C. L. REv. 557 (1998);
Charles Clark, The Publisher in the Digital World, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND
NEW TECHNOLOGIES: PROCEEDINGS OF THE KNoWRIGHT '95 CONFERENCE 85, 99 (Klaus
Brunnstein & Peter Paul Sint eds., 1995); I. Trotter Hardy, Property (and Copyright) in
Cyberspace, 1996 U. Cm. LEGAL F. 217; Robert P. Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules:
Intellectual Property Rights and Collective Rights Organizations, 84 CAL. L. REv. 1293 (1996)
[hereinafter Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules]; Robert P. Merges, The End of
Friction? Property Rights and Contract in the "Newtonian" World of On-Line Commerce, 12
BERKELEY TECH� L.J. 115 (1997) [hereinafter Merges, The End of Friction?]; Maureen A.
O'Rourke, Copyright Preemption After the ProCD Case: A Market-Based Approach, 12
BERKELEY TECH. LJ. 53 (1997) [hereinafter O'Rourke, Copyright Preemption]; Maureen A.
O'Rourke, Drawing the Boundary Between Copyright and Contract: Copyright Preemption
of Software License Terms, 45 DuKE L.J. 479 (1995) [hereinafter O'Rourke, Drawing the
Boundary].
6. See Bell, supra note 5; Hardy, supra note 5; Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules,
supra note 5; Merges, The End ofFriction?, supra note 5; O'Rourke, Drawing the Boundary,
supra note 5. The "progress" and "access" criteria are widely accepted as the test of any
regime of entitlements in creative and informational works. The "progress" criterion is
constitutionally-mandated. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (authorizing Congress to grant
intellectual property rights "[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts"). The
"access" criterion follows from it, both because "progress" is of little value unless its fruits
are made available to the public, and because knowledge is cumulative, so that the public
availability of creative works promotes further progress. See, e.g., Niva Elkin-Koren,

Copyright Policy and the Limits of Freedom of Contract, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 93, 98-101
(1997); Robert A. Kreiss, Accessibility and Commercialization in Copyright Theory, 43
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anything but· convincing. It is based on an essentialism about the
nature of "contract" and "market" that is manifestly unsuited to
mass-market transactions, on a reflexive and unsubstantiated
distrust of the legislative process as compared with the market, and
on assumptions about the nature of "property" and the best ways of
managing it that are wholly unproven and arguably unjustified in
the case of creative and informational works. Taken together, the
cybereconomists' arguments and proposals amount to ideology, not
science.7 Designing the optimal regime of rights in digital works
requires, instead, explicit choices about the degree of author/
publisher control, and the extent of freedom from such control, that
society finds desirable.
Part I of this Article describes the economic models now
proffered as the basis for defining rights in digital works, and
explores their striking resemblance to the system of social ordering
described and advanced in the Supreme Court's Lochner-era
decisions. The ghost of Lochner is not invoked lightly, nor with
intent to belittle. Lochner represented a particular ideal of social
ordering, premised on a seamless convergence of the private-law
institutions of property and contract to provide a zone of legal
insulation for market outcomes.8 In the physical world, that vision
has long been compromised by evidence of market failures. that all
but the most die-hard Chicago school economist cannot help but
acknowledge. The cybereconomists' argument, in essence, is that
cyberspace more closely approximates the conditions necessary for
perfect markets, and that under these conditions, a legal regime
based primarily or even exclusively on the private-law institutions
of property and contract is appropriate. This argument, moreover,
UCLA L. RE.v. 1 (1995); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of
Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 326-27 (1989); Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of
Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 TEXAS L. RE.v. 989, 993-99 (1997); Jessica
Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965 (1990). But see Glynn S. Lunney, Jr.,
Reexamining Copyright's Incentives-Access Paradigm, 49 V AND. L. RE.v. 483 (1996) (arguing
that society should also consider the opportunity cost created by the copyright regime,
measured in terms of other, non-creative activities that might produce greater social welfare).
This Article does not challenge the progress and access criteria, but only the means by which
the cybereconomists argue they are most effectively pursued.
7. Economics is, of course, a social science, and one which as a matter of historical record
has no great claim to predictive accuracy. For that matter, historians of science and
technolC1gy have long recognized that science and technology themselves are not value-free.
See, e.g., JACQUES Eum., THE TECHNOLOGICAL SocIETY (John Wilkinson trans., 1973);
BRUNO LATOUR, WE HAVE NEVER BEEN MODERN (Catherine Porter trans., 1993); LE WIS
MuMFoRD, TECHNrcs AND C!vu.IZATION (2d ed. 1963); cf. THOMAS S. KuHN, THE
STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (2d ed. 1970) (arguing that our perceptions of
scientific "facts" are shaped by the paradigms that we employ to make sense of them).
8. See infra text accompanying notes 13-23, 161-71 (discussing the relation between
freedom of contra't:t and property rights in Lochner-era jurisprudence).
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had found favor with government policymakers, who have used
similar reasoning to frame legislative and treaty recommendations.9
It is both fair and important to ask whether en route to their
conclusions, the cybereconomists have corrected the Lochner
Court's methodological lapses, or simply reproduced them.
Part II demonstrates that the cybereconomists' debt to the social
ideology of

Lochner

runs deep. Their proposals tum out to be

grounded in identical beliefs about the conceptual primacy of
private property and private ordering and the illegitimacy of
"redistributive," market-distorting legislation. As a result, their
models

are

neither scientific (in the sense of describing an

ineluctable reality) nor neutral, but rather normative and
contingent on the very same institutions and arrangements whose
absolute efficiency they seek to prove. Their failure to conceive of
contract as anything less than voluntary and (definitionally) private,
or of property as anything less than complete control, blinds them
to the socially constructed nature of the existing mass market for
creative works and prevents them from seriously considering
whether a regime based on limited ownership rights might be more
effective at promoting access and progress. I argue that in light of
the special nature of creative and informational works and of
creative and intellectual progress, there is substantial reason to
believe

that

a

limited-ownership

regime

is

better

suited

to

furthering these goals.
Part III begins the project of developing a stronger, more
defensible economic model for digital intellectual property rights.
As

a tool for understanding information markets, the

neoclassically-grounded

economic

theory

to

cybereconomists subscribe is fatally incomplete.

which

the

In particular,

critiques of the neoclassical paradigm supplied by institutional,
welfare-theoretic, and political economists have identified several
important factors that should inform efforts to determine the
9. See, e.g., INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE TASK FORCE, UNITED STATES,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE: THE
REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 49-53, 58-59, 64-66,
70-72, 79-84, 177-92, 230-32 & app. (1995) [hereinafter NII WHITE PAPER] (outlining vision
of digital copyright regime under which copyright owners are free to contract around
copyright's limited entitlements, and proposing legislation designed to implement this
vision); Julie E. Cohen, Some Reflections on Copyright Management Systems and Laws
Designed to Protect Them, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 161, 165-66 & n.17 (1997) (describing
Clinton Administration's efforts to secure international treaty provisions similar to its
proposed domestic legislation); Pamela Samuelson, The Copyright Grab, WIRED, Jan. 1996,
at 134 (detailing differences between Administration's vision of copyright and existing
copyright law). For a discussion of the domestic legislation ultimately adopted, see infra text
accompanying notes 283-85.
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optimal system of rights in digital works. First, Part III explores the
dynamics of bargaining power in the consumer mass market for
creative and informational works and suggests that, in light of the
predominantly reactive nature of consumers' power to affect
markets, consumers are more likely to attain relative equality of
bargaining power in the legislative arena. Part III then considers
the relationship between the legal regime governing rights in digital
works and overall social welfare. It demonstrates that allowing
content owners to internalize the uncompensated benefits
generated by creative and informational works under a limited
entitlements regime would result in underproduction of works that
produce significant social benefits. The resulting decrease in social
welfare must be offset against any increased value that would be
realized through market exchange. The question whether such a
regime would be preferable to the current one cannot be answered
except by reference to a normative conception of social welfare.
Moreover, this choice implicates preferences about the conditions
of individual and social self-definition that are not capable of
expression and effectuation through the market. In light of these
considerations, it would be entirely rational to conclude that a
regime of limited entitlements is optimal.
Finally, Part IV considers, and rejects, the cybereconomists'.
implicit contention that the relatively "frictionless" nature of
transactions in cyberspace is a technological imperative that
dictates redefining digital property rights in the neoclassical mold.10
Technology and society constitute each other;

if

we have not yet

developed an alternative technological paradigm for defining and
administering rights in digital works, it is because we have not been
asking the right questions. I conclude that both the legal regime
governing rights in digital works and the technology for
implementing it should be determined with reference to expressly
chosen social priorities. Under a broader conception of economic
theory and of social welfare, society may legitimately choose to
retain and institutionalize a limited-entitlements regime for digital
works.

10. This metaphor is borrowed from Robert Merges. See Merges, The End of Friction?,
supra note 5, at 136 (likening reduced transaction costs in the digital medium to the absence
of friction in "pure" Newtonian mechanics).
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T HE CONVERGENCE OF ECONOMIC IMPERATIVES AND
NATURAL RIGHTS

Any comparison of tum-of-the-century substantive due process
jurisprudence and the contemporary digital "rights management"
movement must begin by acknowledging that they differ in several
important respects. First and foremost, the question of government
power that was so central to

Lochner

does not arise because con

gressional power to define rights in creative works is express.11 De
bates over the appropriate scope of copyright protection focus on
how, not whether, government power should be exercised. In addi
tion, the distinctive brand of conceptualism characteristic of
nineteenth- and early twentieth-century legal reasoning, which con
ceived of the law as a system of abstract concepts and categories
"capable, more or less, of deductive application" to resolve particu
lar disputes, is, deservedly, a thing of the past.12 What is striking is
that, despite these differences, the economic regimes asserted as
natural and neutral by the

Lochner Court on the

one hand, and by

contemporary copyright owners and economics-oriented copyright
scholars on the other, are so remarkably similar.
The central question in Lochner concerned the scope of a state's
police powers. Then, as now, the states could legislate on matters
concerning the safety, morals, health, and general welfare of the
public; however, each of these areas was conceived as narrow and
highly specific.13 To qualify as health-related (the particular police
power at issue in

Lochner),

a law ordinarily had to pertain to the

health of the public as a whole; a law protecting a specific class of
workers was legitimate as a health law only if it could be shown that
the occupation was particularly unhealthful.14
class-specific law might be valid as a labor law

if it

Alternatively, a
could be shown

that the workers engaged in it were uniquely unable to protect
themselves, thus justifying their treatment as "wards of the state."15
11. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
12. See Siegel, supra note 2, at 23-36 (defining conceptualism and its public-law analogue,
"constitutional conceptualism," which looked to the written Constitution as the source of the
applicable concepts and categories).
13. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 56-57 (1905); F1ss, supra note 2, at 159-60;
Siegel, supra note 2, at 8-12.
14. See Lochner, 198 U.S. at 59-61; see also, e.g., Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366 (1898)
(upholding maximum-hours legislation for miners in light of that occupation's "peculiar
hazards and perils"); F1ss, supra note 2, at 173-74.
15. See Lochner, 198 U.S. at 57; see also, e.g., Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 421-22
(1908) (upholding maximum-hours legislation for women because "woman has always been
dependent upon man," and because "there is that in her disposition and habits of life which
will operate against a full assertion of [her] rights" to liberty of contract); F1ss, supra note 2,
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A majority of the Court concluded that bakers as a class were
neither particularly vulnerable nor especially unhealthy. Accord
ingly, it reasoned, upholding the maximum-hours legislation on
health grounds would work a dramatic expansion of the states' au
thority to interpose protective regulation in the workplace.16 This
the Court refused to do. Instead, it held the law invalid, and sug
gested that the state's real intent was to interfere with the results of
private bargaining - presumably, for redistributive or interest
group purposes.11
The

Lochner

Court's narrow conception of the state's role de

rived, ultimately, from the Enlightenment vision of the state as con
stituted via the social contract for limited purposes.18 Within this
vision, legislative authority to shape default rules for social conduct
encompassed only the specific terms of the original compact.19 In
significant part, the compact was defined by principles of classical
economics, which held that government should not interfere with
the "natural" laws of supply and demand.20 In reality, turn-of-the
century governments undertook a broad variety of economic legis
lation pursuant to their recognized authority to promote the "gen
eral welfare."21

Outside the bounds of this general regulatory

authority, however, the state's role was limited to policing private
at 174-79 (arguing that the Court found Muller an easy case "because women were not
viewed as [co-equal] members of the community that constituted the state").
16. See Lochner, 198 U.S. at 59-61.
17. See Lochner, 198 U.S. at 64; see also Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 557
(1923) (describing a minimum wage statute as "a compulsory exaction from the employer for
the support of a partially indigent person, for whose condition there rests upon him no pecu
liar responsibility"); Benedict, supra note 2, at 305-08 ("[T]he state plainly was interfering on
the behalf of one of the parties to a bargain, insofar as unfettered bargaining based on the
supply of and demand for labor would have led to a different outcome."); Sunstein, supra
note 2, at 877-79 ("Because the only available public justifications were insufficient, the mini
mum wage statute [in Lochner] was invalidated as an interest-group deal, reflecting nothing
other than political power."); G. Edward White, Revisiting Substantive Due Process and
Holmes' Lochner Dissent, 63 BROOK. L. RE.v. 87, 88 (1997) (describing Lochner-era due
process decisions as predicated on "the principle that no legislature could enact 'partial' legis
lation, legislation that imposed burdens or conferred benefits on one class of citizens rather
than the citizenry as a whole").
18. See, e.g., JoHN LocKE, T wo T REATISES OF GOVERNMENT, bk. II, §§ 135, 222 (Peter
Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press, 2d ed. 1970) (1690).
19. See supra note 2. Compare Frss, supra note 2, at 158-59 (suggesting that these limits
were derived directly from social contract theory), and White, supra note 17, at 105-06
(same), with Siegel, supra note 2, at 78-90 (arguing that perceived limits on state power were
derived only indirectly from "natural law," and that Lochner-era jurists turned to traditional
common-law concepts and distinctions to give content to the limits).
20. See Benedict, supra note 2, at 298-301; White, supra note 17, at 105-06.
21. See, e.g., Benedict, supra note 2, at 304 (describing categories of cases in which the
Lochner-era Court upheld economic regulation); Harry N. Scheiber, Private Rights and Pub
lic Power: American Law, Capitalism, and the Republican Polity in Nineteenth-Century
America, 107 YALE L.J. 823, 836-47 (1997) (book review) (describing debate among histori-
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property rights and enforcing private agreements, both of which
were conceived to be inherently prepolitical.

"Class" legislation,

which altered the economic playing field to the perceived benefit of
some and the detriment of others, was regarded as an impermissible
invasion of fundamental economic liberty.22 In short, turn-of-the
century jurists and legal scholars viewed the market as the primary
engine of social ordering, and believed that the state existed to fa
cilitate the market.23
The emerging market for digital works displays a similar empha
sis on private ordering of entitlements and obligations. This devel
opment is made possible by the growing use of "click-through"
contracts for the online delivery of digital works and by new "rights
management" technologies that

will

allow copyright owners to set

unilaterally and enforce automatically the terms and conditions of
access to digital content.24 These new technologies radically change
ans about the extent to which economic regulation for the "general welfare" was the ac
cepted norm).
22. See MoRTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1870-1960:
THE Crusis OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 194 (1992) ("Every effort to interfere with outcomes to judge overall social justice by results - inevitably subverted the legitimacy of the market
process as a neutral and apolitical arbiter of the just distribution of wealth."); Benedict, supra
note 2, at 311-14; White, supra note 17, at 94-100.
23. See LocKE, supra note 18, at bk. II,§ 222; Fiss, supra note 2, at 46-49; Benedict, supra
note 2; Siegel, supra note 2, at 78-81; Sunstein, supra note 2, at 887-92; White, supra note 17,
at 105-06; see also supra note 2. For a modem exposition of this view, see EPSTEIN, supra
note 4, at 4 ("The implicit normative limit upon the use of political power is that it should
preserve the relative entitlements among the members of the group, both in the formation of
the social order and in its ongoing operation.").
24. See BURNs, supra note 5, at 15-21, 31-35; PETER WAYNER, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT PRO
TECTION (1997); Jon Bing, The Contribution of Technology to the Identification of Rights,
Especially in Sound and Audio-Visual Works: An Overview, 4 INTL. J.L. & INFO. TECH. 234
(1996); Clark, supra note 5, at 97-101; Mark Stefil:, Letting Loose the Light: Igniting Com
merce in Electronic Publication, in lNrERNET DREAMS: ARCHETYPES, MYTIIs, AND META·
PHORS 219 (Mark Stefil: ed., 1996) [hereinafter Stefil:, Letting Loose the Light]; Mark Stefik,
Shifting the Possible: How Digital Property Rights Challenge Us to Rethink Digital Publish·
ing, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 138 (1997) [hereinafter Stefik, Shifting the Possible]; Daniel J.
Gervais, Electronic Rights Management Systems (ERMS): The Next Logical Step in the
Evolution ofRights Management (on file with author) [hereinafter Gervais, The Next Logical
Step]; International Federation of Reproduction Rights Organizations, Committee on New
Technologies, Digital Rights Management Technologies (visited Sept. 14, 1998) <http://
www.ncri.com/articles/rights_management/ifrro95.html>. The most comprehensive investiga
tion of the possibilities and implications of digital rights management technologies is that
being conducted by IMPRIMATUR, a consortium of European universities, publishing
interests, authors' organizations, and telecommunications providers. For information about
IMPRIMATUR, see Imprimatur (last modified Oct. 6, 1998) <http://www.
imprimatur.alcs.co.uk>. For the archive of reports generated by the project, see Project Doc
uments (last modi fi e d Sept. 24, 1998) <ht t p:/ / www.imprimatur.alcs.co.uk /
download.htm#finyear>.
The term "click-through" (or "click-wrap" or "web-wrap") license refers to a contract
created by requiring the would-be purchaser of a digital work to accept various usage restric
tions, via a series of mouse "clicks," before granting access to the work. Representatives of
various copyright-related industries are now drafting a new Article 2B for the Uniform Com-
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the copyright landscape. Copyright laws were created, at least in
part, to address a market failure arising from the public-good char
acteristics of creative works of authorship.25 By guaranteeing au
thors certain exclusive rights in their creative products, copyright
seeks to furnish authors and publishers, respectively, with incen
tives to invest the effort necessary to create works and distribute
them to the public.26 Digital technologies allow more effective
fencing of intellectual property, and thus cure some of the market
failure problems associated with creative and informational works
- although, as I will argue in Part III, they have the potential to
create market failures of a different sort.
Most obviously, digital copyright management systems (CMS)
will enable copyright owners to enforce automatically many of the
rights afforded them by copyright law. In addition, because digital
technologies reduce licensing costs, it will become increasingly fea
sible to levy fees for various uses of copyrighted works that the law
has regarded as "fair" and that members of the public currently enmercial Code that would render click-through licenses for digital works valid and enforceable
whether or not the terms were actually disclosed before payment. See U.C.C. ART. 2B:
LICENSES§ 2B-208 (Annual Meeting Draft July 1998) (available at <http://www.law.upenn.
edu/library/ulc/ucc2b/2b98.htm>); infra text accompanying note 77.
25. As defined by economists, "market failure" refers to circumstances in which volun
tary market exchange cannot achieve the socially optimal allocation of resources. "Public
goods" are goods that can be consumed without depletion (non-rivalrous consumption) and
that can be withheld from nonpaying beneficiaries only at prohibitive cost (non-excludabil
ity). Because non-excludability reduces incentives for private provision, public goods often
present market failure problems. See ROBERT CooTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND Eco
NOMICS 40-41 (2d ed. 1997); cf. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (Aug.
1813), in THOMAS JEFFERSON, WRITIN GS 1286, 1291-92 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1984):
If nature has made any one thing less susceptible than all others of exclusive property, it
is the action of the thinking power called an idea, which an individual may exclusively
possess as long as he keeps it to himself; but the moment it is divulged, it forces itself
into the possession of everyone, and the receiver cannot dispossess himself of it. Its
peculiar character, too, is that no one possesses the less, because every other possesses
the whole of it. . . .Inventions then cannot, in nature, be a subject of property. Society
may give an exclusive right to the profits arising from them as an encouragement to men
to produce ideas which may produce utility. . . .
Creative and informational works approach the status of pure public goods i n the digital
environment, where the marginal cost of producing and transmitting a copy approaches zero.
Other sources of market failure include monopoly, externalities arising from market
transactions, and information asymmetries that preclude socially optimal transactions or dis
tort market behavior. See CooTER & ULEN, supra, at 38-41.
26. See, e.g., Elkin-Koren, supra note 6, at 98-100; William W. Fisher III, Reconstructing
the Fair Use Doctrine, 101 HAR.v. L. REv. 1661, 1700-04 (1988); William M. Landes &
Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325 (1989).
But see Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books,
Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 HAR.v. L. REv. 281 (1970); Gillian K. Hadfield,
The Economics of Copyright: An Historical Perspective, 38 COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. (AS CAP) 1,
14 (1988) (suggesting that "much of the perceived need for protection in early analyses in fact
arose from or was reinforced by the fact of large 'economies of scale' in publishing (aug
mented by high levels of uncertainty) rather than the 'public goods' problem").
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joy at no charge.27 An important strand of copyright scholarship
conceives the fair use doctrine as a response to a market failure
resulting from prohibitive transaction costs; as a matter of law,
moreover, fair use depends in part on findings about market im
pact.28 Thus, many commentators and some courts have concluded
that the scope of fair use online should be narrowed wherever new
technologies or licensing mechanisms enable markets to form.29
Ultimately, digital CMS will allow content owners to insist on
greater protection than copyright law would afford. For example,
in the nondigital world, the first sale of an object embodying a
copyrighted work exhausts the copyright owner's exclusive distribu
tion right; digital CMS will enable the copyright owner to extend
control over distribution indefinitely - in theory, even for works
whose term of copyright protection has expired.30 Digital CMS also
will allow copyright owners who desire it to abrogate fair use en
tirely - for example, by requiring payment for any excerpting of a
digital work regardless of the reader's purpose, or by conditioning
access to the work on acceptance of a contractual provision prohib
iting parodies.31 Finally, copyright owners will be able to imple
ment contractual restrictions prohibiting reuse of the ideas, facts, or
27. Examples include copying for research or classroom use, see 17 U.S.C.§107 (1994),
copying for private home use, see Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464
U.S. 417 (1984); excerpting for purposes of comment or criticism, see, e.g., Maxtone-Graham
v. Burtchaell, 803 F.2d 1253 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1059 (1987); parody, see
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994); and the decompilation of computer
software to discover uncopyrightable ideas and methods of operation, see 17 U.S.C.§102(b)
(1994); Sega Enters., Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992).
28. See 11 U.S.C.§107; see also, e.g., PAUL GOLDSTEIN, CoPYRIGIIT's HIGH WAY: THE
LAW AND LoRE OF CoPYRIGIIT FROM GUTENBERG TO THE CELESTIAL JUKEBOX 170, 224
(1994); Bell, supra note 5; Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and

Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and its Predecessors, 82 CoLUM. L. REv. 1600
(1982); Robert P. Merges, Are You Making Fun of Me? Notes on Market Failure and tlte
Parody Defense in Copyright, 21 AIPLA Q.J. 305 (1993).
29. See Princeton Univ. Press, Inc., v. Michigan Document Serv., Inc., 99 F.3d 1381 (6th
Cir. 1996) (en bane) (photocopying for classroom use); American Geophysical Union v.
Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1994) (photocopying for research use); GOLDSTEIN, supra
note 28, at 178-79, 202, 216-24; Richard P. Adelstein & Steven I. Peretz, The Competition of
Technologies in Markets for Ideas: Copyright and Fair Use in Evolutionary Perspective, 5
INTL. REv. L. & EcoN. 209 (1985); Bell, supra note 5, at 581-84; Gordon, supra note 28, at
1619-21; Merges, The End of Friction?, supra note 5, at 130-34; Stefik, Shifting the Possible,
supra note 24, at 146-47; see also Fisher, supra note 26, at 1669-72 (observing that a broadly
inclusive approach to the market-impact inquiry "will almost always tilt in favor of the
plaintiff'').
30. See 17 U.S.C.§109(a); BuRNs, supra note 5, at 34-35; Stefik, Shifting the Possible,
supra note 24, at 145-46. But see Lasercomb America, Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970 (4th
Cir. 1990) (holding that attempted contractual extension of copyright term was Inisuse and
rendered copyright unenforceable); infra note 84 (discussing application of copyright misuse
doctrine to digital CMS practices).
31. See 11 U.S.C.§107; Cohen, supra note 9, at 175-78, 179-83.
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functional principles contained in a work - all elements that copy
right law expressly leaves unprotected in order to stimulate further
creativity - or prohibiting reuse of formerly copyrighted expres
sion that has fallen into the public domain.32
Copyright owners maintain that different rules are necessary in
cyberspace because, absent technological protection, it is so easy to
make and distribute unauthorized copies of digital content. Rules
that undermine their control over their creative property, it is ar
gued, will reduce, or even destroy, their incentives to distribute cre
ative works digitally.33 Sounding uncannily like the Supreme Court
of the

Lochner era,

copyright owners and their supporters contend

that translating public-law doctrines that benefit users, such as first
sale and fair use, to the digital environment would require them to
subsidize the reading public.34
32. See 17 U.S.C.§102(b); Feist Pubs., Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349-50
(1991); Cohen, supra note 9, at 175-78, 179-83; see also Litman, supra note 6 (elaborating the
role of a robust public domain in providing the building blocks for ongoing creative
progress).
33. See, e.g., WIPO Copyright Treaties Implementation Act; and Online Copyright Liabil
ity Limitation Act: Hearing on H.R. 2281 and H.R. 2280 Before the Subcomm. on Courts and
Intellectual Property ofthe House Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 224-27 (1997) [herein
after Hearing on H.R. 2281 and 2280]; id. at 204-12 (statement of Allan R. Adler, Vice
President for Legal and Governmental Affairs, Association of American Publishers); id. at
68-77 (statement of Robert W. Holleyman II, President, Business Software Alliance); id. at
212-16 (statement of Gail Markels, General Counsel and Senior Vice-President, Interactive
Digital Software Association); id. (statement of Tom Ryan, CEO, SciTech Software, Inc., on
behalf of the Software Publishers' Association); id. at 156-61 (statement of Allee Willis, song
writer, on behalf of Broadcast Music, Inc.); National Information Infrastmcture Copyright
Protection Act of 1995: Hearing on S. 1284 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th
Cong. 7-15 (1996) [hereinafter Hearing on S. 1284] (statement of Kenneth R. Kay, Executive
Director, Creative Incentive Coalition); NII Copyright Protection Act of 1995: Hearings on
H.R. 2441 Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Property of the House Comm. on
the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 180-203 (1996) [hereinafter Hearings on H.R. 2441]; id. at 69-79
(statement of Barbara A. Munder, Senior Vice-President, The McGraw-Hill Cos.); id. at 2530 (statement of Frances W. Preston, President and CEO, Broadcast Music, Inc.); id. (state
ment of Richard Robinson, Chairman, President, and CEO, Scholastic, Inc., on behalf of the
Association of American Publishers); id. at 21-24 (statement of Jack Valenti, Chairman and
CEO, Motion Picture Association of America, Inc.); Creative Incentive Coalition, Resources:
Key Questions Answered (visited Sept. 27, 1998) <http://www.cic.org!resources/faq.htm>; NII
WHITE PAPER, supra note 9, at 10-12, 177-78, 230.
34. Compare NII WHITE PAPER, supra note 9, at 84 ("The Working Group rejects the
notion that copyright owners should be taxed - apart from all others - to facilitate the
legitimate goal of 'universal access."'), and Merges, The End of Friction?, supra note 5, at
134-35 (characterizing the fair use doctrine as essentially redistributive), with Adkins v. Chil
dren's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 557 (1923) (describing a minimum wage statute as "a compulsory
exaction from the employer for the support of a partially indigent person, for whose condi
tion there rests upon him no peculiar responsibility"); see also Gordon, supra note 28, at 1632
(applying the "subsidy" label to judicially-decreed findings of fair use where licensing theo
retically would be possible); cf. Jane C. Ginsburg, Authors and Users in Copyright, 45 J.
COPYRIGHT SoCY. 1, 15 (1997) (arguing that fair use redistributes value "from those who
purchase copyrighted works at full price"). Section II.B.2, infra, demonstrates that the argu
ment from redistribution is misguided because it assumes the central point in dispute: that
the copyright owner was entitled to expect remuneration for the use in question. Regarding
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Given the foregoing, one might expect that copyright owners
would look to Lockean intellectual property theorists to support
their claims to broad rights management authority. Although the
Constitution expressly authorizes only a limited grant of exclusive
(i.e., property-like) rights to authors, the Enlightenment notion that
property and contract predate the social contract might nonetheless
prove useful to those copyright owners seeking greater control over
their digital content than current copyright law allows. In fact,
although some scholars have advanced a Lockean justification for
intellectual property rights, they have interpreted the Lockean pro
viso that "enough and as good [be left] for others" to require a
robust public domain and a copyright grant that is limited both in
duration and in scope.35 In contrast, it is intellectual property
scholars of the neoclassicist economic persuasion who express the
strongest and most unequivocal support for digital copyright man
agement regimes based on private-law contract and property
rights.36
Ginsburg's injured purchasers, see infra text accompanying notes
lic good aspect of the fair use privilege).

335-42 (discussing the pub

35. See, e.g., Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in SelfExpression: Equality and Indi
vidualism in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533, 1560-72 (1993)
(quoting and discussing LoCl(E, supra note 18, at bk. Il, § 27); Justin Hughes, The Philosophy
ofIntellectual Property, 17 GEo. L.J. 287, 319-25 (1988); cf. Joan E. Schaffner, Patent Preemp
tion Unlocked, 1995 Wis. L. REv. 1081, 1094-95 (advancing similar interpretation to explain
limitations on patent duration and scope).

36. Neoclassical economic theory, closely associated with the Chicago school of legal
economic thought, holds (among other things) that society is composed of rational, utility
maximizing individuals; that these individuals will seek to better their positions through vol
untary market exchange as long as the marginal benefit outweighs the marginal cost; that the
most reliable measure of expected utility is the amount an individual is willing to pay for a
particular exchange; that perfectly competitive markets are the most efficient vehicles for
coordinating these wealth-maxiniizing exchanges; that perfectly competitive markets will
seek equilibrium as prices respond to the laws of supply and demand; and that markets are
presumptively perfectly, or near-enough-perfectly, competitive. See NICHOLAS MERCURO &
STEVEN G. MEDEMA, ECONOMICS AND THE LAW: FROM POSNER TO POST-MODERNISM 1318, 57-60 (1997); see also Robert A. Solo, Neoclassical Economics in Perspective, in THE
CHICAGO SCHOOL OF PoLmCAL ECONOMY 41, 48-55 (Warren J. Samuels ed., 1993); infra
text accompanying note 206 (discussing additional elements of the neoclassical model). Nu
merous critics within both economics and law have charged that the neoclassical market
model, while possessed of considerable theoretical elegance, is descriptively inadequate and
institutionally myopic. For representative critiques from within the discipline of economics,
see, for example, DANIEL
BROMLEY, ECONOMIC INTERESTS AND INSTITUTIONS: THE
CONCEPTUAL F oUNDATIONs OF PUBLIC POLICY (1989); Ezra J. Mishan, The Folklore of the
Market: An Inquiry Into the Economic Doctrines of the Chicago School, in THE CHICAGO
SCHOOL OF PoLmcAL ECONOMY, supra, at 95; 'Varren J. Samuels, Welfare Economics,
Power, and Property, in LAW AND ECONOMICS: AN INSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE 9 {Warren
J. Samuels & A.Allen Schmid eds., 1981); [hereinafter Samuels, Welfare Economics]; Warren
J. Samuels, Further Limits to Chicago School Doctrine, in THE CHICAGO SCHOOL OF POLIT
ICAL EcoNOMY (hereinafter Samuels, Further Limits], supra, at 397; Solo, supra, at 48-55;
Charles K. Wtlber & Jon D. Wisman, The Chicago School: Positivism or Ideal Type, in THE
CHICAGO SCHOOL OF PoLmCAL ECONOMY, supra, at 79; see generally MERCURO &
MEDEMA, supra (describing the various schools of legal-economic thought). Foundational

w.
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Both Maureen O'Rourke and Tom W. Bell see contract as pre
sumptively more efficient than copyright at promoting the dissemi
nation of creative works. Just as the Lochner-era Court reasoned
that private ordering would benefit workers by leaving them free to
bargain for the employment terms of their choice,37 O'Rourke and
Bell argue that the shift to a contract-based "usage rights" regime
will benefit information consumers by increasing their access to dig
ital works and reducing the costs of such access. O'Rourke suggests
that these savings will accrue as the result of price discrimination;
content owners will charge private individuals lower rates in ex
change for subjecting them to use restrictions.38 She further sugcritiques by legal academics include C. Edwin Baker, The Ideology ofthe Economic Analysis
of Law, 5 PHIL. & PUB. A.FF. 3, 32-41 (1975), Mark Kelman, Consumption Theory, Produc
tion Theory, and Ideology in the Coase Theorem, 52 S. CAL. L. REv. 669 (1979), Duncan
Kennedy & Frank Michelman, Are Property and Contract Efficient?, 8 HOFSTRA L. REv. 711
(1980), and Arthur Allen Leff, Economic Analysis of Law: Some Realism About Nominal
ism, 60 VA. L. REv. 451 (1974).
Neoclassically-grounded legal scholars' strong predisposition toward the use of private
law models for intellectual property rights is evident in other areas of intellectual property
law as well. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Intellectual Property Is Still Property, 13 HARv.
J.L. & PUB. PoLY. 108 (1990); Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent
System, 20 J.L. & EcoN. 265 (1977); see generally Mark A. Lemley, Romantic Authorship and
the Rhetoric of Property, 75 TEXAS L. REv. 873, 896-98 (1997) (reviewing JAMES BoYLE,
SHAMANS, SOFTWARE, AND SPLEENS: LAW AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE INFORMATION
SOCIETY (1996)) ("The rise of property rhetoric in intellectual property cases is closely iden
tified . . . with a particular economic view of property rights."). As Part II discusses - and as
the discussion of Lochner-era beliefs about "class" legislation, see supra text accompanying
notes 18-23, also suggests - the convergence of neoclassical "law and economics" and
Lockean social contract theory is no coincidence; despite its claims to quasi-scientific neutral
ity, the neoclassically-grounded economic approach to copyright law practiced by the cyber
economists is firmly rooted in a particular ideology of social ordering. See also Hadfield,
supra note 26, at 41-45 (observing that one school of economic thought about copyright
"tracks the complete property aspect of the natural rights rationale"); Neil Weinstock
Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J. 283, 310 n.109 (1996) (not
ing the convergence between economic and natural rights-based justifications for copyright);
see generally Baker, supra, at 33 (discussing the convergence of utilitarian and libertarian
justifications for market ordering); H.H. Liebhafsky, Price Theory as Jurisprudence: Law and
Economics, Chicago Style, in THE CHICAGO SCHOOL OF PoLmCAL EcoNOMY, supra, at 237,
239-40 ("The Chicago 'price theory as jurisprudence' approach is a curious mixture, not a
compound, of particles of logical positivist methodology suspended randomly in a mythical or
secular natural law philosophy."); Solo, supra, at 42-47, 45 ("[T]he economist acts the part of
the pure scientist, but he plays the role of a moral philosopher. His value judgments are not
purged, but hidden.").
As used in this Article, "neoclassical," "neoclassicist," and "neoclassically-grounded" en
compass economic approaches based on offshoots of neoclassical theory, including "neoinsti
tutional" economics, see infra note 50, and neoclassical market theory as modified by the
Hayekian model of dynamic competition, see, e.g., Linda A. Schwarzstein, An Austrian
Economic View of Legal Process, 55 Omo ST. L.J. 1049 (1994).
37. See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 52-53 (1905); Adkins v. Children's Hosp.,
261 U.S. 525, 545-46 (1923).
38. See O'Rourke, Copyright Preemption, supra note 5, at 62, 70-71; cf William W. Fisher
III, Property and Contract on the Internet, 74 Cm.-KENT L. REv. (forthcoming 1998) (demon
strating how price discrimination can allow copyright owners to increase their overall profits
while charging discount prices to certain consumers); Michael J. Meurer, Price Discrimina-
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particularly when copyright protection is thin or

unavailable, the option of using contract to recoup initial invest
ment in information products may be the decisive factor in ensuring
that a work is produced and placed on the market.39
Taking a different approach, Bell attempts to show that the fair
use exception to the exclusive rights afforded by copyright is more
expensive, and therefore inefficient, than consumers realize. He ar
gues that information is never truly free; rather, a would-be user of
copyrighted material must incur search costs to find material, ex
change costs
costs

if she

if

she decides a license is necessary, and uncertainty

decides it is not. Digital networks and CMS technolo

gies minimize the first two categories of costs and eliminate the last;
the result, Bell contends, is better for everyone.40 As he puts it,
"[a]lthough consumers might have to pay fees that the fair use de
fense would excuse in other media, they would in return gain better
access to better information."41

He further argues that the in

creased value realized by copyright owners as a result of usage fees
tion, Personal Use and Piracy: Copyright Protection of Digital Works, 45 BUFF. L. REV. 845
(1997) (same).
39. See O'Rourke, Copyright Preemption, supra note 5, at 79 (describing the "freedom of
contract" approach to copyright preemption issues); id. at 81-91 (endorsing a predominantly
market-based solution to the copyright preemption problem). Copyright protection for a
work is described as "thin" when the work consists primarily of uncopyrightable elements
such as facts, ideas, and methods of operation, which competitors are free to copy. See 17
U.S.C. §102(b) (1994); Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349-50
(1991).
40. See Bell, supra note 5, at 580-81, 585-88. As Bradford DeLong and Michael
Froomkin demonstrate, in the current digital environment the assumption that digital net
works will invariably reduce search and exchange costs is highly problematic. See J. Bradford
DeLong & A. Michael Froomkin, The Next Economy?, in INTERNET PUBLISHING AND BE
YOND: THE ECONOMICS OF DIGITAL INFORMATION AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
(Deborah Hurley et al. eds., forthcoming 1998) (last modified Apr. 11, 1997) (available at
<http://www.law.miami.edu/-froomkin/articles/newecon.htm>); see also Merges, The End of
Friction?, supra note 5, at 116 (characterizing the assumption of lowered transaction costs as
an "oversimplification"); Dan L. Burk, Muddy Rules for Cyberspace 18-20 (1997) (unpub
lished manuscript, on file with author); infra text accompanying note 148. However, the
Digital Object Identifier (DOI) project, if successful, may reduce search costs substantially
for many creative and informational works. The project, begun in 1994 by the Association of
American Publishers to design and implement a system for assigning unique digital identifi
ers to digital works and maintaining a centralized database to serve as a locator, is currently
in the startup stage. See Bill Rosenblatt, The Digital Object Identifier: Solving the Dilemma
of Copyright Protection Online, 3 J. ELECTRONIC PUBLISHING (Dec. 1997) <http://www.press.
umich.edu/jep/03-02/doi.html>; Digital Object Identifier Foundation, Digital Object Identifier
System (visited Nov. 4, 1998) <http://www.doi.org>. The DOI technology is designed to oper
ate at the publisher's desired level of granularity; sections or components of works may each
have their own unique identifier if the publisher chooses. See Paula Berinstein, DOI: A New
Identifier for Digital Content (visited Oct. 10, 1998) <http://www.infotoday.com/searcher/jan/
story4.html>.
41. Bell,

supra note 5, at 561.
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will

be passed on to consumers as publishers compete to market
their products.4 2
Trotter Hardy takes the arguments made by O'Rourke and Bell
even farther. While both Bell and O'Rourke would retain copy

right as a source of default legal rules,43 Hardy argues that (at least
in cyberspace) copyright should be abandoned altogether in favor
of strong, undivided property entitlements.44 Just as the Lochner
era Court reasoned that minimum wage laws "amount[ ] to a com
pulsory exaction from the employer,"45 Hardy believes that the
public law of copyright imposes unnecessary transaction costs and
uncompensated positive externalities on copyright owners, thereby
undermining incentives to produce creative works.46 Drawing on
the work of Harold Demsetz and Robert Ellickson, Hardy argues
that the system of public entitlements established by current copy
right law may be conceived as a form of common ownership.47 Be
cause the new rights management technologies make it relatively
inexpensive to set and police the boundaries of digital intellectual
property, and because the ongoing public process of copyright law
making is so cumbersome and costly, he asserts that pure private
ownership would be a more efficient method of managing our cul
ture's creative resources.48
Robert Merges's work attempts to bridge the no-man's-land
between neoclassically-grounded cybereconomists like Hardy or
Bell, on the one hand, and copyright scholars who prefer a public
law approach (those who, for example, see a role for fair use be
yond market failure) on the other.49 Merges analyzes private or42. See id. at 588-89.
43. But see id., at 615-17 (suggesting that copyright owners who choose to contract
around these default rules could be required to forego copyright remedies in the event of
breach).
44. See Hardy, supra note 5. Elsewhere, Hardy has argued that strong entitlements are
what the framers of the Constitution envisioned. See I.Trotter Hardy, Contracts, Copyright
and Preemption in a Digital World, 1 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 2, 'll 37 (1995) <http://www.urich.
edu/-jolt/vlil/hardy.html>. As discussed infra note 154, I disagree with his interpretation.

45. See Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 557 (1923).
46. See Hardy, supra note 5, at 254-58; I. Trotter Hardy, The Proper Legal Regime for
"Cyberspace, " 55 U. Prrr. L. REv. 993, 1025-26 (1994) [hereinafter Hardy, Proper Legal
Regime].
47. See Hardy, supra note 5, at 252-54 (citing Harold Demsetz, Toward A Theory ofProp
erty Rights, 57 AM. EcoN. REv. 347, 347-48 (1967), and Robert C. Ellickson, Property in
Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315, 1348-49 (1993)); see also Adelstein & Peretz, supra note 29, at
212-15.
48. See Hardy, supra note 5, at 242-52, 254-60.
49. These are the scholars whom O'Rourke describes as adhering to a "public domain"
view of copyright rather than a "freedom of contract" view. See O'Rourke, Copyright Pre
emption, supra note 5, at 78-79; see also, e.g., Julie E. Cohen, Copyright and the Jurisprudence
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dering in the market for digital works at both transactional and
institutional levels. Borrowing from an offshoot of neoclassical eco
nomic theory called neoinstitutional economics,50 he posits that
copyright owners, if left to their own devices, will develop efficient
collective institutions for valuing, managing, and licensing their in
tellectual property rights.51 These voluntarily constituted "collec
tive rights organizations" will develop procedures for pricing the
rights they administer and remitting royalties to members, and will
"present a simple, coherent menu of prices and other terms to
licensees. "52
Merges argues that government is inherently ill-equipped to
undertake these tasks, because it has no reliable means of valuing
intellectual property, because legislated license terms are compara
tively inflexible, and because the legislative process is subject to
capture by interest groups.53 Moreover, he believes that the
licenses administered by collective rights organizations will be
"closely akin" to compulsory licenses, in that they will be available
to anyone willing to pay the required price and accept the required
terms.54 Thus, he concludes that legislated compulsory licensing of
digital information - in other words, replacement of copyright
owners' current property entitlements with liability rules - is
neither desirable nor necessary. Merges further argues that many,
ofSelf-Help, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1089 (1998); Elkin-Koren, supra note 6; Paul J. Heald,
Reviving the Rhetoric of the Public Interest: Choir Directors, Copy Machines, and New Ar
rangements of Public Domain Music, 46 DuKE L.J. 241 (1996); Kreiss, supra note 6; David
Lange, Recognizing the Public Domain, 44 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1981, at 147;
Jessica Litman, Revising Copyright Law for the Infonnation Age, 15 OR. L. REv. 19 (1996)
[hereinafter Litman, Revising Copyright Law]; Litman, supra note 6; Michael J, Madison,
"Legal-Ware": Contract and Copyright in the Digital Age, 67 FoRDHAM L. REV. (forthcom
ing 1998); Netanel, supra note 36; L. Ray Patterson, Free Speech, Copyright, and Fair Use, 40
VAND. L. REv. 1 (1987); Samuelson, supra note 9, at 134. O'Rourke's more recent work
aligns her more closely with Merges in this respect. See Maureen A. O'Rourke, Fencing
Cyberspace: Drawing Borders in a Virtual World, 82 MINN. L. REv. 609, 695-97 (1998).
50. Historians of economics have identified two "new" institutionalist schools of thought.
THRAINN EGGERTSON, ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR AND INSTITUTIONS 5-9 (1990). As
defined by Eggertson, "new institutional" theorists reject the core principles of the neoclassi
cal economic model
"stablepreferences, the rational-choice model, and equilibria" while
"neoinstitutional" theorists retain the neoclassical core. See id. at 5-6; see supra note 36; see
also MERCURO & MEDEMA, supra note 36, at 101-56 (differentiating between "institutional"
and "neoinstitutional" schools); cf. Netanel, supra note 36, at 312-13 (discussing areas of
commonality between neoclassical and "new institutional" economics, without distinguishing
among schools of institutionalist thought). Merges does not appear to recognize this distinc
tion, but cites theorists from both schools. However, his analysis of the appropriate legal
regime for rights in digital works is predominantly neoclassical in orientation. See infra text
accompanying notes 133-53.

See, e.g.,

-

See Merges, Contracting Into Liability Rules, supra note 5.
Id. at 1328.
53. See id. at 1308-17.
54. See id. at 1328.
51.

52.

-
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if not

most, contractual extensions of copyright are "relatively be
nign. "55 It follows that copyright owners ordinarily "should be free
to craft contracts as they see fit."56
·

Both Merges and O'Rourke are troubled by the vanishing role
of fair use in digital media, however. Merges's proposed solution,
viewed through the prism of Lochner, is an interesting one: He sug
gests expressly acknowledging fair use as a redistributive measure,
and legislatively exempting certain classes of users from generally
applicable market-driven rules.57 This suggestion is reminiscent of
the

Lochner

Court's "wards of the state" reasoning; it reads as

though Merges is attempting to reconcile his clear feeling that some
exception is needed with an unspoken intuition that an exception
articulated in doctrinal terms may bring down the entire market
based edifice. Far better, under the circumstances, to single out
classes of users and leave the topic of privileged uses unbroached.
Moreover, it appears that both Merges and O'Rourke would en
force contractual waivers by privileged users in most cases.58
O'Rourke, Bell, and Merges differ as to whether and when pub
lic policy might be permitted to override private contractual order
ing of rights in digital works.59 For Bell, the answer appears to be
that courts and legislators should intervene in the market only in
cases that meet the stringent common law standard of unconsciona
bility.60 O'Rourke and Merges stake out a position that is slightly
more complicated. Both believe that, in the context of the con
sumer mass market, unconscionability may inhere in particular
contract terms that are so pervasive as to amount to private legisla
tion.61 However, they would find this condition satisfied, and allow
The End of Friction?, supra note 5, at 126.
Id.
57. See id. at 134-35; see also O'Rourke, supra note 49, at 696 (approving Merges's sug

55. Merges,
56.

gestion as applied to Internet hyperlinks, and suggesting that the choice of redistributive
exceptions be informed by non-economic considerations).
58. See Merges, The End ofFriction?, supra note 5, at 126-27; O'Rourke, Copyright Pre
emption, supra note 5, at 83-87 (proposing criteria of disclosure and market-measured "rea
sonableness" for enforcement of standard form contract provisions that conflict with
copyright).
59. Hardy does not address this question.
60. See Bell, supra note 5, at 591, 607 & n.222; see infra note 75. Bell appears to reserve
judgment on whether there might be a role for public policy once the market has reached a
consensus as to the optimal type(s) of contract. See id. at 614-17.
61. See Merges, The End of Friction?, supra note 5, at 126; O'Rourke, Copyright Preemp
tion, supra note 5, at 80. Indeed, the characterization of non-negotiable and essentially uni
form mass-market license terms restricting use of intellectual property as "private
legislation" originates \vith Merges. See Robert P. Merges, Intellectual Property and the Costs
of Commercial Exchange: A Review Essay, 93 MicH. L. REv. 1570, 1611-13 (1995) (book
review) (citing Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion - Some Thoughts About Freedom
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courts to invalidate such terms, only if the copyright owner or group
of copyright owners has antitrust market power.62 In addition,
O'Rourke offers qualified support for a rule requiring conspicuous
disclosure of contract terms that diverge from copyright.63
In sum, the world envisioned by copyright owners and by the
new breed of "cybereconomists" looks a great deal like the one im
plicit in the pronouncements of the pre-New Deal Supreme Court.
Private ordering is paramount, and restrictions imposed by the pub
lic law - whether based on concerns of health and safety or those
of access and fair use - are few and narrowly cabined to avoid
concerns about impermissible wealth redistribution and distortion
of "natural" market outcomes. The difference is that the philoso
pher's "is" has become the engineer's "ought" backed up with the
prescriptive force of rationality. Judicially decreed immutable prin
ciples of social ordering have given way to assertedly objective ap
plication of economic laws to plot the optimal trajectory for legal
change. Of critical importance, then, is whether the proffered mod
els for managing rights in digital works are as comparatively effi
cient as they purport to be. I turn now to that question.
II.

THE NEW CoNCEPTUALISM

The cybereconomists present their private-law models for digital
property rights as the logical products of neutral, incontestable axi
oms. Upon closer inspection, however, the economic arguments
they assert are neither especially neutral nor particularly compel
ling. Rather, they embody a socially determined "natural law" of
the market that takes the private-law institutions of property and
contract as exogenous. Although the conceptualism of the

Lochner

era no longer dominates legal thought, the mode of economic anal
ysis practiced by the cybereconomists, and implicit in the arguments
offered by copyright owners to support strengthening their proprieof Contract, 43 CowM. L. REv. 629 (1943)). However, Merges's current approach to deter
mining when standard form contract terms fall within this category is highly restrictive. See
Merges, supra, at 1612-13; infra text accompanying notes 223-26, 260-62. For further discus
sion of the "private legislation" approach to standard form contracts generally, see infra note
79.
62. See Merges, The End of Friction?, supra note 5, at 126; O'Rourke, Drawing the
Boundary, supra note 5, at 541-55; see also O'Rourke, Copyright Preemption, supra note 5, at
82-84, 88-89 (suggesting that a mass-market license term that conflicts with copyright could
be held invalid if it is not "reasonable" given market conditions). In contrast, Bell argues
that even if a copyright owner is shown to have market power, its use of digital CMS will still
produce efficiency gains for the public. See Bell, supra note 5, at 588-89 n.142.
63. See O'Rourke, Copyright Preemption, supra note 5, at 83-87. The current trend is
against requiring such disclosure. See infra text accompanying note 87 (discussing the ap·
proach to disclosure of contract terms taken by proposed UCC Article 2B).
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tary rights, rests upon a conceptualism of a different sort. "Con
tract," "market," and "property" - the efficient building blocks of
the new social order - have talismanic significance, with the result
that private-law forms of regulation are advocated absent any proof
that they would produce the best regime, or even a good one, for
disseminating information and promoting ongoing creative
progress.64
This Part examines the economic arguments for a private-law
approach to digital intellectual property, and finds them unconvinc
ing. Section II.A scrutinizes the cybereconomists' claims about the
presumptive efficiency of contract as a vehicle for allocating rights
in digital works. It concludes that the existing consumer mass mar
ket fails to satisfy the cybereconomists' own criteria for efficiency,
and that they have not provided us with any meaningful way of
comparing the existing, demonstrably imperfect market with the
concededly imperfect legislative process.

Section II.B examines

their arguments about the importance of private-law property rights
and rules, and concludes that they fail to prove that strong property
rights will maximize digital works' value to society. To the contrary,
evaluation of the cybereconomists' arguments about value max
imization in the context of creative and informational works sug
gests that a limited-entitlements regime is likely to be more
effective.
A.

Constructing Consent

The cybereconomists' belief in the superiority of contract for al
locating usage rights in digital works rests on two points. First, they
argue that granting more control to the purveyors of digital works
will make creative and informational works more accessible in the
long run (which, it is assumed, will result in more progress) as the
natural result of competition in the consumer market.65 Second,
they assert that the legislative process is comparatively unsuited to
64. Cf. MARGARET JANE RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES 31-34 (1996) (suggesting
that conceptualism about "property" leads both logically and rhetorically toward acceptance
of universal co=odification); Pierre Schlag, An Appreciative Comment on Coase's The
Problem of Social Cost: A View from the Left, 1986 Wis. L. REv. 919, 933-45 (arguing that
the "law and econoinics" movement has adapted Coase's vocabulary and analytical tools to
serve it� own normative and political ends).
65. See Bell, supra note 5, at 587-90, 601-08; Hardy, supra note 5, at 236-60; Merges,
Contracting into Liability Rules, supra note 5, at 1328; O'Rourke, Copyright Preemption,
supra note 5, at 81-87; see also Merges, The End of Friction?, supra note 5, at 120-28; see
generally Lemley, supra note 6, at 1044-47 (delineating Chicago school argument that the
market will promote creative progress by allocating improvement rights to those who value
them most highly); Netanel, supra note 36, at 321-24 {describing neoclassically-oriented theo
rists' cominitment to "legal marginalism").
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accomplish these ends because it is coercive and controlled by spe
cial interests.66 Neither of these points survives more thorough
scrutiny. Even assuming that a market based on voluntary, in
formed bargaining over rights in digital works would work as the
cybereconomists say it would,67 the conditions for such bargaining
do not exist in the market we have. As a result, it is impossible to
say with certainty that the market would be better at promoting
access and progress than the existing system of public ordering via
the legislative process.
Two fundamental requirements of the neoclassical model of so
cial ordering through private exchange are knowledge of contract
terms and meaningful (i.e., voluntary and fully informed) assent.68
Both are necessary (though not sufficient) requirements for an "un
regulated" market to reach the efficient equilibrium point; the ab
sence of either or both may signal a market failure justifying some
form of adjustment.69 Under the proposed digital CMS regime,
however, consumer transactions relating to digital works will bear
little resemblance to the paradigmatic bargained-for exchange. In
stead, much like the typical software purchase today, they will be
governed by standard form "licenses" that include provisions re
garding permissible and impermissible uses.70 Digital CMS enable
66. See Bell, supra note 5, at 607-08; Hardy, supra note 5, at 254-58; Merges, Contracting
Into Liability Rules, supra note 5, at 1308-17.
67. This is an extremely charitable assumption. As discussed further in section II.B, infra,
there is no particular reason to believe that creative ability will always correlate with ability
to pay market price for improvement rights, or that owners will be equally willing to license
all types of improvements. See also Lemley, supra note 6, at 1048-61; Merges, Are You Mak·
ing Fun ofMe?, supra note 28 (acknowledging that market approach may not work well for
parodies).
68. See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 25, at 186-93.
69. See id.; Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View ofthe Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REv. 1089, 1111 (1972); Elkin-Koren,
supra note 6, at 108; see also supra note 25 (defining "market failure"). Other requirements
include rational, utility-maximizing parties, zero transaction costs, perfect information, and a
sufficiently large number of buyers and sellers that no party has market power. See CooTER
& ULEN, supra note 25, at 186-93; see also supra note 36.
70. See, e.g., Clark, supra note 5, at 99; NII WHITE PAPER, supra note 9, at 51, 58-59; see
also O'Rourke, Drawing the Boundary, supra note 5, at 487-95 (discussing typical software
license terms); David A. Rice, Public Goods, Private Contract Prohibitions and Public Policy:
Federal Preemption of Software License Provisions Against Reverse Engineering, 53 U. P1rr.
L. REv. 543, 552-67 (1992) (hereinafter Rice, Public Goods] (same).
The application of "license" terminology to digital works is contested. In the nondigital
world, the purchaser of a book does not assume ongoing contractual obligations; quite the
opposite. Under copyright law, the initial sale of a copy embodying the copyrighted work
exhausts the owner's rights to control the use or disposition of that copy. See 11 U.S.C.
§109(a) (1994); Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339, 349-51 (1907). To avoid the first
sale doctrine, software developers have attempted to characterize the initial transaction as a
license of usage rights rather than a sale. See, e.g., O'Rourke, Drawing the Boundary, supra
note 5, at 487-95; Rice, Public Goods, supra, at 552-67; David A. Rice, Digital Information as
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the use of such "click-through" contracts to require acceptance of
usage restrictions for any type of work that is made available on
line.71 A critical question is whether this sort of transaction, in ag
gregate, can or will produce the near-perfect, self-equilibrating
market that, for the neoclassically-grounded economist, constitutes
the pinnacle of social ordering. Merges does not address this ques
tion; O'Rourke, Bell, and Hardy use specious logic to evade it.
One does not need to be a neoclassical economist to understand
that requiring individual negotiation of every term in a consumer
contract would be prohibitively expensive. This is precisely the sort
of problem that the Uniform Commercial Code was created to ad
dress.72 It does so by recognizing two categories of terms roughly, more and less important ones - and by setting higher
standards for disclosure of more important, or "material," terms.73
Both types of terms are, however, presumptively enforceable

if the

applicable disclosure standards were met.74 The UCC does author
ize refusal to enforce terms that are unconscionable, but the thresh
old for unconscionability is high.75 Although some courts and
Property and Product: U.C.C. Article 2B, 22 U. DAYTON L. REv. 621, 624-26, 632-34 (1997)
[hereinafter Rice, Digital Infonnation]. Taking their cue from software developers, major
copyright owners' associations and developers of digital CMS have adopted licensing termi
nology as the frame of reference for transactions in digital works. See, e.g., Clark, supra note
5, at 99; Gervais, From Rights Trading to Electronic Publishing, supra note 24; see also
Madison, supra note 49 (manuscript at 36-60) (describing the increasing prevalence of
"shrinkwrap" licensing practices, both among software developers and among publishers of
more traditional works). Most courts, however, have preferred to apply a functional test that
asks whether the transaction looks like a one-time sale of a copy, despite assertions that one
party intended it to create an ongoing relationship. See, e.g., Step-Saver Data Sys., Inc. v.
Wyse Techs., 939 F.2d 91, 98-100 (3d Cir. 1991); Arizona Retail Sys. v. Software Link, Inc.,
831 F. Supp. 759, 762-66 (D. Ariz. 1993); Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property and Shrink
wrap Licenses, 68 S. CAL. L. REv. 1239, 1244 n.23 (1995) (collecting cases). But see ProCD,
Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996) (Easterbrook, J.) (holding shrinkwrap license
terms that restricted ongoing use of product enforceable); Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105
F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997) (Easterbrook, J.) (same). The forthcoming Article 2B of the Uni
form Commercial Code rejects the majority viewpoint and adopts Judge Easterbrook's, treat
ing most shrinkwrap license terms as enforceable restrictions that render the consumer's use
subject to the copyright owner's ongoing control. See U.C.C. ART. 2B: LICENSES (Annual
Meeting Draft July 1998), supra note 24, at Preface, Pt. 2: Basic Themes; Rice, Digital Infor
mation, supra, at 629-31, 634-36.
71. See supra text accompanying notes 24-32.
72. See Michael M. Greenfield, The Role ofAssent in Article 2 and Article 9, 75 WASH. U.
L.Q. 289, 290-93, 302-04 (1997); John E. Murray, Jr., The Revision of Article 2: Romancing
the Prism, 35 WM . & MARY L. REv. 1447, 1453-56 (1994).
73. See U.C.C.§
§2-204, 2-207, 2-305 to -310, 2-314, 2-316 (1989).
74. See U.C.C.§2-316(2), (3)(a).
75. See U.C.C. §2-302 & cmt. 1 ("The principle is one of the prevention of oppression
and unfair surprise, and not of disturbance of allocation of risks because of superior bargain
ing power." (citation omitted)); see, e.g., Siemens Credit Corp. v. Newlands, 905 F. Supp. 757,
765 (N.D. Cal. 1994) ("Even if a contract term fails the test of procedural unconscionability,
an 'unbargained for' term will only be denied enforcement if it is also substantively unreason
able."); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRAcrs§208 cmt. b (characterizing uncon-
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commentators have expressed doubt as to whether Article

2

of the

current UCC applies to computer software sales, a new Article

2B

is being drafted to cover transactions in intellectual property and
other intangibles.76 Thus, it seems likely that consumer transactions
in digital works eventually

will

be governed by uniform provisions

roughly analogous to those governing sales of goods.77 For pur
poses of this discussion, the important thing to understand about
the UCC is that it represents a regulatory solution to a perceived
market failure, adopted in recognition that high transaction costs
foreclosed the kind of particularized assent that both the law and
neoclassical precepts required for a contract term to be enforcea
ble.78 The resulting market may or may not function efficiently as
compared with other possible regimes, but it does not function acscionable contract terms to be such "as no man in his senses and not under delusion would
make on the one hand, and as no honest and fair man would accept on the other") (quoting
Hume v. United States, 132 U.S. 406 (1889)).
76. See, e.g., NMP Corp. v. Parametric Tech. Corp., 958 F. Supp. 1536, 1542 (N.D. Okla.
1997); Architectronics, Inc. v. Control Sys., Inc., 935 F. Supp. 425, 432 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); In re
Bedford Computer Corp., 62 B.R. 555, 566-67 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1986); Bonna Lynn Horovitz,
Note, Computer Software as a Good Under the Uniform Commercial Code: Taking a Byte 011t
ofthe Intangibility Myth, 65 B.U. L. REv. 129 (1985). Many other courts have simply applied
Article 2 to computer software cases. See sources cited s11pra note 70.
For the most recent draft of Article 2B, see <http://www.law.upenn.edu/library/ulc/
ulc.htm>.
77. The current draft of Article 2B is much less consumer-friendly than Article 2. See
infra text accompanying note 87; see also Cohen, s11pra note 49, at 1096-1118; Memorandum
from Profs. Jean Braucher and Peter Linzer to Members, American Law Institute (May 5,
1998) (available at <http://www.ali.org/ali/braucher.htm>) [hereinafter Braucher/Linzer
Memorandum]. It is not entirely clear whether the current draft of Article 2B is the version
that will be adopted. Originally, the draft was scheduled for a final vote by the National
Council of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) at the NCCUSL's July 1998
annual meeting. However, the American Law Institute (ALI), which has the power of final
approval, expressed serious reservations, as did many other commentators. See, e.g., Letter
from Prof. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Director, ALI Ad Hoc Committee on Article 2B, to
Gene N. Lebrun, President, NCCUSL, and Charles Alan Wright, President, ALI (Mar. 26,
1998) (available at <http://www.2bguide.com/docs/ghmar98.html>); Braucher/Linzer Memo
randum, supra; David Nimmer et al., The Metamorphosis of Contract Into Expand, 81 CALIF.
L. REv. 17 (1999); Pamela Samuelson, Does Information Really Have to Be Licensed?, 41
CoMM. ACM 15 (Sept. 1998) <http://sims.berkeley.edu/-pam/papers/acm_2B.html>. In re
sponse to the criticism, the NCCU SL took the unusual step of agreeing to consider additional
comments and proposals submitted within three months after the annual meeting. The draft
ing committee will meet again in November 1998 to consider whether additional revisions are
warranted, and final votes by the NCCUSL and the ALI have been postponed until mid1999. See American Law Institute, Schedule of Adoption and Drafting Committee Meetings
(visited Nov. 4, 1998) <http://www.2bguide.com/schedule.html>. In addition, because much
of the impetus for the current version of Article 2B has come from the computer software
industry, some representatives of other copyright industries have suggested that the scope of
Article 2B be narrowed to cover only computer software and electronic information prod
ucts. See Letter from Simon Barsky, Senior Vice President & General Counsel, Motion Pic
ture Association, to Carlyle Ring, Jr., Chair, Article 2B Drafting Committee (Apr. 29, 1998)
(available at <http://www.Softwarelndustry.org/issues/guide/docs/conn0429.html>). As of
this writing, the NCCUSL's response to this suggestion is unknown.
78. See Greenfield, supra note 72, at 291-92, 302-14.
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cording to the pure neoclassical model, and its constituent transac
tions cannot plausibly be described as fundamentally private.79
How does copyright law interact with this state-based regulatory
regime? Section 301 of the Copyright Act preempts state law rights
that are "equivalent" to any of the exclusive rights afforded by
copyright.so Although Congress's exact intent regarding section
30l's effect on contract rights is uncertain, it seems clear that Con
gress did not intend the Copyright Act to displace state contract law
generally.81 It seems equally certain, however, that Congress did
not intend to allow the states to establish alternative, universally
applicable regimes of property-like protection for works falling
within the subject matter of copyright.82 Moreover, even if Con79. Indeed, this is true of any socially-enforced regime of contract law. See Jean
Braucher, Contract Versus Contractarianism: The Regulatory Role of Contract Law, 47
WASH. & LEE L. REv. 697 (1990). It is particularly true of mass-market, standard form
contracts, however. Scholars within the fields of both law and economics have characterized
the standard form contracts that the UCC enables as "private legislation" - de facto legisla
tion produced by private firms pursuant to a delegation of authority from the state, via the
legal rules governing the formation and enforceability of such contracts. See Victor P.
Goldberg, Institutional Change and the Quasi-Invisible Hand, 17 J.L. & EcoN. 461, 468 n.15,
484-91 (1974); Friedrich Kessler, Contracts ofAdhesion - Some Thoughts About Freedom of
Contract, 43 CoLUM. L. REv. 629 (1943); W. David Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and
Democratic Control of Law-Making Power, 84 HARv. L. REv. 529, 538-42 (1971); see also
Samuels, Further Limits, supra note 36, at 397, 438-39. Goldberg observes that such contracts
also can be characterized - perhaps more palatably for those of a neoclassical bent - as the
result of investments in the political/legislative arena by firms, "for the purpose of keeping
certain activities (that is, those covered by standard form contracts) in the private market
arena." Goldberg, supra, at 484 n.49; see also infra text accompanying notes 253-70 (consid
ering the interplay between private interests and legal institutions in determining the rules
that govern mass-market contracts). Merges recognizes the private legislation dynamic, but
contends that contract terms do not attain this status unless their purveyor has market power.
See Merges, supra note 61, at 1612-13; Merges, The End of Friction?, supra note 5, at 126;
supra note 61. As discussed infra text accompanying notes 253-59, however, the private legis
lation dynamic does not require market power.
80. See 17 U.S.C. §301(a) (1994).
81. See 17 U.S.C. §30l(b); H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 132 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5747-48; Lemley, supra note 70, at 1282; Rice, Public Goods, supra note
70, at 602-04.
82. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 130-32, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5745-48;
Dennis S. Karjala, Federal Preemption of Shrinkwrap and On-Line Licenses, 22 U. DAYTON
L. REv. 511, 524, 527-28, 537-39 (1997); Lemley, supra note 70, at 1282-83; Rice, Public
Goods, supra note 70, at 603, 607. For this reason, a work need not actually be copyrightable
to fall \vithin the subject matter of copyright for purposes of§301, as long as it is a type of
work to which copyright might apply. If the Copyright Act withholds protection from such
works, then states may not grant them copyright-like protection. See, e.g., National Basket
ball Assn. v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841 (2d Cir. 1997); ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d
1447 (7th Cir. 1996).
The question whether the Copyright Act preempts certain provisions in licenses for digi
tal works is really two questions. The first question, discussed in the text, is whether state
contract law can be considered to establish a regime of "equivalent" rights for purposes of
§301. The second question - whether the Copyright Act preempts state laws other than
those covered by§301 - is more complicated. Compare Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514
U.S. 280, 288 (1995) ("The fact that an express definition of the pre-emptive reach of a stat
ute 'implies' . . . that Congress did not intend to pre-empt other matters does not mean that
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gress did so intend, the intellectual property clause of the Constitu
tion arguably would exert independent preemptive force.83
Relying on this distinction between particular contracts and
universally-applicable proprietary regimes, courts and commenta
tors attempting to decide whether copyright law preempts inconsis
tent contract terms h ave characterized legitimate contract
restrictions as involving an "extra element" of breach of promise or
a "special relationship" between copyright owner and consumer
that is distinct from the copyright owner's rights against the world.84
the express clause entirely forecloses any possibility of implied pre-emption.") with Cipollone
v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 517 (1992) ("When Congress has considered the issue of
pre-emption and has included in the enacted legislation a provision explicitly addressing that
issue, and when that provision provides a 'reliable indicium of congressional intent with re
spect to state authority,' . . . 'there is no need to infer congressional intent to pre-empt state
laws from the substantive provisions' of the legislation.") (quoting Malone v. White Motor
Corp., 435 U.S. 497, 505 (1978)). One court has given the Copyright Act broader preemptive
scope, but \vithout discussing whether § 301 precludes that result (and, indeed, without dis
cussing § 301 at all) . See Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software, Ltd., 847 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1988)
(finding preemption of a standard form contract provision prohibiting reverse engineering).
Myrick's rebuttable presumption is easily defeated here. Since it is clear that when Congress
enacted § 301, it did not consider the wholesale displacement of copyright via self-enforcing,
standard form digital contract terms, § 301 should not operate to bar implied preemption of
such contracts. See Cohen, supra note 49, at 1129. Ultimately, however, the implied pre·
emption inquiry does not matter much, because the intellectual property clause of the Con·
stitution may require preemption even if the Copyright Act does not. See infra note 83.
83. See U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see Feist Pubs., Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S.
340, 349-50 (1991) (holding that denial of copyright protection for facts is constitutionally
compelled because facts must remain in the public domain); Cohen, supra note 49, at 113033; Wendy J. Gordon, On Owning Information: Intellectual Property and the Restittltionary
Impulse, 78 VA. L. REv. 149, 155 n.22 (1992); David L. Lange, The Intellectllal Property

Clause in Trademark Law: An Appreciation of 1ivo Recent Essays and Some Thoughts About
Why We Ought To Care, 59 L. & CoNTEMP. PROBs. 213, 225-44 (1996); David L. Lange,
Copyright and the Constitution in the Age of Intellectual Property, 1 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 119
(1993); Karjala, supra note 82, at 533-34, 539-41; L. Ray Patterson, Copyright Overextended:
A Preliminary Inquiry Into the Need for a Federal Statute of Unfair Competition, 17 U. DAY·
TON L. REv. 385, 394-96 (1992); Malla Pollack, Unconstitutional Incontestability? The Inter
section of the Intellectllal Property and Commerce Clauses of the Constitution: Beyond a
Critique of Shakespeare Co. v. Silstar Corp., 18 SEATTLE U. L. REv. 259 (1995); Marci A.
Hamilton, The Dormant Copyright Clause (1998) (unpublished manuscript, on file with au
thor); cf. O'Rourke, Copyright Preemption, supra note 5, at 73 n.108 (expressing agnosticism
on the question "what the constitutional inquiry would add to § 301"); O'Rourke, supra note
49, at 696-97 (suggesting that constitutional considerations require preemption of standard
form "license" terms barring World Wide Web linking).
84. See ProCD, Inc., 86 F.3d at 1454; O'Rourke, Copyright Preemption, supra note 5, at
76-77; O'Rourke, Drawing the Boundary, supra note 5, at 519-23; see also National Basketball
Assn., 105 F.3d at 848-53 (applying the "extra element" test to a state law misappropriation
claim and discussing collected authorities on the scope of § 301 preemption). But see Rice,
Public Goods, supra note 70, at 615 ("The measure of equivalence is not literal. Claim ele·
ments additional to those of copyright infringement do not prevent preemption unless . . . the
extra elements make the state claim qualitatively different.").
In addition, the Fourth Circuit has held that an attempted contractual extension of the
term of copyright constitutes misuse and renders the copyright (as opposed to the contract
term) unenforceable. See Lasercomb America, Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970 (4th Cir. 1990);
see also DSC Communications Corp. v. DGI Techs., Inc., 81 F.3d 597, 601 (5th Cir. 1996)
(suggesting that on remand, infringement defendant might show that plaintiff's contract term
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Recently, the Seventh Circuit interpreted this test in a way that in
dicates its support for a regime based primarily on market ordering.
It held that a mass-market shrinkwrap license met the requirements
of voluntary assent and non-universality because the defendant
consumer remained free to return the product and seek better
terms elsewhere, and because the license would not bind an individ
ual who found a copy of the work lying in the street.85 As justifica
tion for market ordering, however, the court's reasoning is
unconvincing. Works protected by digital CMS cannot be copied or
otherwise accessed by unauthorized third parties, so it is irrelevant
that the licenses would not bind them if they did gain access. 86 And
the opportunity to engage in comparison shopping, so important to
the court in theory, does not seem particularly attractive if one must
purchase each product to learn the terms governing its use. Proeffectively prohibiting reverse engineering of unpatented microprocessor cards amounted to
copyright misuse). Tue Lasercomb court did not discuss preemption, and the connection
between preemption and misuse remains largely unexplored in the legal literature. David
Rice notes the overlap and suggests that under Lasercomb, a finding of preemption under
§301 might lead to complete unenforceability of the copyright. Rice, Public Goods, supra
note 70, at 550-51; see also Merges, The End of Friction?, supra note 5, at 124-25 (noting
potential nexus between the misuse and preemption doctrines). Mark Lemley argues that
the copyright misuse doctrine will be increasingly useful as a complement to preemption law,
because it allows courts to invalidate restrictive contract terms in particular cases without
having to hold the restrictions preempted in all cases. See Mark A.Lemley, Beyond Preemp
tion: The Federal Law and Policy of Intellectual Property Licensing, 87 CAL. L. REv. (forth
coming Jan. 1999).
85. See ProCD, Inc., 86 F.3d 1447 (1996).
86. See supra text accompanying notes 24-32; Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright, Common
Law, and Sui Generis Protection ofDatabases in the United States and Abroad, 66 U. CIN.L.
REv. 151, 167 (1997) [hereinafter Ginsburg, Protection of Databases]; Jane C. Ginsburg,
Copyright Without Walls?: Speculations on Literary Property in the Library of the Future, 42
REPRESENTATIONS 53, 62-63 (1993) [hereinafter Ginsburg, Copyright Without Walls?] ("[I]f
copying could be electronically tracked or prevented, no 'third parties' to the contract would
exist."); see also Cohen, supra note 9, at 181-83 (arguing that a copyright owner cannot uni
laterally create a "special relationship" with the entire world); Karjala, supra note 82, at 52931 (arguing that mass-market standard form contracts do not contain the "extra element" of
bargaining).
Under proposed Article 2B of the U C C, this distinction vanishes entirely, because license
restrictions would bind third parties. See U. C.C.ART. 2B: LICENSES (Annual Meeting Draft
July 1998), supra note 24,§2B-507; cf id. at Preface, p. 9 (explaining drafters' decision not to
carry over Article 2's provision for the unenforceability of property rights against a bona fide
purchaser for value, see U.C.C.§2-403 (1995), on the ground that such a provision would be
inconsistent with licensors' federal intellectual property rights). As Jane Ginsburg notes, this
approach effectively converts a contract right into a property right. See Ginsburg, Protection
of Databases, supra, at 167. She notes, however, that contract and copyright remedies may
differ, and argues that because contractual protection supplies incentive to invest in the crea
tion of noncopyrightable information, mass-market contract terms inconsistent with copy
right limitations should not be preempted \vithout further policy analysis. See id. at 167-68.
In contrast, Merges argues that extending standard form contract terms to third parties is
inappropriate, but that property rules should fill the resulting gap in protection. See Merges,
The End of Friction?, supra note 5, at 120-21 (arguing that the concept of privity, while
"stretch[ed]" in the mass-market context, should retain some meaning).

488

Michigan Law Review

posed UCC Article

2B

[Vol. 97:462

would validate for all digital publishers the

current practice of software publishers not to disclose their terms
prior to purchase, creating obvious practical difficulties for even the
most determined comparison shoppers.87 Moreover, there is a sub
stantial difference between shopping for price - something that
many consumers of mass-marketed products do, and do well - and
shopping for terms, which is much more difficult.88
Unlike the Seventh Circuit, O'Rourke recognizes that there is a
real question whether the circumstances surrounding a standard
form, mass-market contract justify the inference of the "extra ele
ment" that is needed to escape preemption.89 Her answer to this
question, however, is market-conceptualism as high art.

She ar

gues, first, that an inference of voluntariness is justified if the mar
ket is functioning efficiently, forgetting that the UCC was adopted
to allow the market to function in the absence of such particular
ized knowledge and assent.90 As to universality, she suggests that a
standard form contract restriction is not universal, or quasi87.

See U.C.C. ART. 2B:

LICENSES (Annual Meeting Draft July 1998),

supra note 24,

§
§2B-111, -112(b)-(c) & cmts. 2, 5; Braucher/Linzer Memorandum, supra note 77; Cem
Kaner,

Restricting Competition in the Software Industry: Impact of the Pending Revisions to
the Uniform Commercial Code 5 (last modified Nov. 11, 1997) <http://www.badsoftware.com/
nader.htm>; cf. DeLong & Froomkin, supra note 40 (documenting finding that many online
vendors of music compact discs withhold price information from comparison shoppers);
Burk, supra note 40, at 19 (discussing implications of the DeLong and Froomkin study for
arguments that digital co=erce will be near-costless). Instead, the proposed draft would
afford consumers who enter into mass-market licenses a limited rescission right after
purchase but before use. See U.C.C. ART. 2B: LICENSES (Annual Meeting Draft July 1998),
supra note 24,§2B-112(b)-(c) & cmts. 2, 5.
88. Why will not competition among producers protect the contract term taker as well?
. . . [T]he cost of acquiring and processing information on contract terms is much greater
than for price; unless the firm intentionally makes the particular term an important sell
ing point - as is sometimes the case with the length or inclusiveness of the warranty few, if any, customers will perceive the existence of variations in terms. Any movement
toward contractual equilibrium due to the aggressive bargain-seeking of a few customers
will be slow indeed . . . .
Goldberg, supra note 79, at 485; see also Slawson, supra note 79, at 530-31, 540-41. The
neoclassical economist might respond that this simply proves that most consumers do not
care enough about the terms in question to bother with additional research, but this assumes
the very point in dispute. The question of consumer perceptions is further complicated by
the fact that producers may not routinely enforce particular terms that consumers might find
oppressive. See Goldberg, supra note 79, at 485 n.53. Digital rights management technolo
gies change this aspect of the equation, but it is not clear whether we may expect to see
different consumer behavior as a result. As Goldberg observes, efforts to model the standard
form contract have been hampered considerably by the fact that the neoclassical market
model simply ignores it, or assumes that the requirements for a voluntary, fully-informed
contract are in fact met. See id. at 483-84; see also Samuels, Further Limits, supra note 36, at
438-39. For an effort to model producer-consumer dynamics in mass markets for creative and
informational works more accurately, and to incorporate into the model institutional consid
erations relating to standard form contracts, see infra section IIl.A.1.
89.

See O'Rourke, Copyright Preemption, supra note 5, at 77.

90. See id. at 83-87 (arguing that a market may be "efficient" even
uninformed); see also Bell, supra note 5, at 601-08.

if most parties are
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legislative, unless it is "unreasonable" to think that the parties
would have bargained to it-even though section 301 speaks of
rights in works, not power in markets, and even though it is inco
herent to speak of reasonable bargains without voluntariness.9 1
Use of the neoclassical conception of contract to bootstrap volunta
riness and "reasonableness" in this setting strains logic to the break
ing point.9 2 For O'Rourke, it seems, "contract" means fully
informed and voluntary as to nearly every term even when the law
stipulates that it need not mean either of those things in fact to be
enforceable. As a result, she overlooks the possibility that what is
good enough to establish enforceability under the UCC and the an
titrust laws, which are broadly concerned with maintaining func
tioning markets, may not be good enough to avoid preemption by
copyright law, which has other, more substantive concems.93 The
real question is whether a regime that makes it easier for publishers
unilaterally to impose usage restrictions that conflict with copyright
is better suited than copyright to optimize access and progress.94
O'Rourke does not say; like the

Lochner Court a century ago, she is

too busy explaining that unilaterally imposed contract terms do not
really exist.
Relying on this curiously circular presumption of voluntariness
in the mass market for digital works, Hardy and Bell contrive to
tum the tables on copyright completely. They argue that it is copy91. See O'Rourke, Copyright Preemption, supra note 5, at 83-89 (arguing that efficient i.e., competitive - markets protect even uninformed parties by equilibrating around reason
able terms); O'Rourke, Drawing the Boundary, supra note 5, at 541-55; 17 U.S.C. § 301(a)
(1994). Bell and Merges make similar arguments. See Bell, supra note 5, at 588-89 n.142;
Merges, The End of Friction?, supra note 5, at 126. As Goldberg observes, this sort of rea
soning obscures fundamental questions about consumer knowledge and desires. See
Goldberg, supra note 79, at 485; supra note 88.
The whole point of copyright is to give owners at least some market power. See, e.g.,
Elkin-Koren, supra note 6, at 98-100 (discussing the "deadweight loss" aspect of copyright
protection); Fisher, supra note 26, at 1700-04 (same); Landes & Posner, supra note 6, at 33944. Exactly how much power is an empirical question, the answer to which probably will vary
for different types of works. See infra text accompanying notes 218-26. Nonetheless, § 301's
reference to "works" matters. Recognizing the inconsistency with § 301, O'Rourke argues
that § 301 is "mechanical" and that authority to conduct a market analysis should be inferred
to avoid preemption of "many" standard form license terms that conflict with copyright. See
O'Rourke, Copyright Preemption, supra note 5, at 87-88.
92. Unless, of course, one is prepared to apply an external normative standard of "rea
sonableness" - which the neoclassical market model claims not to do. See supra note 36.
93. See Rice, Public Goods, supra note 70, at 564-65 (observing that the UCC was devel
oped "to allocate product failure and performance risks" between the parties, not to deter
mine rights in the subject matter of the contract). For this reason (as O'Rourke recognizes),
the objection that consumers do not expect to bargain over price misses the point. While one
might cheerfully accept the need to pay a standardized price for Coca-Cola, no court would
enforce a shrinkwrap contract that imposed an obligation not to reverse engineer it. See
O'Rourke, Copyright Preemption, supra note 5, at 80-81.
94. This question is considered further

infra in section III.A.
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right law that constitutes the onerous standard form contract and
market ordering that constitutes the flexible, policy-sensitive instru
ment.95 This feat of lexical legerdemain allows them to disavow
rigid boilerplate regimes that are unresponsive to individual or con
sumer desrres while simultaneously endorsing private standard
form contract regimes as the product of "empower[ed] mutually
consenting parties."96 The "market" is the realm of consent, while
the legislative process is the realm of interest-group oppression.
This approach has conceptual roots in both public choice theory
and institutional economics. Ultimately, however, neither branch
of economic theory justifies the conclusion the cybereconomists
reach. Their insistence that the market is the better forum for
achieving copyright's goals rests on no firmer basis than the

Lochner Court's instinctive distrust of attempts to alter the existing
balance of bargaining power.
The central thesis of public choice theory is that government

actions are rarely, if ever, designed solely to serve a monolithic pub
lic interest. Rather, the various outputs of the political process, in
cluding legislation, regulation, and enforcement, are shaped by the
rent-seeking efforts of powerful and well-organized constituen
cies.97 In its strongest form, public choice theory characterizes the
legislative and political processes as entirely, or almost entirely, de
fined by interest-group concerns and compromises. 98 This percep
tion underlies Hardy's description of copyright legislation and
Merges's depiction of the rate-setting process under the legislated
95. See Bell, supra note 5, at 607-08 ("Insofar as th[e fair use] doctrine represents a 'bar
gain' between copyright owners and the public - a popular fiction - it epitomizes the kind
of take-it-or-leave-it offer that foes of adhesion contracts so dislike." (footnotes omitted));
Hardy, supra note 44, 'll'll 38-39 (characterizing the Copyright Act as "specifying what are
essentially the actual quite specific terms of large classes of 'bargains' over the use of intellec
tual property"); see also O'Rourke, Copyright Preemption, supra note 5, at 78-79, 83-84 (ar
guing that an "immutable rules" approach to copyright is undesirable because "the
impersonal workings of the market" protect even uninformed parties).
96. See Bell, supra note 5, at 608.
97. See DANIEL A. FARBER
CAL lNrnODUCTION (1991).

&

PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE!

A CRITI·

98. See, e.g., THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT (James Buchanan & Gordon Tullock eds.,
1962); THE PoLmCAL EcoNOMY OF RENT-SEEKING (Charles K. Rowley et al. eds., 1988).
But see FARBER & FmcKEY, supra note 97, at 24-33, 49-60 (summarizing empirical work that
undercuts the strong public-choice hypothesis); Herbert Hovenkamp, Legislation, Well-Being
and Public Choice, 57 U. Cm. L. REv. 63, 88-89 (1990) (same); DONALD P. GREEN & IAN
SHAPIRO, PATHOLOGIES OF RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY! A CRITIQUE OF APPLICATIONS IN
PoLmCAL SCIENCE (1994) (arguing that the theory has not been empirically validated and
that most studies purporting to do so are methodologically unsound); cf. THE RATIONAL
CHOICE CONTROVERSY: ECONOMIC MODELS OF PoLmCS RECONSIDERED (Jeffrey Friedman
ed., 1995) (collecting responses to Green and Shapiro).
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compulsory license for sound recording rights.99 Nor is it entirely
inaccurate; as Jessica Litman has documented, over the past several
decades the path of copyright legislation has been defined largely
by the major copyright industries.100
As the new institutional economics would counsel, the cyber
economists compare the legislative process with the market and
market-generated collective licensing institutions, and find the mar
ket superior. Both legislative and market actions reflect the pursuit
of self-interest, but the self-interest manifested in the market is (so
the reasoning appears to go) uncomplicated by distorting interest
group effects, undiminished by administrative costs, and subject to
the market's wealth-maximizing power of correction.101 But that is
disingenuous, and far too simple. First, the comparison is misdi
rected. The legislative process may (indeed must) be imperfect, but
it does not follow that the market is always preferable. An equally
important lesson of institutional economics is that all real-world in
stitutions, including market-based ones, are imperfect, and that it is
real-world institutions that must be compared.102 As discussed
above, the market we have is not the pure neoclassical market the
cybereconomists posit. Without closer attention to the imperfec
tions present in the existing consumer mass market, even a strong
99. See Hardy, supra note 5, at 254-58; Merges, Contracting Into Liability Rules, supra
note 5, at 1306-17.
100. See Jessica Litman, Copyright Legislation and Technological Change, 68 OR. L. REv.
275 (1989) [hereinafter Litman, Copyright Legislation]; Jessica Litman, The Exclusive Right
to Read, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 29 (1994) [hereinafter Litman, The Exclusive Right];
Litman, Revising Copyright Law, supra note 49, at 19 (1996).
101. See, e.g., James M. Buchanan, Rent Seeking and Profit Seeking, in TowARD A THE
ORY OF THE RENT-SEEKING SocIETY 3, 8-9 (James M. Buchanan et al. eds., 1980);
EGGERTSON, supra note 50, at 275-77; see generally Hovenkamp, supra note 98, at 98-106
(summarizing literature).
102. See, e.g., RANDALL BARTLETI, ECONOMICS AND POWER: AN INQUIRY INTo HUMAN
RELATIONS AND MARKETS 203-06 (1989); Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L.
& EcoN. 1, 43 (1960); EGGERTSON, supra note 50; Goldberg, supra note 79, at 473-74;
Maxwell L. Steams, The Misguided Renaissance ofSocial Choice Theory, 103 YALE L.J. 1219,

1229-30 (1994). Demsetz also makes this argument. See Harold Demsetz, Information and
Efficiency: Another Viewpoint, 12 J.L. & EcoN. 1 (1969) (characterizing the comparison of
imperfect institutions against ideal alternatives as the "nirvana approach"). Gillian Hadfield
notes, however, that Demsetz did not practice what he preached, and failed to "weigh the
costs of the [private property] system against its benefits." Hadfield, supra note 26, at 43.
Instead, he presumed "the operation of a perfectly competitive market." Id. at 43-44.
It is worth noting that the litigation process that polices the market is itself also vulnera
ble to a public-choice critique. See Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify
More Intrusive Judicial Review?, 101 YALE L.J. 31, 68-71, 80-87 (1991) (arguing that public
choice analysis can be extended to the judiciary); Marc Galanter, When the Haves Come Out
Ahead, 9 L. & SoCY. REv. 95, 98-104 (1974) (arguing that litigants who are repeat players
and have the resources to do so will seek to shape the rules and the law in ways that favor
their interests).
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public-choice hypothesis does not demonstrate that the market is
the preferred forum for determining copyright policy. 103
Second, and more important, the comparison is incomplete.
Market ordering and government oversight are complementary, not
mutually exclusive, choices. Market ordering presupposes some ex
ante distribution of entitlements.1 04 The cybereconomists take ex
isting entitlements as given, and do not inquire as to the welfare
effects of alternative entitlement structures. For example, we might
consider formalizing the public's fair use entitlements - an ap
proach that, ironically, is suggested by Hardy's "divided ownership"
model.105 This is a choice that would matter; it may well be that in
the perfect, costless world, the market for digital works would reach
the same equilibrium point regardless of initial entitlements, but we
do not live in such a world, and the equilibrium that is reached will
depend on where we start out.106 A regime in which the public has
property-like entitlements in certain uses of creative and informa103. Cf. Hovenkamp, supra note 98, at 99 ("Much of the public choice literature is filled
with anecdotal evidence of great legislative failures, such as the Smoot-Hawley Tariff. But
such failures are no different, and probably no more frequent, than the economic market's
Edsels . . . ."); id. at 100 ("(P]olitical failure (substantial divergence between private gain and
social gain) has never been shown to be more widespread in political markets than market
failure (substantial divergence between private gain and social gain) in economic markets.");
Mark Kelman, On Democracy-Bashing: A Skeptical Look at the Theoretical and "Empirical"
Practice of the Public Choice Movement, 74 VA. L. REv. 199, 232-34 (1988) (arguing that
claimed inefficiencies generated by legislation must be compared "with the inefficiencies gen
erated by an inegalitarian nonredistributive regime"); Stearns, supra note 102, at 1240-45
(demonstrating that in some circumstances, legislatures can efficiently correct for inefficient
Arrovian "cycling" in markets).
104. See, e.g., BARTLETI, supra note 102, at 141-66, 195; BROMLEY, supra note 36, at 70;
ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COL
LECTIVE AcrroN 14-15 (1990); C. Edwin Baker, Posner's Privacy Mystery and the Failure of
Economic Analysis of Law, 12 GA. L. REv. 475, 486 (1978); Guido Calabresi, The Pointless
ness ofPareto: Carrying Coase Further, 100 YALE L.J. 1211, 1214 (1991); Victor P. Goldberg,
On Positive Theories ofRedistribution, 11 J. EcoN. IssuES 119, 121-22 (1977); Kelman, supra
note 103, at 231-34; Kennedy & Michelman, Are Property and Contract Efficient?, supra note
36; Samuels, Further Limits, supra note 36, at 397, 406-07, 421-22; Cento G. Veljanovski,
Wealth Maximization, Law and Ethics - On the Limits ofEconomic Efficiency, 1 INTL. REV.
L. & EcoN. 5, 6 (1981); see also Samuels, Welfare Economics, supra note 36, at 9, 45-48
("[N]ot only does the Pareto-analysis assume the existing income and wealth distribution,
working rules, power structure and so on, but it tends to assume their propriety."); cf.
Steams, supra note 102, at 1240-45 (arguing that legislatures may be the most efficient fora to
determine ex ante "how a market should best operate to facilitate private transactions").
As Lloyd Weinreb reminds us, "copyright is itself an intervention in the market, rather
than, as it so often is made to appear, the 'natural' way of doing things." Lloyd L. Weinreb,
Copyright for Functional Expression, 111 HARV. L. REv. 1150, 1240 (1998).
105. See supra text accompanying note 47; cf. Carol Rose, The Comedy ofthe Commons:
Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 711 (1996) (describ
ing the origins of and justifications for co=on law doctrines that rest collective property
rights in the "unorganized" public).
106. See BROMLEY, supra note 36, at 118-21, 134-43, 165-81 (modeling the effects of alter
native entitlement structures and demonstrating that the efficient equilibrium point depends
on the starting point). The original insight is, of course, Coase's. See Coase, supra note 102.
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tional works might be preferable, distributively speaking, to a re
gime in which they do not.107 It also might promote the goals of
access and progress more effectively than the private-law model
that the cybereconomists prefer.10s
Alternatively, Margaret Jane Radin envisions a regime of "in
complete commodification," which would acknowledge both mar
ket and nonmarket understandings of entitlements and exchanges
and expressly privilege nonmarket understandings in some circum
stances.109 In the particular case of copyrighted works, that regime
might look very much like the one we have now, but it would oper
ate quite differently in practice. For example, fair use cases would
still be contested, but not the dual nature of the fair use doctrine
itself. Rather, parties to copyright disputes would understand and
accept that the doctrine does more than simply correct for market
failure due to high transaction costs.110 In particular, the mere fact
that new technologies had enabled new markets to form would not
preclude a finding of fair use

if nonmarket considerations

of suffi

cient importance - such as educational access or first amendment
rights of criticism and comment - supported it.111
Either formalized public entitlements or incomplete commodifi
cation must come, of course, via the legislative process, with all the
107. See Baker, supra note 36, at 6-7, 28-31 (arguing that the socially optimal regime must
be determined in part by distributive considerations).
108. This question is considered in more detail infra at text accompanying notes 125-53,
text accompanying notes 310-42, and text accompanying notes 358-74.
109.

See RADIN, supra note 64, at 102-22.

110. See supra text accompanying notes 28-29; cf. RADIN, supra note 64, at 95-104
(describing and rejecting the argument that the market paradigm necessarily exerts a "dom
ino effect" on social policy).
111. Two important recent decisions privileging the "market failure" view of fair use are

Princeton University Press, Inc. v. Michigan Document Service, Inc., 99 F.3d 1381 (6th Cir.
1996) (en bane) (reversing panel decision that photocopying excerpts from copyrighted
works for student coursepacks was a fair use, because mechanism existed for licensing photo
copying rights), and American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1994)
(holding that corporate employee's photocopying of journal articles for research purposes
was not a fair use where mechanism existed for licensing photocopying rights). An "incom
plete co=odification" regime would recognize good reasons to decide both of these cases
differently. Cf. Lydia Pallas Loren, Redefining the Market Failure Approach to Fair Use in an
Era of Copyright Permission Systems, 5 J. lNTELL. PROP. L. 1, 32-48 (1997) (arguing that the
vision of fair use advanced in Princeton University Press and American Geophysical is inap
propriately narrow). Another case that might be resolved differently is Campbell v. Acuff
Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994). There, the Supreme Court recognized that defend
ants' rap parody of the song Oh, Pretty Woman was the sort of "transformative" use of preex
isting material that promotes the purposes of copyright, but nonetheless suggested that
infringement liability might attach if, on remand, the evidence suggested significant demand
for a non-parody, rap version of the song. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 593-94. Under an
incomplete co=odification regime, the transformative nature of parody and the high social
value attached to critical co=entary would support an order of su=ary judgment for
defendants.
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potential for lobbying and logrolling that process entails.112 But to
characterize either arrangement as the illegitimate

result of

interest-group pressure for that reason alone is facile. The cyber
economists offer no standard for determining when proposals for
legislative change are fairly representative of the broader public in
terest, or for deciding how much interest-group pressure is too
much.113 Moreover, they neglect to note that the existing copyright
regime, which over the past two decades has allotted ever stronger
entitlements to copyright owners, is itself a product of the legisla
tive process they decry.114 Stripped of grand-sounding economic
justifications, this unquestioning acceptance of the existing distribu
tion of entitlements and bargaining power is

Lochner pure and sim

ple.

In striking down labor reform measures as impermissible
Lochner-era Court reasoned that "since it is
self-evident that . . . some persons must have more property than
others, it is from the nature of things impossible to uphold freedom
of contract and the right of private property without at the same
time recognizing as legitimate those inequalities of fortune that are
the necessary result" of that freedom.115 In positing the current dis"class" legislation, the

112. See, e.g., Merges, Contracting Into Liability Rules, supra note 5, at 1308 n.29. "In
complete commodification" also might be decreed judicially. However, in the wake of the
American Geophysical and Princeton University Press decisions, this result seems increasingly
unlikely.
113. See Elhauge, supra note 102, at 49-59 (arguing that one cannot determine whether
interest-group influence is (to paraphrase Goldilocks) too big, too small, or just right without
reference to some external normative standard); Goldberg, supra note 104, at 122 (arguing
that identifying certain entitlements as initial and others as products of legislative redistribu
tion "would be meaningful only if there were some set of 'fundamental natural rights' that
together determined the natural distribution of wealth"); cf. Hovenkamp, supra note 98, at
106-07 (noting that in contrast to the original public choice theorists, whose work focused on
description and explanation, those associated with "Chicago School" law and economics have
given the theory a normative slant, seeking to minimize legislated wealth transfers). The
implicit criterion that the legislative result not differ from the (presumptively efficient) result
the market would have produced is self-evidently untenable, for the reasons just discussed.
See supra text accompanying notes 101-08.
114. See Litman, Copyright Legislation, supra note 100, at 305-21. For examples of recent
and proposed legislation eiq>anding content owners' rights, see, e.g., No Electronic Theft Act,
Pub. L. No. 105-147 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2311 (1997)) (criminalizing certain acts of copy
right infringement even where the alleged infringer realizes no financial gain); Sonny Bono
Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298 (West, WESTLAW through 1998 Sess.)
(extending the term of copyright protection by an additional 20 years); Digital Millenium
Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304 (West, WESTLAW through 1998 Sess.) (hereinafter
DMCA] (banning technologies that could be used to circumvent digital rights management
systems and imposing (though deferring) liability for acts of circumvention); Collections of
Information Antipiracy Act, H.R. 2652, 105th Cong. (1998) (creating a right against "misap
propriation" of uncopyrightable collections of data); infra text accompanying notes 283-85
(discussing the Digital Millenium Copyright Act in more detail). Authors' exclusive rights in
copyrighted works underwent a parallel expansion at the tum of the twentieth century. See
Lunney, supra note 6, at 536-37 & n.214.
115. Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 17 (1915). Thus, as Michael Benedict documents,
what began as a principled distrust of the power of wealthy "factions" to subvert government
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tribution of ownership and bargaining power as natural, and pro
posals to limit ownership prerogatives as inherently suspect, the
cybereconomists make the same argument and commit the same
error. Declarations of entitlement are definitional, public acts and
should be understood as such:116 Taken on its own terms, the
cybereconomists' process-oriented critique offers no principled ba
sis for preferring any particular socially-determined entitlement
structure over others.
In short, the cybereconomists' argument from contract princi
ples reduces to the propositions that market ordering is efficient
because it is market ordering and that the legislative process is inef
ficient because it is not. Without more, this hardly constitutes a
compelling case for replacing the public law of copyright with a re
gime based on the private law of contract. Still remaining to be
considered, however, is the contention that, assuming efficient mar
kets, the societal goals of access and progress are best served by
according digital publishers more complete control of their digital
content.
B.

Manufacturing Scarcity

The cybereconomists' approach to the question of optimal
author/owner control reveals a similar essentialism, and similar log
ical lacunae. Their proposal for a private-law regime of digital in
tellectual property rights is based on a fiction about the invariant
nature of "property" and its relation to social welfare. Social wel
fare, in their view, is simply the sum of the wealth generated by
private transactions; therefore, the most efficient regime of entitle
ments in creative and informational works is that which affords
owners of such "property" the control necessary for them to maxi
mize its market value. Social efficiency - defined here as op
timization of the access and progress desiderata - and allocative
efficiency are synonymous, or at least inseparably linked. Whether
became a reflexive aversion to legislative action designed to aid any group, including - and,
for some Lochner-era thinkers, especially - "the ignorant and propertyless mass of urban
voters." Benedict, supra note 2, at 306-10.
116. See supra text accompanying note 104. This insight, too, dates back to the Lochner
era. See, e.g., .AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM 98-129 (William W. Fisher III et al. eds., 1993);
HORWITZ, supra note 22, at 145-67, 194-98; Keith Aoki, (Intellectual) Property and Sover
eignty: Notes Toward a Cultural Geography ofAuthorship, 48 STAN. L. REv. 1293, 1334-38
{1996); Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 CoLUM. L.
REv. 809 (1935); Morris R. Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 8 (1927);
Robert L. Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38 PoL. Ser.
Q. 470 {1923). It is particularly true of intellectual property, which is in no conceivable sense
"prepolitical." See supra text accompanying notes 18-23.
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or not this thesis is valid as applied to other types of property, the
economic case for assigning strong, undivided property rights in
digital works is inadequate at best. Determining the optimal degree
of author/owner control of digital content requires careful consider
ation of what system of entitlements would be most effective given
the public-good nature of creative and informational works and the
unpredictable pathways of creative progress.
The strongest version of the argument for control is, of course,
Hardy's. He advocates simply abandoning the conceptual frame
work of copyright in favor of digital property rights expressly
modeled on their private-law counterparts.117 In contrast, Merges,
Bell, and O'Rourke frame their assertions about control in the rhet
oric of contract and public choice. Ultimately, however, they con
tend that copyright owners should be afforded contract rights broad
enough to accomplish virtually the identical result urged by Hardy,
for virtually identical reasons.118 The similarity is underscored by
Merges's unequivocal rejection of legislatively-mandated "liability
rules" in the intellectual property context.119 Accordingly, I shall
use the analytic framework supplied by Hardy, with some refine
ments supplied by Merges, to evaluate the cybereconomists' "con
trol thesis." Hardy and Merges use two different types of
arguments to justify a private-property regime: the assertedly low
costs of transacting in and fencing digital information, which (they
argue) make strong property rights the most efficient vehicle for
allocating creative resources to their most highly valued uses, and

117. See supra text accompanying notes 46-48.
118. Cf. Ginsburg, supra note 86, at 63 ("When 'we're all connected,' no functional differ
ence may exist between a contract and a property right."). To the extent that they would
recognize limitations on author/owner control, Merges, Bell, and O'Rourke conceive those
limitations in terms of abuse of the market process - e.g., unconscionability or the acquisi
tion of antitrust market power - rather than as definitional restrictions that would apply
regardless of the owner's behavior or market position. See Bell, supra note 5, at 591, 607;
Merges, The End ofFriction?, supra note 5, at 126; O'Rourke, Copyright Preemption, supra
note 5, at 81-87; O'Rourke, Drawing the Boundary, supra note 5, at 541-55. But see Merges,
The End ofFriction?, supra note 5, at 134-35 (advocating, at least in principle, a limited "fair
use" exception to digital property rights for designated classes of users); supra text accompa
nying note 57. This convergence of contract reasoning with property reasoning mirrors the
Lochner-era view that the system of social ordering should protect the market decisions of
economic actors. See infra text accompanying notes 161-71.
119. See Merges, Contracting Into Liability Rules, supra note 5, at 1302-17; supra text
accompanying notes 53-56; see also Merges, The End of Friction?, supra note 5, at 120-21
(arguing that property rights are necessary to protect content owners against third parties
who may acquire copies of their works). On Hardy's and Merges's discussions of the law and
economics literature on the choice between property and liability rules, see infra text accom
panying notes 150-53.
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the need for an effective incentive structure to induce creative
activity.120
1.

Transaction Costs and Common Resources

To support his argument about transaction costs, Hardy relies
on Harold Demsetz's axiom that (given effective fencing tech
niques) dividing commonly-owned property into privately-owned
parcels is the more efficient way of maximizing its value.121 How
ever, Demsetz implicitly presumes both knowledge about effective
long-term growth strategies and reduced costs of implementing
these strategies under a private-ownership system.122 Thus, for
Hardy's model to be accurate, we must know what sort of access
regime would maximize the production and distribution of creative
and informational works over the long term, and know that as
signing absolute property entitlements to copyright owners would
lead to implementation of that regime more cheaply. (Put differ
ently, we must know that Hardy's scheme would produce fewer sig
nificant long-term social costs, or greater long-term social gains, or
both.) If either of these conditions does not hold, the case for the
putative efficiency of Hardy's scheme vanishes.123 This is precisely
what is disputed in the current debate over the scope of copyright in
digital works.124 Arguing that undivided entitlements are per se
more efficient simply assumes away the problem.
120. See supra text accompanying notes 44-56; cf. Netanel, supra note 36, at 308-10, 31421 (describing neoclassically-based model of copyright as a mechanism for achieving alloca
tive efficiency, as well as a source of incentives to create).
121. See Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 51 AM. EcoN. R:Ev. 347,
351-52, 355-56 (1967). Similar reasoning underlies Edmund Kitch's proposed "prospect" ap
proach to patents. See Kitch, supra note 36.
122. See Demsetz, supra note 121; see also Lemley, supra note 6 at 1048-65 (criticizing, in
particular, Kitch's prospect theory); cf. Weinreb, supra note 104, at 1239 ("[T]he elegance
and persuasiveness of the [allocative efficiency] argument depend on its remaining insistently
hypothetical and abstract.").
123. At the very least, the question becomes more complicated, since Hardy must
demonstrate that the sum total of negative externalities and/or decreases in productivity
under his system would be smaller than the "transaction costs" imposed under the current
system.
124. See, e.g., Aoki, supra note 116, at 1333-37; Elkin-Koren, supra note 6, at 109-13;
Lemley, supra note 6, at 1048-65; Litman, Revising Copyright Law, supra note 49; see also
Julie E. Cohen, Reverse Engineering and the Rise of Electronic Vigilantism: Intellectual Prop
erty Implications of "Lock-Out" Programs, 68 S. CAL. L. R:Ev. 1091, 1104-24 (1995) (arguing
that the purpose of copyright is not merely to disseminate works to the public as consumers,
but also to foster access to works by the public as creators, and that a maximum-protection
regime does not serve this purpose); Kreiss, supra note 6 (same); Litman, supra note 6
(same); Netanel, supra note 36 (arguing that a purpose of copyright is to promote the deliber
ation and debate constitutive of a robust democratic public sphere, and that a maximum
protection regime does not serve this purpose); Niva Elkin-Koren, Cyberlaw and Social
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Assuming that Demsetz is correct about the superiority of a
private-ownership system in some cases,12s there are reasons to sus
pect that creative works do not satisfy the assumptions required by
the Demsetz model. Demsetz focuses on conservation of known,
currently existing resources - for example, fur-bearing animals or
river water.126 The interests of private property owners and of soci
ety in general may not be exactly identical in such cases - for ex
ample, society may wish to conserve the population of fur-bearing
animals over a longer time span, or ensure that the river water re
mains suitable for a broader spectrum of uses - but they may often
coincide substantially. Copyright, in contrast, is concerned with
stimulating the production of new creative works; it does not seek
only or even primarily to conserve existing works for their own
sake.121 Here, the interests of current copyright owners and of soci
ety may diverge. Society may wish to recognize and accord privi
leges to new authors, whose works may outsell, displace, or criticize
those of existing authors.128 In addition, there is no particular rea
son to believe that a new author's ability to pay for the right to use
an existing work is a good predictor of the quality of the eventual
result, whether quality is measured in terms of market success or by
some other standard.129 Thus, it is at least conceivable that vesting
existing authors/owners with absolute control over the terms of ac
cess would deter or prevent the creation of some valuable works
that would be produced under the current system.13o If so, the
Change: A Democratic Approach to Copyright Law in Cyberspace, 14 CARDOZO ARTS &
ENT. L.J. 215 (1996) (same).
125. This is far from clear. See, e.g., BROMLEY, supra note 36, at 12-18; OSTROM, supra
note 104, at 1-28.
126. See generally Demsetz, supra note 121. Demsetz does briefly mention patents and
copyrights, but does little more than offer the standard public-good/market-failure justifica
tion for affording any exclusive rights. See id. at 359; supra text accompanying notes 25-26.
127. See U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (authorizing limited grant of exclusive rights to
promote "Progress").
128. Cf Wendy J. Gordon, Toward A Jurisprudence ofBenefits: The Norms of Copyright
and the Problem of Private Censorship, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 1009, 1042-43 (1990) (outlining
the calculus that might lead society to override private censorship of criticism).
129. The likelihood of creative success, however defined, is extremely difficult to judge
before the fact. Cf. Lemley, supra note 6, at 1055-56 (noting that uncertainty as to the result
may preclude an accurate assessment of the gains from trade). This problem is particularly
acute for the newest authors, who lack established reputations. New authors may therefore
have difficulty finding publishers or other backers willing to underwrite their requests for
"usage rights." Even if these problems of prediction could be overcome, moreover, the no
tion that ability to pay provides a reliable and appropriate measure of a resource's value, or
of the value of its intended use, has long been discredited. See, e.g., Baker, supra note 36, at
9-20; Kelman, supra note 36, at 678-85; Leff, supra note 36, at 455-58, 462-63, 478-80.
130. See, e.g., Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir.
1997) (lawsuit against satirist who used characters and scenes from plaintiff's popular "Dr.
Seuss" books as a vehicle to comment on the controversial O.J. Simpson trial), cert. dis·
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cybereconomists' "control-equals-access-equals-progress" syllogism
is false; certainly, they have not proved it to be true. Even

if it

results in increased consumer access to digital works, a private-law
regime designed to maximize control will not necessarily result in
more or better creative progress.131 The increase in the private
benefits flowing to intellectual property owners will not necessarily
correspond to an increase in the social benefits flowing to the public
as a whole.132
Merges's proposal for collective institution-building by copy
right owners does not offer a way out of this difficulty. Such a col
lective is no more guaranteed to safeguard the interests of future
authors, and thereby serve society's interests, than are individual
copyright owners.133 To support his argument that private copy
right management collectives are the efficient solution to the prob
lem of administering transactions in creative works, Merges relies
on economist Elinor Ostrom's study of the evolution and operation
of institutions for collective management of commonly-owned
property.134 Ostrom focuses on the benefits of collective govern
ance for community members who want access to a shared re
source, and expressly excludes from consideration "situations in
missed, 118 S. Ct. 27 (1997); Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1987)
(lawsuit by reclusive author against biographer who excerpted portions of author's letters),

cert. denied, 484 U.S. 890 (1987). Maxtone-Graham v. Burtchaell, 803 F.2d 1253 (2d Cir.
1986) (lawsuit by abortion rights activist against anti-abortion activist who used excerpts of
her work in a book arguing against abortion rights), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1059 (1987); see
also Lemley, supra note 6, at 1056-61 (discussing other reasons that might lead existing copy
right owners to refuse licenses for socially valuable improvements).
131. As explained supra at text accompanying notes 24-32, digital rights management
technologies make it possible to decouple access and reuse rights. Thus, asserting control
over reuse need not interfere with content owners' ability to market their works to consum
ers. On the question of how "better" progress is defined, see infra section III.B.2.
132. I am far from the first critic of Demsetz's work to make this observation. See, e.g.,
BROMLEY, supra note 36, at 175-83 (demonstrating that "productive" or monetary efficiency
is only one of the issues that factor into the determination of whether a particular rule or
practice is socially efficient); ANDREAS A. PAPANDREOU, ExrERNALITY AND INSTITUTIONS
225 (1994) ("[I]nstitutional change does not require efficiency gains to be initiated, it requires
gains to the initiators of change, which may or may not coincide with an overall increase in
wealth."); AMARTYA K. SEN, CHOICE, WELFARE AND MEASUREMENT 288-90 (1982); Mishan,
supra note 36, at 95, 103-05; see also BROMLEY, supra note 36, at 137-39 ("Judgments about
social efficiency require that analysis be conducted against the backdrop of some social wel
fare function and its implicit social utility function." (emphasis in original)); Baker, supra
note 36, at 6-7, 28-31 (arguing that "human satisfaction" is a function of distributive as well as
efficiency considerations); Veljanovksi, supra note 104, at 19 ("The only wealth-maximizing
outcome that is ethically attractive is the one based on a 'just' assignment of initial rights.")
(emphasis omitted)).
133. See PAPANDREOU, supra note 132, at 200-04 (arguing that because private benefit
and social benefit may diverge, Demsetz's approach will not necessarily lead to the formation
of socially optimal institutions).
134. See OSTROM, supra note 104.
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which participants can produce major external harm for others."135
Merges likewise emphasizes the potential of collective institutions
to foster cross-licensing and other cooperative behavior among
members. Consumers and future creators figure in his analysis only
as potential trespassers, not as parties whose interests should be
represented in the constitution and governance of these institu
tions.136 Whether licensing collectives might produce negative ex
ternalities for these parties or for society generally is a question that
he does not consider.137
Relatedly, Ostrom suggests that collective institutions are more
likely to be effective over the long term if ownership privileges are
restricted to a closed, relatively homogenous group.138 The com
munity of authors is neither closed nor homogenous - nor, pre
sumably, would we want it to be. Merges's discussion of
performing rights societies (copyright collectives that license public
performance rights in musical compositions) is not to the contrary.
ASCAP and BMI, the two main performing rights societies in the
United States, together have over 250,000 members and a "stable"
of millions of works.139 However, neither ASCAP nor BMI is a
private institution in the sense that both Merges and Ostrom use
that term. Rather, both societies operate under antitrust consent
decrees that govern their membership, internal governance, and

135. Id.

at

26.

136. See, e.g., Merges, Contracting Into Liability Rules, supra note 5, at 1325-27, 1372-73.
For this reason, Merges's example of self-governing patent pools in the airplane and automo
bile industries, in which inventors, consumers, and future inventors are likely to be drawn
from the same small group of repeat players, says little about the desirability of collective
licensing arrangements for copyrighted works, for which there is no comparable guarantee.
See id. at 1342-52; cf. GARY D. LIBECAP, CONTRACTING FOR PROPERTY RIGHTS 24-28, 116
(1989) (identifying as the stakeholders in institutional design only those groups with claims to
property rights). In contrast, technologist Mark Stefik has proposed the establishment of a
Digital Property Trust, composed of representatives from both the copyright industries and
consumer groups, to oversee digital rights management policies and practices. See Stefik,
Shifting the Possible, supra note 24, at 156-58; Mark Stefik & Alex Silverman, The Bit and the
Pendulum: Balancing the Interests of Stakeholders in Digital Publishing, 7 AM. PROGRAM·
MER 1, 13-14 (1997).

137. In very general terms, an externality is a cost or benefit generated by an exchange
but borne or received by third parties, and tlierefore not taken into account by the parties
tliemselves. See CooTER & ULEN, supra note 25, at 38-40. More precise definitions vary; for
discussion of definitional issues and of the externalities generated by transactions in creative
and informational works, see infra section III.B.1.
138. See OSTROM, supra note 104, at 205-07, 211; cf. LIBECAP, supra note 136, at 21-23
(observing that a large number or heterogeneity of competing interests will delay the crea
tion of new institutions for allocating property rights); id. at 116 (noting that distributional
considerations frequently lie at the root of conflicts over institutional development).
139. See Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules, supra note 5, at 1334-35.
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licensing practices. 14 0 The decrees require

ASCAP

and BMI to

make membership available on a nondiscriminatory basis, to issue
licenses to all who request them, and to accept a judicially
determined reasonable fee (ASCAP) or a fee determined by an ar
bitrator (BMI) in the event of a dispute. 14 1 Most significantly, the
decrees prohibit ASCAP and BMI from holding or licensing any
rights in copyrighted musical compositions other than the public
performance rights. 14 2 These provisions suggest that the govern
ment and the respective courts believed that allowing collective or
ganizations control over the entire bundle of rights in copyrighted
works would be detrimental to competition. In short, the example
of ASCAP and BMI does not support Merges's thesis that
privately-governed collective institutions represent the optimal so
lution for licensing a broad range of usage rights in copyrighted
works.
Ostrom's research has only limited bearing on the problem of
rights in creative works for an even more basic reason, however.
Ostrom explicitly distinguishes renewable but potentially exhaus
tible common-pool resources - the focus of her study, and of
Demsetz's theorizing - from true public goods, such as the crea
tive works at issue here. 143 Because common pool resources are
subject to depletion through overuse, a system of entitlements must
address both provision (replenishment) and appropriation issues.
140. See United States v. Broadcast Music, Inc., 1966 Trade Cas. (CCH) 'll 71,941
(S.D.N.Y. 1966) ("BMI"), as amended, 1996-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 'll 71,378 (S.D.N.Y. 1994);
United States v. The American Socy. of Composers, Authors & Publishers, 1950 Trade Cas.
(CCH) 'll 62,595 (S.D.N.Y. 1950) ("ASCAP II"); United States v. The American Socy. of
Composers, Authors & Publishers, 1941 Trade Cas. (CCH) 'll 56,104 (S.D.N.Y. 1941)
("ASCAP").
The California water districts studied by Ostrom also operate under judicial decrees, but
Ostrom finds it significant that the participants themselves initiated legal proceedings in or
der to structure their own bargaining process. See OSTROM, supra note 104, at 110. That was
not the case with ASCAP and BMI. See BMI, 1966 Trade Cas. (CCH) 'l[ 83,324; JoHN RYAN,
THE PRooucnoN OF CuLroRE IN THE Musrc INousTRY 92-100 (1985) (discussing ASCAP
decree).
141. See BMI, 1966 Trade Cas. (CCH), at 83,325-26; ASCAP II, 1950 Trade Cas. (CCH),
at 63,754.
142. See BMI, 1966 Trade Cas. (CCH), at 83,325; ASCAP II, 1950 Trade Cas. (CCH), at
63,752.
143. See OSTROM, supra note 104, at 32-33; see also supra text accompanying note 25
(discussing public good nature of creative works). Demsetz's seminal article speculates
briefly about the implications of his work for the system of intellectual property rights. See
Demsetz, supra note 121, at 359. In later works, he tackled the issue of property rights in
information more directly; however, he did not answer or even address the concerns raised
here. See Demsetz, supra note 102; Harold Demsetz, The Private Production of Public
Goods, 13 J.L. & EcoN. 293 (1970); see also Hadfield, supra note 26, at 41-45 (concluding
that Demsetz's work "does not take us far in the analysis of appropriate public policy with
respect to intellectual products" because he does not address the problem of imperfection in
markets).

502

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 97:462

Based on her research, Ostrom concludes that conditioning appro
priation rights on provision obligations is the most effective long
term strategy for conservation and renewal.144 In contrast, appro
priation poses no direct threat of depletion of a public good, which
by definition is both non-excludable and non-rivalrous; a public
good benefits all without depletion.145 A regime designed to ensure
provision of a particular public good might use appropriation rights
as an incentive, but need not do so. Certainly, it need not assign
providers complete, undivided appropriation rights - that is to say,
it need not treat the good as a common pool resource or, as Hardy
would have it, a private good - especially if society concludes that
a limited-entitlements regime would do a better job of inducing
provision. The possibility that authors, if given undivided property
entitlements and left to their own devices, might create efficient
rights-management institutions says nothing about whether they
should be given undivided property entitlements in the first
place.146
Both Hardy and Merges also rely, in different ways, on the con
ventional wisdom that lowered transaction costs favor property
rules to encourage bargaining.147 In fact, it is not so clear that digi
tal networks will lower transaction costs in all cases.148 But the ar
gument is fl.awed in any case. Hardy relies largely on Calabresi and
Melamed's important but preliminary exploration of differences in
entitlement structures.149 This ignores a substantial recent litera
ture suggesting that the choice between property rules and other
types of rules depends on a number of factors, of which transaction
costs is only one.150 Merges undertakes a more thorough review of
144. See OSTROM, supra note 104, at 32-33, 46-50, 90-92.
145. See id. at 32; Stewart E. Sterk, Rhetoric and Reality in Copyright Law, 94 MICH. L.
REv. 1197, 1236 (1996) ("[U]nlike land, intellectual property offers no potential for a tragedy
of the commons."); supra note 25.
146. Cf. BROMLEY, supra note 36, at 78-79 ("The issue is not one of being efficient or
inefficient in the abstract, but of being efficient or inefficient with respect to a particular
purpose or objective."); id. at 148-83 (demonstrating that the efficient equilibrium point de
pends on the initial distribution of entitlements, which must be determined with reference to
"social efficiency" rather than mere "productive efficiency").
147. See Hardy, supra note 5, at 229-32, 241-42; Merges, Contracting Into Liability Rules,
supra note 5, at 1303-06.
148. See Burk, supra note 40, at 18-20; DeLong & Froomkin, supra note 40.
149. Hardy, supra note 5, at 229-32, 241-42 (citing Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 69).
150. See Ian Ayres & Eric Talley, Distinguishing Between Consensual and Nonconsensttal
Advantages ofLiability Rules, 105 YALE L.J. 235 (1995) [hereinafter Ayres & Talley, Liability
Rules]; Ian Ayres & Eric Talley, Solomonic Bargaining: Dividing A Legal Entitlement to
Facilitate Coasean Trade, 104 YALE L.J. 1027 (1994) [hereinafter Ayres & Talley, Solomonic
Bargaining]; Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Property Rules Versus Liability Rules: An Eco
nomic Analysis, 109 HARV. L. REv. 713 (1996) [hereinafter Kaplow & Shavell, Property
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the current literature, and in particular the conclusion of Ian Ayres
and Eric Talley that liability rules are more likely to encourage effi
cient bargains in cases of information asymmetry.151 He concludes
that property rules are preferable where intellectual property is
concerned, because they allow intellectual property owners to max
imize their monetary return (and thus, also, their incentives to cre
ate new works).152 However, he neglects to explain why this result
is desirable. If society believes that limiting author/owner control
of digital works will promote progress more effectively, a legal re
gime that enhances control would be unwise.153
In sum, for Hardy and, it seems, for Merges, all "property" axio
matically requires the Blackstonian right of absolute exclusionary
power in order to attain its highest value.154 Thus, they are able to
characterize the legislative process that shapes the public law of
Rules]; Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Do Liability Rules Facilitate Bargaining? A Reply to
Ayres and Talley, 105 YALE L.J. 221 (1995) [hereinafter Kaplow & Shavell, Reply]; A. Mitch
ell Polinsky, Resolving Nuisance Disputes: The Simple Economics ofInjunctive and Damage
Remedies, 32 STAN. L. REv. 1075 (1980).
151. See Ayres & Talley, Solomonic Bargaining, supra note 150, at 1029-30, 1032-33;
Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules, supra note 5, at 1304 n.22. Kaplow and Shavell
dispute this conclusion. They agree, however, that liability rules may induce efficient non
consensual use of a disputed resource, particularly when bargaining is impossible. See
Kaplow & Shavell, Reply, supra note 150, at 223-24. They also agree that divided property
(as opposed to liability) entitlements may produce more efficient trade than undivided enti
tlements. See Kaplow & Shavell, Reply, supra note 150, at 222 n.5; Kaplow & Shavell, Prop
erty Rules, supra note 150. Both conclusions are potentially relevant to mass-market
transactions in intellectual property. Cf. Lemley, supra note 6, at 1069-70 (discussing the
operation of divided property entitlements in the patent system). Merges does not address
them. Merges has been more receptive to the concept of dividing entitlements to facilitate
bargaining with respect to patents. See Robert Merges, Intellectual Property Rights and Bar
gaining Breakdown: The Case of Blocking Patents, 62 TENN. L. REv. 75, 94-97 (1994); see
also id. at 106 (distinguishing copyright-related transactions on the ground that high transac
tion costs are the only barrier to consensual exchange).
152. See Merges, Contracting Into Liability Rules, supra note 5, at 1303-06. Merges cites
Kaplow and Shavell for the proposition that in some cases, a liability rule may inefficiently
require the holder of a limited resource to make payments to "multiple takers" in order to
retain control of the resource. See id. at 1305 n.23 (citing Kaplow & Shavell, Property Rules,
supra note 150, at 765-66). As discussed above, however, intellectual property is a public
good, so the Kaplow and Shavell reasoning, which presumes rivalrous use, does not apply.
See supra text accompanying notes 143-46.
Ayres and Talley agree that undivided property entitlements might be the appropriate
choice in cases presenting incentive problems. See Ayres & Talley, Solomonic Bargaining,
supra note 150, at 1084-85. However, it is not at all clear that such problems exist in the case
of creative and informational works. See infra text accompanying notes 159-60.
153. See Netanel, supra note 36, at 335 & n.228. Kaplow and Shavell suggest that non
consensual taking under a liability rule may not be efficient when owners, on average, place
higher idiosyncratic value on the resource than do takers. See Kaplow & Shavell, Property
Rules, supra note 150, at 760-63; supra note 151. In the case of creative and informational
works, however, the value realized by the "owner" is not the only, or even the most impor
tant, measure of the value realized by society. See supra text accompanying notes 121-32;
infra section III.B.1.
154. See Hardy, supra note 5, at 230 (defining "property" as conferring a right of exclu
sion) (citing Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 69, at 1092); Merges, Contracting Into
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copyright as a wasteful cost of transacting rather than a necessary
cost of production.155 There is one piece of the puzzle remaining,
however. Although they are primarily concerned with demonstrat
ing that private-law rules will maximize allocative efficiency, the
cybereconomists also make arguments about the relationship be
tween control, monetary return, and creative incentives. Under
standing the basis for their conceptualization of property, and the
reason that they fail to recognize the potential societal interest in
limiting author/owner control, requires consideration of these argu
ments as well.
2. Incentives and Redistribution
Hardy asserts that his proposed expansion of copyright owners'
legal entitlements is simply an adjustment to maintain the size of
the owners' overall "pie" of incentives. He notes, in particular, that
the "slice" of protection formerly afforded by the difficulty and ex
pense of producing high-quality copies has shrunk due to the ease
of copying digital files.156 Hardy argues that any decrement in
copyright owners' aggregate protection against copying will reduce
the market value of their works, which in tum will reduce their in
centives to create new works - which, of course, will result in less
progress, and ultimately less access as well.157 The clear implication
of all this is that expansion of legal entitlements is necessary to
avoid a redistribution of economic value from copyright owners to
the public, with potentially catastrophic consequences. Nothing
Liability Rules, supra note 5, at 1305 (expressing dismay at the prospect that, under a liability
rule, there would be "many people who might be in a position to take an entitlement").
To bolster his appeal to essentialism, Hardy argues that his sense of "property" is the
sense in which the framers of the Constitution understood it. But this argument proves too
much; the framers may well have understood "property" as Hardy describes, but they author
ized Congress to grant only "exclusive [r]ights" for "limited [t]imes." U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 8,
cl. 8; see Hardy, supra note 44, 'lI 37; see also Hamilton, supra note 83; Meredith L. McGill,
The Matter of the Text: Commerce, Print Culture, and the Alllhority of the State in American
Copyright Law, 9 AM. LITERARY HIST. 21 (1997). A full exploration of the original intent
underlying the patent and copyright clause is a subject for another article.
155. See Hardy, supra note 5, at 254-57; Merges, Contracting Into Liability Rules, supra
note 5, at 1308-17; see Pierre Schlag, The Problem of Transaction Costs, 62 S. CAL. L. REv.
1661, 1685-85 {1989). One could argue just as easily that it is the public that is the property
owner, since the public stands in the relation of remainderman to the copyright "owner's" life
(plus 50) tenancy, and since it is the public's remaindered interest that justified the creation
of the life tenancy in the first place. See, e.g., Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co.,
499 U.S. 340, 349 {1991); Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975);
United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948); McGill, supra note 154
(concluding that historical evidence suggests copyright was originally conceived as a "tempo
rary alienation of public property").
156. See Hardy, supra note 5, at 222-29.
157. See Hardy, supra note 5, at 220-28; see also Adelstein & Peretz, supra note 29, at
214-15, 234-35.
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could seem more reasonable. Similar reasoning leads Merges to
characterize his proposal for limited privileges for certain classes of
users as essentially redistributive.15s

In fact, however, this reasoning rests on two unsupported, and
unsupportable, assumptions. First, it assumes a direct, linear rela
tionship between market value and incentives, and thus

(again)

makes maximization of creative works' monetary value the sole

measure of copyright's efficacy at inducing progress. As discussed
above, maximizing a work's post-creation value to the copyright
owner

will

not necessarily maximize its value to society.159 The ar

gument that the law

will

encourage the most progress by maximiz

ing a work's prospective market value is equally unpersuasive. The
cybereconomists cite no evidence that monetary reward is the sole
source of inducement to create new works, and there is much to
suggest that nonmonetary incentives are equally,

if not

more, im

portant in some cases.160
158. See Merges, The End of Friction?, supra note 5, at 134-35; see also O'Rourke, supra
note 49, at 696; supra text accompanying note 57; cf Ginsburg, supra note 34, at 15 (endors
ing Merges's description of fair use).
159. See supra text accompanying notes 121-32.
160. See, e.g., Princeton Univ. Press v. Michigan Document Servs., 99 F.3d 1381, 1410 (6th
Cir. 1996) (en bane) (Ryan, J., dissenting) (su=arizing testimony of numerous academic
authors "that they write for professional and personal reasons" and "that the receipt of im
mediate monetary compensation such as a share of licensing fees is not their primary incen
tive to write"); cf Breyer, supra note 26 (arguing that the additional incentive provided by
copyright is not necessary to the survival of the book publishing and computer software in
dustries); Weinreb, supra note 104, at 1232-33 (making the same argument); ED WARD L.
DEcr & RICHARD FLAsTE, WHY WE Do WHAT WE Do: THE DYNAMICS OF PERSONAL
AUTONOMY (1995) (su=arizing empirical research showing that "[i]ntrinsic motivation is
associated with richer experience, better conceptual understanding, greater creativity, and
improved problem solving" than extrinsic motivation); Weinreb, supra note 104, at 1234-36
(same); John Kay, The Economics of Intellectual Property Rights, 13 INTI.. REv. L. & EcoN.
337 (1993) (suggesting that in many cases the monetary value of a copyrighted work to the
public will bear no relation either to the "moral worth" of the work or to the incentives that
led the author to create it). The exact role that copyright plays in inducing production of
creative and informational works is an unanswered empirical question.
Hardy argues that the motivations of those who create for nonmonetary reasons need not
be factored into the incentives analysis because these individuals will continue to create new
works regardless of changes in the law. See Hardy, supra note 5, at 221-22. This argument
assumes, first, that works created solely for monetary reasons are as important to "progress"
as other works. Given the vast number of important works produced within the college and
university system, which operates under a different incentives structure, that assumption
seems unwise. See Breyer, supra note 26, at 287, 309; cf Lunney, supra note 6, at 561-69
(arguing that the copyright system perversely awards the greatest protection to the least valu
able works); infra section 111.B.1 (discussing the externalities generated by creative and infor
mational works, and the consequent risk of underproduction of those works that are most
socially valuable). It also ignores the possibility that changes in the legal rules governing
access to and control of works, specifically those preventing or sharply limiting unpaid access
by scholars and students, may alter existing social patterns of creation. See infra section
III.B.1.
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Second, and more significant, the argument from redistribution
assumes that the author or publisher of a digital work has the right
to pursue and control any monetary return that the work may be
made to generate, and may claim "property" even in the inchoate
possibility of monetary gain. From there, it is a short step to the
conclusion that a regime that would prevent owners from exploiting
emerging or even unforeseen markets enabled by new technologies
is not only inefficient but also unjust. Yet this understanding of
property is historically and theoretically contingent; it is neither a
necessary nor an invariably efficient feature of a scheme of prop
erty - much less intellectual property - rights.
The understanding of property as the right to appropriate any
possibility of profit dates from none other than the Lochner era.
For most of the nineteenth century, jurists and legal scholars under
stood constitutionally-protected "property" to mean "vested" rights
only.161 Legislation restricting prospective uses of property, if gen
erally applicable, was presumptively legitimate.162 Gradually, how
ever, as the growing variety of intangible, commercial interests
made real property-based tests of ownership seem increasingly ir
relevant, courts began to reconceive property as having an ahistori
cal, and thus implicitly fonvard-looking, character derived from an
"ideal boundary" between the owner and society.163 Within this vi
sion, property rights and freedom of contract were inextricably re
lated. Both originated in the prepolitical sphere and thus outside
public control.164 Full enjoyment of one right necessarily entailed
the other; interference with business was interference with prop
erty, and vice versa. In the line of cases that have come to be
known as the Lochner cases, the Court used the rhetoric of contract
and property interchangeably.165 Social contract theory and no161. See HOR\VITZ, supra note 22, at 150-51; Siegel, supra note 2, at 7-8; see also Robert
Brauneis, "The Foundation of Our 'Regulatory Takings' Jurisprudence": The Myth and
Meaning ofJZ1Stice Holmes's Opinion in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 106 YALE L.J. 613,
624-27 (1996); White, supra note 17, at 93-96.
162. See Benedict, supra note 2, at 304-05, 327-28; Brauneis, supra note 161, at 625;
Siegel, supra note 2, at 7-8; supra text accompanying notes 18-23.
163. Brauneis, supra note 161, at 624-27, 630; see also HORWITZ, supra note 22, at 145-51;
Siegel, supra note 2, at 8-12, 64.
164. See supra text accompanying notes 18-23.
165. See, e.g., Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 545 (1923) (" 'Included in the
right of personal liberty and the right of private property - partaking of the nature of each
- is the right to make contracts for the acquisition of property. Chief among such contracts
is that of personal employment, by which labor and other services are exchanged for money
and other forms of property."' (quoting Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 14 (1915)); Truax v.
Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 328-30 (1921) (holding that statute prohibiting labor injunctions "de
prives the owner of the business and the premises of his property without due process");
Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 172-73 (1908) (invalidating law barring firing of union
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tions of economic laissez faire thus combined to create a climate in
which legislative interference with (definitionally) private control of
economic resources was presumptively suspect.166
The definition of intellectual property as profit potential also
dates from the Lochner era. It has largely escaped comment that
International News Service v. Associated Press, 167 in which the
Court defined news as quasi-property based on a misappropriation
theory, was a Lochner-era case.168 INS concerned the copying of
concededly uncopyrightable news items from publicly accessible
bulletin boards maintained by Associated Press member news
papers. As in the contemporaneous "substantive due process"
members on ground that both employee and employer had rights of liberty and property to
decide acceptable terms of employment); Brauneis, supra note 161, at 671; see also EPSTEIN,
supra note 4, at 280 ("Restrictions on hours or wages are without question limitations upon
the power of the employer to dispose of property.").

166. See HORWITZ, supra note 22, at 145-51, 160-64 (demonstrating that abstraction and
dephysicalization of "property," and increasing use of market expectation to define its scope,
led to an "infinitely expandable" conception of property that arguably prohibited any restric
tions on use). The contemporaneous legal realist attack on the expectation-based under
standing of property is well documented in HORWITZ, supra note 22, at 145-67. Among
modem legal scholars, C. Edwin Baker and Frank Michelman, in particular, have challenged
the understanding of "property" as denoting a zone of absolute freedom from interference
with economic expectation. Michelman demonstrates that the Constitution designed by the
framers reflects and was intended to serve distributive as well as antiredistributive concerns.
Property was both a source of security against government and a precondition for the effec
tive exercise of democratic self-government. See Frank I. Michelman, Possession vs. Distri
bution in the Constitutional Idea ofProperty, 72 lowA L. REv. 1319, 1325-34 (1987). To the
extent that "ei.-posure to superior private power can . . . leave people without the material
independence or competence required for effective citizenship," these conceptions of prop
erty are in tension, for "material independence" can be guaranteed only by government ac
tion that is in some formal sense redistributive. See id. at 1335-36. Michelman concludes that
the constitutional law of property can best serve the political ideals embodied in the Consti
tution by finding a pragmatic way to mediate between the two conceptions. See id. at 1350.
Baker disaggregates "property" into the various functions it serves, and argues that any
constitutionally cognizable right against government interference extends only to those func
tions essential to human liberty. See C. Edwin Baker, Property and Its Relation to Constitu
tionally Protected Liberty, 134 U. PA . L. REv. 741 (1986). He includes among these functions
the use of one's property for one's own welfare and "personhood," but not its use to dictate
the allocation of resources within society, or to control exchange relations with others. See
id. at 744-73. Decisions regarding the rules for resource allocation - of which the rules of
exchange are, properly speaking, a subset - are, he argues, "inherently collective" decisions.
See id. at 749-50. In particular, because exchange confers a form of sovereignty over others,
individuals have no liberty interest in unfettered rights of exchange. See id. at 752, 770.
Baker identifies the "allocative" and "exchange" functions of property as central to the argu
ment for a return to Lochner-style constitutional protection of economic liberty. See id. at
767-69, 774.
167. 248 U.S. 215 (1918) ("INS").
168. But cf. JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE, AND SPLEENS: LAW AND THE CON
STRUCTION OF THE INFORMATION SOCIETY 37-41 (1996) (discussing INS as archetype of the
"commodity" approach to information); HORWITZ, supra note 22, at 203 (describing INS as
"a significant example of judicial efforts to come to terms with" the implications of an ab
stract, expectation-based understanding of property); Aoki, supra note 116, at 1314-32 (link
ing expansive approach to intellectual property rights to laissez-faire liberalism and its
ideology of the primacy of private property).
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cases, the Court reasoned from the fact of marketability to the con
struct of property. Asserting that any other result would undercut
incentives to gather the news, it held that the AP was entitled to
prevent a competing news agency from reaping where it had not
sown.169 Automatically upon reaching this conclusion, the Court
assigned to the AP what Hardy and Merges would recognize as a
right protected by a property rule; it ordered that the competitor be
enjoined from using the news at all without the AP's permission.17o
Although some courts have sought to limit

INS - and avoid copy

right preemption - by imposing a requirement of competitive in
jury, such a requirement merely serves to underscore the fact that
under the INS approach, property rights (which implicitly confer
absolute control over use) are a function of economic expectation,
rather than the reverse.171 The cybereconomists' appeal to incen
tives falls squarely within this tradition.

In the modem, nondigital world, property entitlements are not
conceived quite so broadly. The right to control one's land does not
include the right to create a nuisance, even

if that would

create the

greatest profit, and the right to control one's apartment building
does not include the right to discriminate on the basis of race.172
These limits, moreover, are entirely consistent with a variety of
"law and economics" approaches to the underlying problems.
Although the rule against uncompensated redistribution and the
definition of property as profit potential are foundational principles
of neoclassically-grounded economic analysis of law,173 we might
169. See International News Serv., 248 U.S. at 239-40.
170. See International News Serv., 248 U.S. at 245-46. The property rule was of limited
duration - the injunction prohibited the competitor from appropriating the news while it
still had economic value to the AP
but it was a property rule nonetheless.
171. See, e.g., National Basketball Assn. v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 852-54 (2d Cir.
1997); United States Golf Assn. v. St. Andrews Sys., 749 F.2d 1028, 1037-38 (3d Cir. 1984);
Wendy J. Gordon, On Owning Information: Intellectual Property and the Restitutionary
Impulse, 78 VA. L. REv. 149, 178-79 (1992) (criticizing the INS Court's equation of "value"
with "property").
172. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (1994); REsrATEMENT {SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 821D, 822; cf.
Fisher, supra note 38, at 31-33 (describing rationales for legal imposition of "compulsory
terms" in contracts, including those relating to the use of private property).
173. Formally speaking, the touchstone of neoclassical analysis is the Pareto criterion,
and the requirement of Pareto-optimality is anti-redistributive by definition, in that no one
may be made worse off than before. See, CooTER & ULEN, supra note 25, at 12; Calabresi,
supra note 104, at 1215. In practice, this criterion has been relaxed by adoption of the
Kaldor-Hicks test, which allows redistributive policies that increase overall social welfare if
the gainers could compensate the losers, whether or not compensation is actually paid. See
CooTER & ULEN, supra note 25, at 41-42; Calabresi, supra note 104, at 1221-22; Hovenkamp,
supra note 98, at 65-67. As to wealth transfers designed to benefit the poor (inevitably the
Kaldor-Hicks losers), practitioners of neoclassically-grounded, Chicago school law and eco
nomics argue that courts should not attempt such transfers because legislative wealth trans
fers are more efficient. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System is
-
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conclude that nuisance laws and antidiscrimination restrictions are
justified because the negative externalities the prohibited conduct
would impose outweigh any incremental' benefit derived from in
creased incentives.174 Alternatively (stepping now into the institu
tionalist mainstream), if in our view the efficient society is one
without housing discrimination or air pollution, we might conceive
of "property" simply as not including the right to discriminate or
the right to pollute.175 Hardy and Merges do not consider whether
either analysis might apply to digital works.176 Their maximum.:.
incentives thesis is simply the Lochner-era stricture against redistri
bution of profit potential translated into economic terms.
The argument against redistribution of profit potential effec
tively precludes recognition of a societal interest in limiting author/
owner control of things denominated "property." Self-evidently,
this broad property-as-profit rule protects the status quo distribu
tion of entitlements and wealth; a right insulated by. a penumbra of
monetary expectation will be relatively impervious to legislative
change.177 The scope of such a property right can only expand.
Thus, this understanding of property inevitably enables the aggran
dizement of existing entitlements - more often than not at the exLess Efficient Than the Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 23 J. LEGAL STUDIES 667
(1994). When confronted with redistributive legislation, however, they then argue that legis
lation is inefficient for the reasons demonstrated by public choice theory, see supra text ac
companying notes 97-101, and that only the co=on law as enforced by judges is truly
efficient. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, EcoNoMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW §§ 8.1-.3, 19.1-.3 (4th
ed. 1992). Moreover, both in theory and increasingly in practice, such uncompensated, legis
latively-sanctioned transfers stop at the boundaries of entitlements classified as "property."
See, e.g., Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994); Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Coun
cil, 565 U.S. 1003 (1992); Nollan v. California Coastal Commn., 483 U.S. 825 (1989); Frrst
English Evangelical Church v. Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987).

174. See Polinsky, supra note 150, at 1080-85.
175. Cf. Baker, supra note 166, at 759, 767-69 (arguing that constitutional protection
should not extend to those aspects of property that would determine the allocation of re
sources, or "would affect the social world in a manner that make other people's contrary
choices irrelevant"); Dan Thu Thi Phan, Note, Will Fair Use Function on the Internet?, 98
CoLUM. L. REv. 169, 214 (1998) ("Thinner property rights do not mean the divestiture of all
ownership . . . . The law recognizes that property, like copyright, is described and circum
scribed by a set of societal concerns . . . .") . Such a choice presupposes a non-market-based
approach to specifying the relevant social welfare function. On that question, see infra sec
tion III.B.2.

176. For a preliminary analysis of the effects of externalities in information markets and
their implications for design of the socially efficient bundle of entitlements in digital works,
see infra section III.B.
177. See HoRwrrz, supra note 22, at 145-51 (delineating necessary implications of an
expectation-based theory of property rights); cf. Baker, supra note 166, at 751-53 (arguing
that a broad conception of "property" confers sovereignty on property owners); Brauneis,
supra note 161, at 700 ("The problem with continuity is that it equally preserves the wicked
and the good."); Gordon, supra note 171, at 179 ("[P]aralysis, rather than increase in social
wealth, more likely will result from granting rights against any change that may cause harm
to someone."); Michelman, supra note 166, at 1335-36 (same).
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pense of third parties whose current practices or privileges, because
not considered "property," are not perceived as obstacles.178 The
cybereconomists justify their proposed regime as a mere efficiency
enhancement that will improve the position of some at no detri
ment to others.179 The fact of controversy, however, tends to sug
gest otherwise; if the proposed change were really Pareto-optimal,
there would be no reason for anyone to oppose it.180 Disputes over
proposed changes arise precisely because some such changes do im
pose costs; they are not movements toward the Pareto frontier but
movements along it, with (re)distributive consequences.181
Digital works are a case in point. Hardy's ''pie" is incomplete,
in that it omits the slice consisting of "no-protection," or entitle
ments belonging to the public - a slice not currently conceived as
"property" in the same sense as the interest belonging to the copy
right owner. Consequently, he need not consider that his other
three slices - legal entitlements, contracts, and special-purpose
technical restrictions - are expanding at the public's expense,
rather than simply compensating for the lower protection afforded
by the "state-of-the-copying-art. " 182 Invoking the anti
redistributive animus that characterized the Lochner era obscures
the fact that the redistribution worked by digital rights management
technology, and advocated by its defenders, is from the public to
copyright owners, not the other way around.183 There is a constitu
ency that would be damaged if Hardy's proposals were adopted 178. See Samuels, Further Limits, supra note 36, at 447-49.
179. See, e.g., Bell, supra note 5, at 585-90.
180. See Calabresi, supra note 104, at 1220. Arguably, interested parties might oppose
Pareto-optimal changes if they felt they could do even better by petitioning the relevant
legislative body for special favors. This argument, however, is unlikely to be fruitful as long
as it leaves the central question - how to tell when parties are engaged in "rent-seeking" unaddressed. See supra text accompanying notes 112-16.
181. See Calabresi, supra note 104, at 1229-31.
182. Hardy, supra note 5, at 226-28; see, e.g., Litman, The Exclusive Right, supra note 100,
at 40-43; Samuelson, supra note 9, at 134.
183. The cybereconomists' focus on price discrimination lends further support to this con
clusion. See, e.g., Bell, supra note 5, at 589 n.142; O'Rourke, Copyright Preemption, supra
note 5, at 62, 70-71; see also GOLDSTEIN, supra note 28, at 8; Demsetz, supra note 143, at 30104 (advocating price discrimination as a tool for enabling the private production of public
goods such as information); cf Fisher, supra note 38, at 25-30, 35-36 (arguing that price dis
crimination by copyright owners will enhance social welfare in many, though not all, cases).
"Price discrimination" is nothing more than a technique by which a producer may attempt to
capture all of the consumer surplus generated by a particular product. "In the ideal case of
perfect price discrimination, every customer is charged her maximum willingness to pay for
the items she purchases." Meurer, supra note 38, at 869; see also id. at 877 (predicting that
digital rights management technologies "will create a windfall of profit for copyright hold
ers"); Bell, supra note 5, at 589 n.142. The key underlying assumption - that it is good
policy to allow producers of creative and informational works to do this - goes
unquestioned.
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and, hence, a need for Bell's argument that information that costs
money is cheaper than information that does not.184 The Em
peror's new clothes are wondrous, indeed.
In a sense, however, characterization of a new technology or
legal rule as redistributive is question-begging. Redistribution can
not be defined without reference to initial entitlements, and it is
nearly always the scope of those entitlements that is contested.185
The rhetoric of redistribution simply masks the underlying dispute.
Thus, for example, copyright owners contend that they have always
had the legal right to prevent private noncommercial copying, but
could not enforce it; educational and library organizations counter
that in fact copyright owners have never had this right and cannot
enforce a nullity.186 But (as Hardy and Merges recognize) the de
bate about rights in digital works is not about what rights members
of the public have had in the past, although that information is cer
tainly relevant as evidence of social values and preferences. It is
about what rights they should have in the future.
Here it is worth returning to Ostrom's careful distinction be
tween common-pool resources and public goods.187 True public
goods, once created, are not scarce, yet the cybereconomists pro
pose to treat them as if they were. What could possibly justify such
an approach? The answer, quite simply, is that scarcity is a precon
dition for markets.188 Copyright owners wish to create markets for
all ratable uses of digital works. Therefore, creative works, which
until now have defied the commodi:fication that is the cornerstone
of a market-based system, must become commodities.189
184. See supra text accompanying notes 41-42.
185. See Goldberg, supra note 104, at 122-23.
186. Compare, e.g., Hearing on H.R. 2281 & 2280, supra note 33, at 204-12 (statement of
Allan R. Adler, Vice President for Legal and Governmental Affairs, Association of Ameri
can Publishers), and NII WHITE PAPER, supra note 9, at 14-17, 73-84, with, e.g., Hearing on
H.R. 2281 & 2280, supra note 9, at 243 (statement of Douglas Bennett, President, Earlham
College, on behalf of the Digital Future Coalition), Digital Future Coalition, Collected Posi
tion Papers, Letters, and Press Releases, (visited Sept. 24, 1998) <http://www.dfc.org/>, Lit
man, The Exclusive Right, supra note 100, at 40-43, Samuelson, supra note 9, and Richard
Stallman, Reevaluating Copyright: The Public Must Prevail, 15 OR. L. REv. 291 (1996). See
also Jessica Litman, Reforming Information Law in Copyright's Image, 22 U. DAYTON L.
REv. 587, 596-97 & n.52 (1997).
187. See supra text accompanying note 143.
188. Or, more precisely, scarcity is a precondition for property, which is a precondition
for markets. See, e.g., CooTER & ULEN, supra note 25, at 10; Arnold Plant, The Economic
Theory Concerning Patents for Inventions, 1 EcoNOMICA 30, 31 (1934) ("[P]roperty rights in
patents and copyrights make possible the creation of a scarcity of the products appropriated
which could not otherwise be maintained.").
189. See G.J. MuLGAN, COMMUNICATION AND CoNTRoL: NETWORKS AND THE NEW
EcoNoMIES OF CoMMUNicATION 119-20 (1991) ("To be a tradeable good, which adds value
and offers return on investment, information must behave like a co=odity."); Rice, Public
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Calling something a commodity, however, does not necessarily
make it one. To begin with, the market and the law must confront
the insuperable difficulty of determining exactly what is owned. To
the extent that creativity is cumulative, it eludes attempts to set au
thorial or ontological boundaries.19° Put differently, the boundaries
of the authorial work and the literal boundaries of the copy that
embodies it do not coincide; the latter encompass much that the
former do not. Facts, ideas, and unoriginal constructs incorporated
into a work remain part of the public domain.191 From an instru
mental perspective, moreover, the commodity approach to digital
intellectual property is substantially at odds with the reason for pro
tecting creative works. The "progress" justification for copyright is
not neutral as to issues of creative merit.192 (Although courts es
chew judgments of artistic merit in determining copyrightability, or
at least say they do, this merit-neutral stance is expressly intended
to serve meritocratic as well as market ends.193) It follows that the
sole test of a work's merit is not its success in the market, and that
prospects for success in the market are not the sole determinant of
Goods, supra note 70, at 562 ("Contract creates scarcity and enforcement of contract corrects
for inherent non-excludability."); see generally KARL PoLANYI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMA
TION: THE PoLmcAL AND EcoNOMIC ORIGINS OF OuR TIME 71-73 (1944) ("The commodity
fiction . . . supplies a vital organizing principle in regard to the whole of society . . . namely,
the principle according to which no arrangement or behavior should be allowed to exist that
might prevent the actual functioning of the market mechanism on the lines of the commodity
fiction.").
190. See BoYLE, supra note 168, at 51-58; Peter Jaszi, Toward a Theory of Copyright: The
Metamorphosis of "Authorship, " 1991 DuKE L.J. 455; Lange, supra note 49, at 147; Litman,
supra note 6.
191. The cybereconomists do not appear to challenge this longstanding principle.
192. See U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; Margaret Chon, Postmodern "Progress": Reconsid
ering the Copyright and Patent Power, 43 DEPAUL L. REv. 97 (1993). According to Chon, at

its origin copyright was premised in part on the notion that there exist objective criteria of a
work's intrinsic merit. See id. at 114-22. Chon rejects this notion, but also rejects market
based criteria of value. Instead, she offers a "post-modem" view of the progress criterion as
shaped by social practices and human needs. See id. at 123-44; see infra text accompanying
notes 363-74 (exploring the non-market dimensions of progress).

193. See, e.g., Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251-52 (1902):
It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law to constitute

themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations, outside of the narrowest
and most obvious limits. At the one extreme some works of genius would be sure to
miss appreciation. Their very novelty would make them repulsive until the public had
learned the new language in which their author spoke. It may be more than doubted, for
instance, whether the etchings of Goya or the paintings of Manet would have been sure
of protection when seen for the first time. At the other end, copyright would be denied
to pictures which appealed to a public less educated than the judge.
Cf Alfred C. Yen, Copyright Opinions and Aesthetic Theory, 71 S. CAL. L. REv. 247 (1998)
(showing that judges in copyright cases do in fact make judgments about artistic merit, and
arguing that these judgments and the standards that inform them should be expressly
acknowledged).
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a work's publishability.194 Thus, the market must contend with the
recurring assertion of non-commodity definitions of value.
As Karl Polanyi demonstrated more than fifty years ago, com
modity constructs are apt to prove uncooperative when applied to
"fictitious commodities" - factors incompletely determined by
commodity attributes.195 Such constructs make markets possible,
but simultaneously introduce tension into the market system.
Where the harsher consequences of commodification are unaccept
able, society attempts to introduce stabilizing measures - for ex
ample, minimum wage laws and/or welfare grants to mitigate the
starvation that serves as incentive to labor; rent control laws to
lessen the impact of the laws of supply and demand on the housing
market; and fair use privileges to prevent the commodification of
creative works from impoverishing �ducation and public debate.196
These countermeasures in tum incur criticism for their disruptive
effect on the market and their inconsistency with market
principles.197
The resulting debate, however, cannot resolve the underlying
tension, because it is focused on the welfare measure and never re
ally addresses the initial determination to commodity. One need
not be clairvoyant to foresee a similar reaction to Merges's pro
posed "redistributive" fair use exemption for favored classes of
users

if the cybereconomists'

proposals succeed, nor to predict that

no resolution of that issue will be fully satisfying as long as the ten
sion underlying the commodification of creative works remains
194. For further discussion of the limitations and potential consequences of relying solely
on the market to measure the value of creative and informational works, see infra text ac
companying notes 332-42.
195.

PoLANYI,

supra note 189,

at 71-75. Polanyi wrote:

Now, in regard to labor, land, and money such a postulate cannot be upheld. To allow
the market mechanism to be sole director of the fate of human beings and their natural
environment . . . would result in the demolition of society. For the alleged commodity
"labor power" cannot be shoved about, used indiscriminately, or even left unused, with
out affecting also the human individual who happens to be the bearer of this peculiar
commodity. In disposing of a man's labor power the system would, incidentally, dispose
of the physical, psychological, and moral entity "man" attached to that tag.
at 73; see also Solo, supra note 36, at 55-56 (characterizing land, labor, and capital as the
"disappearing quanta" of the neoclassical model); RADIN, supra note 64, at 107-10 (charac
terizing regulation of the labor and housing markets as a socially enforced "incomplete com
modification" intended to preserve a space for human flourishing).

Id.

196. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994); PoLANYI, supra note 189, at 77-110; RADIN, supra note
at 108; Fisher, supra note 26, at 1768-74.
197. See PoLANYI, supra note 189, at 77-110; RADIN, supra note 64, at 108; see also, e.g.,
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); NII WHITE PAPER, supra note 9, at 84; Bell, supra
note 5, at 607-08; cf. O'Rourke, supra note 49, at 696 (noting that eligibility for Merges's
64,

proposed "redistributive" fair use exemptions
economic factors).

will

need to be determined in part by non
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unaddressed.198 A successful intellectual property regime must me
diate the tension between commodity and non-commodity defini
tions of value in creative works, not ignore it.
Incentives to create and limits on author/owner control are not
mutually exclusive, as the argument from redistribution might lead
one to think. Rather, they are complementary means for triangu
lating "progress." The trick is to balance the two, and neither asser
tions about redistribution nor formulaic prescriptions for
maximizing

allocative

efficiency

will

help us.199

The

cyber

economists' arguments about the superiority of common-law prop
erty rules are dictated by their initial assumptions about what
"property" is and ought to be. A useful economic model for digital
intellectual property rights must begin elsewhere.
*

*

*

Their claims of economic certainty notwithstanding, the cyber
economists fall well short of demonstrating that a private-property
and-contract-based regime of rights in digital works would best pro
mote access and progress. To decide whether a particular goal is
best served in the "public" or the "private" (i.e., market) arena, we
must assess so-called market institutions in their real-world, demon
strably imperfect forms, and must weigh the full range of possible
alternatives. To begin that inquiry by presupposing voluntary par
ticularized consent to standard form contract terms and presuming
the illegitimacy of (further) legislative intervention - just as the

Lochner

Court presumed voluntary, particularized consent to re

strictive labor contracts and conceived legislated labor standards as
the product of interest-group pressure - is to predetermine the re
sult. Similarly, the argument for undivided entitlements proceeds
from economic ideology, not logic or neutral science. Because they
begin with a particular, contingent understanding of "property," the
cybereconomists do not consider whether other models might be
more effective at inducing production and dissemination of public
goods generally and creative and informational works in particular.
As currently constituted, the

economic case

for recognizing unlim

ited contract rights and undivided entitlements in digital works is
weak. More is required to justify abandoning the public law of
copyright. Part III attempts to lay the groundwork for a richer,
198. See supra text accompanying note 57.
199. Cf. Lawrence Lessig, Intellectual Property and Code, 11 ST. JoHN's J. LEGAL COM·
MENr. 635, 638-39 (1996) (" 'Sufficient incentive,' . . . is something less than 'perfect
control.'").
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more contextualized understanding of the relationship between
legal institutions and information markets.
III .

ON MODELING INFORMATION MARKETS

As we have seen, reliance on essentialized notions of "contract,"
"market," and "property" elides important empirical and policy
questions about the extent of the monopoly that society should af
ford creators of digital works - questions that a more sophisticated
model would consider. This is not necessarily an argument against
the utility of the economic analysis of law, but an argument that law
and economics in the neoclassical mode is too narrow and far too
simplistic to yield a meaningful solution to the problem of digital
copyright. If it is to be undertaken, the economic analysis of copy
right law should draw on the full panoply of resources that the disci
pline of economics has to offer.200
The field of economics is not monolithic, and the neoclassical
market model is, as one might expect, only part of the story.
Merges likens the new digital CMS regimes to a frictionless, or
"Newtonian" system of licensing rights in digital works.201 This
metaphor is more apt than he may have realized. Newtonian
mechanics dominated scientific thinking for two and a half centu
ries - coincidentally, the same period during which the classical
liberalism of the Enlightenment flourished.202 The Newtonian par
adigm, however, proved insufficiently complex to describe the real
world, and eventually was displaced by the more precise constructs
200. See Hadfield, supra note 26, at 43-45 (observing that the modem literature on the
economics of copyright has not tackled the problem of developing a rigorous alternative to
the Demsetz model); cf. Robert Ashford, Socio-Economics: What Is Its Place in Law Prac
tice?, 1997 Wis. L. REv. 611, 612-15; Neil K. Komesar, Exploring the Darkness: Law, Eco
nomics, and Institutional Choice, 1997 Wis. L. REv. 465, 466-67. Arguably, a more
interdisciplinary, contextualized approach to the economic analysis of law simply returns the
field to its roots in the work of the legal realists and institutional economists of the 1920s and
1930s. See Hadfield, supra note 26, at 36-39 (discussing an alternative strand in the economic
literature on copyright that traces back to the work of Arnold Plant, who focused on the
relation between copyright and overall social welfare (citing Arnold Plant, The Economic
Aspects of Copyright in Books, 1 EcoNOMICA 167 (1934))); see also Victor P. Goldberg,
Commons, Clark, and the Emerging Post-Coasian Law and Economics, 10 J. EcoN. lssUES
877 (1976); Steven J. Medema, Wandering the Roadfrom Pluralism to Posner: The Transfor
mation of Law and Economics in the Twentieth Century, 30 HIST. PoL. EcoN. (forthcoming
1998).
201.

See Merges, The End of Friction?, supra note 5,

at 136.

202. See J.L. HEILBRON, ELEMENTS OF EARLY MODERN PHYSICS 2-11 (1982). Perhaps
this is Jess coincidental than it appears. A focus of debate in the emerging school of socio
economics is the extent to which the scientific method can survive the reductivism character
istic of neoclassical economics. See, e.g., Ashford, supra note 200.
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supplied by Einstein, Heisenberg, and others.203 Similarly, the re
ceived wisdom of neoclassical economic theory is (and has long
been) under challenge on many fronts, including several of poten
tial relevance to the market for digital information.
The project of constructing an adequate economic model for
digital intellectual property rights is complex. As Part II suggests,
the model must address two related sets of questions. First, it must
determine whether the existing consumer mass market offers the
best forum for defining information policy and establishing the
scope of entitlements in digital works.204 Section III.A analyzes
digital rights management contracts and technologies in context, as
the latest move in an ongoing contest between content owners and
consumers regarding endogenous definition and enforcement of the
legal entitlements and exemptions provided by copyright law.
Given the predominantly reactive nature of consumers' power in
the market, the inexorable nature of this particular enforcement
technique, and the institutional constraints imposed by standard
form contracting law and practice, it concludes that consumers are
more likely to experience a relative equality of bargaining power in
the legislative arena. This suggests that consumers would do well to
be skeptical of proposals for allocating rights in digital works within
the parameters set by the existing market.
The second set of questions that the model must address con
cerns the relationship between creative and informational works
and social welfare. What kinds of value do such works generate?
Even

if the

market process is otherwise fair, are market measures

the most accurate means for assessing and optimizing creative and
informational works' overall value to society? Section III.B ana
lyzes the uncompensated positive externalities produced by transac
tions in creative and informational works, and concludes that these
externalities represent a significant source of social value and that
many (if not most) of them would be underproduced by a fully mar
ket-based regime. The choice between that world and the one we
have now has profound implications for the processes of individual
and collective development and self-definition. Many of these
processes occur outside the market, in ways the market cannot
measure. It follows that we should not make the choice between a
See DANIEL J. KEVLES, THE PHYSICISTS: THE HISTORY OF A SCIENTIFIC COMMU·
MODERN AMERICA 155-69 (1977); see generally THOMAS s. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE
OF SCIENTIFIC REvoLUTIONs (2d ed. 1970). The process of paradigm revision in the field of
physics is ongoing. See DAVID LINDLEY, THE END OF PHYSICS (1993).

203.
NITY IN

204. As used here, "best" simply means the process most likely to yield the results that
the parties want, or a mutually acceptable compromise.
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fully market-based regime and a regime of incomplete entitlements
without considering the nonmarket as well as the market prefer
ences of citizen-consumers.
A.

Bargaining Power and Choice in Information Markets

Just as Einstein challenged the Newtonian model by recognizing
the dimension of time, institutional, welfare-theoretic, and political
economists have challenged the neoclassical paradigm of the mar
ket as the realm of unconstrained private choice by recognizing the
dimension of power. In the neoclassical model, power - whether
over people or over markets - is absent. Exchanges of all types
are presumed to be voluntary; departures from this norm are called
"market failures" and are presumed to be rare. For an increasing
number of modern economic theorists, in contrast, both forms of
power are endemic to capitalist market systems.205 From this per
spective, an intellectually defensible market model must acknowl
edge and inquire about power asymmetries and their consequences
in both market and legislative arenas, and a socially defensible in
formation policy must take power asymmetries into account. In the
context of mass-marketed digital works, this inquiry suggests that
consumers are likely to be disadvantaged in either arena, but that
the disadvantages that consumers encounter in the legislative forum
are less insurmountable.

1.

Contested Exchange and the Power to Switch

A central tenet of neoclassical economic theory is that consum
ers have freedom to enter and exit markets for consumer goods. As
a consequence,

if consumers refuse

to buy a particular product or

service, producers will reconfigure the product or service - by low
ering the price, by changing product attributes, or by some combi
nation of the two - in order to maximize pro:fits.206

Thus,

205. See, e.g., BARTLETI, supra note 102, at 66-68, 195-96, 204-06; SAMUEL BOWLES &
HERBERT GINTis, DEMOCRACY AND CAPITALISM (1986); SAMUEL BOWLES & RICHARD
EDWARDS, UNDERSTANDING CAPITALISM: COMPETITION, COMMAND AND CHANGE IN THE
U.S. EcoNOMY 16-18 (1985); JoHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE ANATOMY OF POWER (1983);
PAPANDREou, supra note 132, at 216; A. ALLAN SCiiMID, PROPERTY, PowER, AND Pusuc
CHOICE: AN INQUIRY INTO LAW AND EcoNoMics (1978); William M. Dugger, Power: An
Institutional Framework ofAnalysis, 14 J. EcoN. IssUES 897 (1980); Samuels, Further Limits,
supra note 36. A universally-accepted lexicon for describing and theorizing about power has
yet to emerge, however.
206. In its purest form, neoclassical econoinic theory is centrally concerned with price
and its responsiveness to supply and demand. See supra note 36. Law and econoinics in the
neoclassical mode modifies this model by positing that changes in other terms of the ex
change will be reflected in the goad's price. As Neil Netanel observes, however, the price
model has often proved too simple and narrowly focused to bear the weight of "complex
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consumer preferences exercise considerable,

if indirect, power over

the overall pattern of supply. As section II.A discussed, the cyber
economists (and at least one court sympathetic to their project) ex
tend this model to the terms and conditions imposed by digital
CMS, and argue that copyright owners will abandon or modify
terms to which consumers refuse to agree.201 However, they over
state the actual extent of consumer knowledge and consent. The
legal rules.governing such exchanges make it difficult for consumers
of mass-marketed products and services to act like the rational,
utility-maximizing comparison shoppers that the model presumes.
Understanding the power dynamics of information markets re
quires a more nuanced, context-specific approach, one that takes
into account the complexity of information products and transac
tions, the limited range of roles available to consumers, and the
ways in which existing legal and market institutions further con
strain those roles.
One promising avenue of inquiry is the theory of "contested ex
change" developed by political economists Samuel Bowles and
Herbert Gintis. Bowles and Gintis challenge the neoclassical as
sumption of perfect, costless, exogenous enforcement of market ex
changes by identifying certain types of exchange for which such
enforcement is infeasible.

Of particular relevance here are ex

changes in which "the contested attribute can be measured only im
perfectly or at considerable cost" and those in which "the number
of contingencies concerning future states of the world relevant to
the exchange preclude writing a fully specified contract. "208 Such
exchanges, they reason, will be contested, meaning that the party
concerned with a particular attribute or contingency will develop or
attempt to develop endogenous mechanisms of enforcement. For
example, to extract the desired work effort from an employee, an
employer may make continued employment contingent on a satis
factory level of performance.209
Endogenous enforcement activities do not invariably signal a
power imbalance. First, such activities may be mutual. Robert
Ellickson's model of norm enforcement among neighbors in closereal-world public policy issues." Netanel, supra note 36, at 311 n.113. See also supra text
accompanying note 88 {discussing the information problems that undermine efforts to evalu
ate non-price contract terms).
207. See supra text accompanying notes 65-94; Bell,
O'Rourke, Copyright Preemption, supra note 5, at 81-90.

supra

note 5, at 588-89, 601-08;

208. Samuel Bowles & Herbert Gintis, Contested Exchange: New Microfoundations for
18 PoL. & SoCY. 165, 177 (1990).

the Political Economy of Capitalism,
209. See id. at 177-78.
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knit communities is an example of this situation, which Bowles and
Gintis term "bilateral power."210 Second, unilateral endogenous
enforcement will fail if the other party (for example, the employee)
is indifferent as to this particular exchange (for example, continued
employment versus losing this particular job), as the neoclassical
model presumes.211 Bowles and Gintis demonstrate that, at least in
the labor market, this is not the case.212 Most workers are not indif
ferent to losing their jobs, and this indicates a power asymmetry
between employer and employee. The employer, who is on the
short side of a nonclearing labor market, has power over the em
ployee and may use the threat of sanctions to affect his or her be
havior; generally speaking, employees lack equivalent power to
dictate the terms of the exchange.213
From the copyright owner's perspective, transactions in digital
works are contested exchanges. It is impossible to know how indi
viduals will use works, and often difficult to predict how copyright
standards such as fair use will apply. Using the legal system to po
lice all uses of copyrighted works would be infeasible because of the
great expense and difficulty of monitoring individual use. Digital
rights management contracts and technologies are the prototypical
endogenous enforcement mechanism, and there do not seem to be
comparable enforcement mechanisms available to most
consumers .214
210. Id. at 184; see ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAw: How NEIGHBORS
SETILE DISPUTES (1991).
211. At a given price, the level of indifference between this particular transaction and any
other transaction will be a function of the substitutability of other products or services - i.e.,
whether and to what extent the subject matter of the transaction is uniquely suited to meet
the buyer's needs - and of the elasticity of demand for the subject matter of the transaction
- i.e., whether demand is a linear correlate of price or is driven by other factors, such as
hunger or the need for shelter. See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 25, at 24; see infra text
accompanying notes 218-26.
212. See Bowles & Gintis, supra note 208, at 178-81.
213. See id. at 182-83. A nonclearing market exists when some participants who wish to
transact at the market price cannot do so, and the market does not respond by adjusting to a
point at which supply equals demand. See supra note 36. For example, the persistence of
unemployment in the labor market, despite willingness of the unemployed to work at - or
even below - the market wage, indicates failure to clear. See Bowles & Gintis, supra note
208, at 172-81. Because "[n]o actor is capable of improving his or her position by altering a
variable over which he or she has control," the market is in competitive equilibrium; how
ever, neoclassical assumptions about the relationship between supply and demand at the
equilibrium point do not hold. See id. at 182. The party in the favorable position in a non
clearing market is on the "short side" of the market. See id. at 183. In labor markets, this
party usually will be the employer; however, some classes of employees - for example,
highly skilled professionals in a growth sector of the market - may wield short side-power.
See, e.g., Amy Harmon, Vacant Cubicles - A Special Report: Software Jobs Go Begging,
Threatening Technology Boom, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 1998, at Al.
214. Some consumers, of course, are likely to respond by attempting to develop techno
logical means of their own to defeat digital CMS. Recently, copyright owners attempted to
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Assessing the distribution of power in information markets is
more difficult. As noted above, the conventional economic wisdom
regarding producer/consumer markets holds that, at least when
there are no limits on the quantity of goods produced (indisputably
the case where digital works are concerned), consumer purchasing
behavior disciplines the market.215 Gintis himself has characterized
this "power to switch" as a critical determinant of power in the mar
ket for consumer goods, and has argued that mass-market transac
tions are best understood as contested exchanges in which the
contested attribute is product quality and consumers have short
side power.216 In fact, there is some indication that copyright own
ers are nervous about their ability to impose technological controls
to the full extent that they would like.217 A preliminary inquiry
suggests that it is too early for unqualified optimism, however.
First, the extent of consumer indifference to particular transac
tions in creative and informational works is an empirical question
that requires investigation. It may be incorrect to assume that the
market in copyrighted works behaves like the markets for con
sumer goods such as bread, toothpaste, and vacuum cleaners - or,
at least, to assume this in all cases.218 Arguably, some works are
more interchangeable, and some types of consumers more discrimi
nating, than others.

Consumers of popular fiction, for example,

may recognize more substitutability than consumers of academic
works - or perhaps that is gross elitism, and perhaps far less sub
stitutability exists among, say, the works of Jackie Collins, Danielle
Steel, and Judith Krantz than among the hypertrophic byproducts
of the tenure process. The point is that there is insufficient infor
mation from which to generalize either that the market for creative
and informational works exhibits a high degree of substitutability or

convince Congress to declare all such circumvention technologies illegal. That struggle and
its implications for the contested exchange model offered in this Article are discussed infra in
section III.A.2.
215. See, e.g., Herbert Gintis, The Power to Switch, in UNCONVENTIONAL WISDOM:
EssAYS oN ECONOMICS IN HONOR OF JoHN KENNETH GALBRAITii 65 (Samuel Bowles et al.
eds., 1989); supra note 206. Depending on the product and the range of available alterna
tives, consumer behavior may be slightly more complex. Where there are few close substi
tutes for a product, or where consumers have a degree of product loyalty, consumers initially
may prefer "voice" to "exit." See generally ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN, Exrr, VOICE, AND
LoYALTY: REsPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES (1970),
216.

See Gintis, supra note 215.

217.

See BuRNs, supra note 5,

at 16, 36.

218. Cf. Elkin-Koren, supra note 6, at 110 (arguing that copyrighted works should not be
treated as interchangeable co=odities in economic models).
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that it does not.219 The elasticity of demand for information prod
ucts also is an open question, and may well vary for different types
of works or different types of content.220 Even where consumers
are indifferent as between two different works of the same general
type, such as newspapers, romance novels, or word processing pro
grams, they may feel it important to purchase some work that falls
within that category.

Further research is needed to determine

whether and to what extent demand for creative and informational
works is independent of their market price.
There is also insufficient information from which to conclude
that, in a mature market, vendors of substitutable products will
compete to offer less restrictive access terms. In rapidly evolving
markets, such as the market for personal computing software, new
entrants can gain substantial market share by offering their prod
ucts without copy-protection, or as unrestricted shareware.221 In
sharp contrast, although the two dominant providers of online legal
219. It is worth noting that the public-goods rationale for copyright protection accepts
that granting the copyright monopoly will result in a certain amount of "deadweight loss" that is, that there will be consumers who wish to transact in the work, but at a price lower
than the monopoly price. See, e.g., Elkin-Koren, supra note 6, at 99. In other words, the right
to charge supracompetitive prices is built into the structure of the market for copyrighted
works. It has been argued that this statutory monopoly usually does not translate into mar
ket power in the economic sense, and current antitrust policy reflects this belief. See Guide
lines of Apr. 6, 1995, 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 'l[ 13,132, at 20,734; Bell, supra note 5, at 58889 n.142; Note, Clarifying the Copyright Misuse Defense: The Role ofAntitrust Standards and
First Amendment Values, 104 HAR.v. L. RE.v. 1289, 1298-99 (1991). However, the question
requires further study. What is the relevant market? How is the substitutability of intellec
tual products to be judged? Is any one book about American history, or any one Pulitzer
Prize-winning novel, or any one comic book, as good as any other? For a preliminary explo
ration of these questions, see Fisher, supra note 26, at 1700-03.
220. Researchers investigating consumer responses to an eight-month-long newspaper
strike in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, found that some of consumers' informational needs were
filled by other news media, particularly television. Thus, for example, consumers felt them
selves to be well-informed about the candidates in the upcoming presidential and senatorial
elections. They were less aware, however, of candidates for congressional seats and of local
news, sports, and cultural events. See JEFFREY J. MoNDAK, NoTiiING TO READ: NEWSPA
PERS AND ELECTIONS IN A SOCIAL EXPERIMENT 61-67 (1995); Associated Press, Missing
News: Pittsburgh Readers Weather Newspaper Strike, ST. Lams PosT-DISPATCH, July 12,
1992, at E4; Bob Hertzel, Pirates Merely a Rumor: In Pittsburgh, Newspaper Strike Has Cut
Flow of Information, SAN FRANCISCO EXAMINER, Oct. 9, 1992, at E3; Reuters, Bad News:
Pittsburgh Mourns Loss of City's Struck Papers, ST. Lams PoST-DisPATCH, Aug. 27, 1992, at
3B. In light of my arguments about the constrained nature of consumer sovereignty, infra
text accompanying notes 221-50, it is worth noting that the strike directly affected only one of
Pittsburgh's two major daily newspapers. Pursuant to a previous agreement, the other news
paper suspended publication during the strike. See Jeff Barker, Pittsburgh Copes With Life
Without Newspapers: Gaps Are Filled During Strike in Subtle, Significant and Bizarre Ways,
BUFFALO NEws, Sept. 6, 1992, at A7.
221. In the mid-1980s, Borland used this strategy to great advantage and discovered that
consumers were willing to pay a higher price for unprotected software. See Paul B. Carroll,
On Your Honor: Software Firms Remove Copy-Protection Devices, WALL ST J., Sept. 25,
1986, at 86; Philip Elmer-DeWitt, A Victory for the Pirates? Software Firms Abandon Their
Key Defense Against Illegal Copying, TIME, Oct. 20, 1986, at 86.
.
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reference materials, West and Mead Data Central, compete vigor
ously on price and service, they seem to have a firm sense of their
shared interest regarding more serious matters such as the scope of
subscribers' contractual rights to use and reuse digital content.
Their standard form restrictions on reuse are remarkably similar.222
To the extent that a particular work is unique in an economic
sense (as opposed to merely "original"), or that demand for a par
ticular type of work is independent of price and other terms, it will
be the publisher who has the power to dictate the terms of use.
Here, the analysis offered by Merges and O'Rourke illustrates the
conceptual limits of the neoclassical model. They appear to regard
works as fungible commodities and do not address substitutability
or elasticity issues. They do recognize the concept of market power
in the antitrust sense, and even extend that concept to encompass
oligopoly that results in substantial uniformity of the terms of ac
cess to digital content.223 Consistent with the received neoclassical
tradition, however, they seem to regard either form of market
power as the extraordinary case.224 This is puzzling; economists
have recognized for nearly one hundred years that where technol
ogy creates significant economies of scale, markets tend toward
dominance by a few large players.225 In recent years, many of the
222. See General Terms and Conditions for use of the Lexis-Nexis Services (visited Sept.
25, 1998) <http://www.lexis-nexis.comflncc/abouUterms.html>; West Group Notice of Copy
right and Trademarks (visited Oct. 19, 1998) <http://www.westgroup.com/westhome/copy
right.htm>; Contract Between West and University of Pittsburgh School of Law (on file with
author). The prohibition on reverse engineering found in most mass-market software
"licenses" also is remarkably uniform. See, e.g., O'Rourke, Drawing the Boundary, supra
note 5, at 490-500. Uniformity does not necessarily indicate economic optimality, moreover.
A recent theoretical literature exploring standardization in corporate contracting practices
demonstrates that such standardization can occur for a variety of reasons unrelated to effi
ciency, including learning and network externalities and strategic behavior. See, e.g., Marcel
Kahan & Michael Klausner, Standardization and Innovation in Corporate Contracting (Or
"The Economics of Boilerplate"), 83 VA L. REv. 713, 715-16 (1997); Jody S. Kraus, Legal
Design and the Evolution of Commercial Norms, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 377 (1997). The implica
tions of this literature for "boilerplate" in the consumer mass market remain to be explored.
223. See Merges, The End of Friction?, supra note 5, at 126; Merges, supra note 61, at
1611-13; O'Rourke, Copyright Preemption, supra note 5, at 82; O'Rourke, Drawing the
Boundary, supra note 5, at 541-55.
224. See Merges, The End of Friction?, supra note 5, at 126.
225. See, e.g., GALBRAITii, supra note 205, at 131-35, 140-41; NAOMI R. LAMOREAUX,
THE GREAT MERGER MOVEMENT IN AMERICAN BUSINESS, 1895-1904 (1985); PAPANDREOU,
supra note 132, at 14-15 (discussing ALFRED MARSHALL, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS (1920));
PoLANY1, supra note 189; Samuels, Further Limits, supra note 36, at 432-33; Solo, supra note
36, at 46-47 ("The theory of monopolistic competition is tucked away in every text, but its
relevance and its implications are ignored."). In the market for computer software, network
effects centered around proprietary standards intensify this phenomenon. See Mark A.
Lemley, Antitrust and the Internet Standardization Problem, 28 CoNN. L. REV. 1041 (1996);
Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Legal Implications of Network Economic Effects, 86
CAL. L. REv. 479 (1998).
.
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major copyright industries have undergone enormous consolida
tion.226 If "market success" is defined as a perfectly competitive,
atomistic market comprised of independent transactions in fungible
commodities, it may be that (at least for information markets) mar
ket failure is the rule, not the exception.
The neoclassically-grounded understandings of market power
and consumer sovereignty also overlook the fact that power imbal
ances may arise in markets for reasons other than market share. In
particular, it is worth considering more carefully two oft-cited ex
amples of consumers' power to affect product offerings in high
technology markets. In the mid-1980s, consumers' vehement un
happiness with software copy-protection devices - and their per
sistent and creative efforts to defeat them - drove software
manufacturers to abandon the devices.227 More recently, the failure
(or lack of success) of several widely-publicized fee-based Internet
publishing ventures has led some commentators to argue that con
sumers will reject pay-per-use schemes for access to digital con
tent.228 Placed in context, however, these two examples should lead
us to question whether the scope of consumer power may be more
limited than has been acknowledged.229 Both episodes may repre226. See BEN H. BAGDIKIAN, THE MEDIA MONOPOLY (5th ed. 1997); C. EDWIN BAKER,
ADVERTISING AND A DEMOCRATIC PRESS (1994); BENJAMIN R. BARBER, JIHAD VS.
McWoRLD 137-48 (1995); NoAM CHOMSKY & EDWARD HERMAN, MANuFACTURING CoN
SENT: THE PoLmCAL EcoNoMY OF THE MAss MEDIA 3-14 (1988).
227. See Carroll, supra note 221; Elmer-DeWitt, supra note 221; T.R. Reid, Consumers
Win as More Software Firms End Copy Protection, WASH. PoST, Nov. 10, 1986, (Wash. Bus.),
at 13 [hereinafter Reid, Consumers Win]; T.R. Reid, Let Freedom - From Copy Protection
Gimmicks - Ring, WASH. PoST, Apr. 28, 1986, (Wash. Bus.), at 25 [hereinafter Reid, Free
dom]; Lotus Plans to Cut Anti-Copying Device From 1-2-3 Program, WALL ST. J., Sept. 16,
1987, § 2, at 38.
228. See, e.g., Iver Peterson, Wall Street Journal on Line: Readers Pay but Profits Remain
Elusive, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 1997, at D8 (describing failure of Microsoft's on-line magazine,
Slate, to generate paying subscribers and uncertain future of Wall Street Journal's Interactive
Edition); Jared Sandburg, Web Magazines' New Battle Cry: Charge!, WALL ST. J., Feb. 26,
1998, at Bl; E-mail from T!Illothy C. May to Recipients of List CO-E-CONF (Nov. 7, 1996)
(on file with author) (proceedings of 25-person online focus group convened by the United
States Copyright Office, as part of its "Project Looking Forward," to discuss the future devel
opment of Internet technology and its implications for copyright); infra note 229. But see
infra note 243 (observing that both of these ventures appear to be succeeding at their second
attempts to charge subscribers).
229. Interestingly, these examples have been cited by co=entators on all sides of the
digital CMS question. Opponents of the private-law approach to digital copyright use them
to argue that consumers will (and should) reject restrictions on their traditional fair use
rights. See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, Will the Copyright Office Be Obsolete in the Twenty-First
Century?, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 55, 59-60 (1994). They join a cadre of self
proclaimed "digerati" who assert that information cannot be fenced, and that in order to
succeed as business ventures, purveyors of information must attempt to differentiate them
selves on quality of service issues. See, e.g., John Perry Barlow, The Economy of Ideas: A
Framework for Rethinking Patents and Copyrights in the Digital Age, WIRED, Mar. 1994, at
84; Stewart Brand, Finding A Balance in the Slippery Economics of an Information Age:
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sent little more than skirmishes in a larger contest that content
providers appear to be winning - aided in no small part by the
legal and market institution of the standard form contract, which
ensures that consumers and producers do not start out on the level
playing field posited by neoclassical theory.
The consumer rebellion against software copy-protection de
vices was both more and less than the populist revolt that it has
come to symbolize. Although many consumers objected to copy
protection on principle, others balked at the inconvenience and
sheer frustration the devices entailed. This latter group included
large numbers of corporate and governmental consumers of
software products. Early copy-protection devices prevented users
from creating back-up copies of the floppy disks containing the
original copies of the software and, often, from loading purchased
programs onto hard-disk storage for more efficient use.23° In addi
tion, some devices caused system crashes and peripheral device fail
ures.231 These problems spelled disaster for organizational users
that relied on the copy-protected software to run their opera
tions.232 Media coverage of the copy-protection debacle suggests
that it was these consumers whose protests mattered most to
Depending on Your Perspective, Data's Free - or Priceless, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 8, 1987; Esther
Dyson, Intellectual Value, WIRED, July 1995, at 136.
If this latter group of critics is right, of course, digital CMS do not seem to have much of a
future, and the potential threat to user privileges traditionally afforded by the public law of
copyright need not concern us greatly. The cybereconomists do not make (or, for that mat
ter, address) that argument, but simply maintain or assume that consumers will exercise their
power to reject particular terms and conditions that they find unpalatable. See, e.g., Bell,
supra note 5, at 601-08; O'Rourke, Copyright Preemption, supra note 5, at 81-89. In fact,
however, the positions staked out by thinkers like Dyson and Barlow, on the one hand, and
copyright owners and the cybereconomists, on the other, are not as different as they seem.
Perhaps because of their belief that "information wants to be free," Dyson and Barlow seem
comfortable with the idea that purveyors of digital information should enjoy broad contrac
tual authority. See Barlow, supra; Brand, supra; Dyson, supra. The theory seems to be that if
contractual restrictions on the use of information acquired from any particular vendor cannot
impede the flow of information in society generally, there is no reason not to allow such
restrictions. That theory, of course, presumes a perfectly functioning neoclassical market of
the sort that does not exist. See supra section II.A.
Pamela Samuelson, on the other hand, has used the example of copy-protection in the
1980s to argue that consumers will take matters into their own hands and develop ways of
defeating unpopular copy-protection schemes - as long as the government does not make it
illegal to do so. See Samuelson, supra, at 59-60. Allowing consumers to exercise this power
would, of course, be inconsistent with the cybereconomists' proposed private-law regime.
For further discussion of this issue, see infra text accompanying notes 263-66 and 274-76.
230. See, e.g., Carroll, supra note 221; Reid, Consumers Win, supra note 227; Reid, Free
dom, supra note 227.
231. See, e.g., Tun Frost, Tales From the Encryption Wars: CD-Secure2 Software,· CD
Cops Disc Analysis Software; DiscGuard Encryption Device; CopyLok Encryption Device,
ONE TO ONE, Dec. 1, 1997.
232. See, e.g., Carroll, supra note 221 (quoting complaints of personal computing man
ager at Coopers & Lybrand).
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software companies. Deciding factors in many software companies'
decisions to abandon copy-protection were "the objections of the
big corporations - the kinds of places that tend to have a few hun
dred IBM PCs spread around the company," and the Department
of Defense's ban on the purchase of copy-protected programs for
its own internal use.233
After the software industry had conceded defeat, however, the
Software Publishers' Association undertook an aggressive cam
paign designed to convince its members' corporate customers of
their visibility and vulnerability to copyright infringement lawsuits,
and made known that it "would welcome a case to prosecute."234
Meanwhile, software firms began to redesign the offending devices.
More recent efforts eliminate many of the undesirable side-effects
of the first-generation devices - for example, by using more dura
ble CD-ROM media to distribute software products, and encryp
tion coupled with "licensed" authorized-user access codes, rather
than malfunction-prone jamming devices, to protect against copy
ing.235 Although there is still considerable resistance to the idea of
copy-protection among some consumer communities, there is some
evidence that these hybrid technological and contractual copy
protection regimes are beginning to achieve market penetration
among corporate customers.236
Experiments with copy-protection devices for- other types of
mass-marketed works have yielded varying results. Thus far, con
sumers have refused to buy digital audio tape machines and media
outfitted with serial copy management technology that prevents
233. See Reid, Consumers Win, supra note 227; Elmer-DeWitt, supra note 221. In
Hirschman's terms, these large corporate customers chose to combine "voice" with credible
threats of exit. See HmsCHMAN, supra note 215, at 30-43. A key factor in that decision may
have been their sizable investments in software and employee training. See id. at 92-98 (pre
dicting that high costs of entry may create a "loyalty" effect, which will incline customers to
try voice first in order to preserve their initial investment). Because of their size, these cus
tomers' threats posed a serious financial risk to software vendors.
234. Peter Coffee, Fear ofProsecution Prompts Comeback ofHardware Keys, PC WEEK,
Apr. 3, 1989, at 13.
235. See Frost, supra note 231:
236. See id.; Philip E. Ross, Cops Versus Robbers in Cyberspace, FoRBES, Sept. 9, 1996, at
134; A License You'd Like to Lose, PC MAG., Apr. 22, 1997, at 29; see also Coffee, supra note
234. It is worth noting that the SPA and another industry association, the Business Software
Alliance, have continued to maintain an aggressive enforcement stance. See Susan Athey &
John Plotnicki, Would the Software Police Find Your Company Guilty?, 45 J. SYs. MGT., Oct.
1994, at 32; Kelly R. Bowers, Piracy and Penance: How In-House Counsel Deal With
Software Piracy and Make lnfringers Pay, 7 CoRP. LEG. TIMES, May 1997, at 1; Software
Publishers' Assoc., Directory of Piracy/Releases (visited Oct. 11, 1998) <http://www.spa.org/
piracy/releases>.
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second-generation copying.237 However, both machines and re
cording media cost substantially more than their analog counter
parts, and high-fidelity digital sound recordings are already
available on compact disc. Meanwhile, anti-copying devices are
routinely incorporated into videocassettes sold for commercial
rental.238 Although anti-anti-copying devices exist, there is no evi
dence suggesting that substantial numbers of ordinary consumers
use them.239
The track record of pay-per-use models for digital publishing is
better. Arguments that all such models are destined to fail ignore
the unequivocal success of online pay-per-use services aimed at par
ticular market segments - for example, legal and business
databases such as LEXIS/NEXIS, Westlaw, and Dialog.240 Experi
ments with different bundling and fee structures for Internet deliv
ery of specialized content to various technical and academic
markets are now underway.241 Library organizations are working
to develop policies for licensing and making available to patrons
digital content provided on a pay-per-use basis, and thousands of
for-profit libraries of digital information already exist.242 This sug237. See Ken C. Pohlmann, Swashbuckled (digital video disc piracy), VIDEO MAo., Dec.
1, 1996. Despite the opposition of the home recording industry, music producers successfully
lobbied Congress to pass an amendment to the Copyright Act requiring the installation of
serial copy management technology on all digital audio recording equipment and media. See
Audio Home Recording Act of 1992, 17 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1101 {1994).
238. See Nicholas E. Sciorra, Self-Help & Contributory Infringement: The Law and Legal
Thought Behind a Little 'Black-Box, ' 11 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. LJ. 905, 925-26 (1993).
239. See id. at 928-29.
240. See E-Mail from Brian Kahin, Director, Information Infrastructure Project, John F.
Kennedy School of Government, to Recipients of List CO-E-CONF (Nov. 10, 1996) {pro
ceedings of 25-person online focus group convened by the United States Copyright Office, as
part of its "Project Looking Forward," to discuss the future development of Internet technol
ogy and its implications for copyright) (on file with author) ("Metered-use charging on the
Web will come into its own for high-value information and certain forms of niche market
ing. . . . ); E-Mail from Tnnothy C. May to Recipients of List CO-E-CONF (Nov. 10, 1996)
(on file with author).
"

241. See Jeffrey K. MacKie-Mason & Juan F. Riveros, Economics and Electronic Access
to Scholarly Information, in INTERNET PuBLISHING AND BEYOND: THE EcoNOMICS OF Dm1.
TAL INFORMATION AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (Deborah Hurley et al. eds., forthcoming
1998); John Chung-I Chuang & Marvin A. Sirbu, The Bundling and Unbundling of Informa
tion Goods: Economic Incentives for the Network Delivery of Academic Journal Articles,
(visited Oct. 11, 1998) <http://www.ini.cmu.edu/-sirbu/pubs.html>; see also Hal R. Varian,
Pricing Information Goods, (visited Oct. 11, 1998) <http://www.sims.berkeley.edu/-hal/peo
ple/haYpapers.htm>; Hal R. Varian, Versioning Information Goods, (last modified Mar. 13,
1997) <http://www.sims.berkeley.edu/-hal/people/hal/papers.htm> (discussing theoretical is
sues involved in designing a pay-per-use regime).
242. See Hal R. Varian, The Information Economy: How Much Will 1ivo Bits Be Worth
in the Digital Marketplace?, Sci. AM., Sept. 1995, at 200, 201; Mary M. Case, Library As
sociations Endorse Principles for Licensing Electronic Resources (last modified July 15, 1997)
<http://www.arl.org/newsltr/194fficensing.html>.
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gests that the question is not whether rights management technolo
gies will be adopted, but the precise forms they will take in new
market segments. Self-evidently, consumers will not pay for infor
mation that is readily available elsewhere at no charge, but the
World Wide Web is still in its infancy as a commercial medium, and
the search for business models that might enable Internet publish
ers to capture some of the consumer surplus they generate is just
beginning.243
What are we to make of these stories? (And why not simply
conclude, along with the cybereconomists, that consumers are be
coming accustomed to, and maybe even starting to like, rights man
agement technologies and contractual pay-per-use regimes?)
Consumer sovereignty is, as Bowles and Gintis note, "a peculiarly
toothless kind of sovereignty."244 It is structural only; individual
consumers generally cannot initiate directed changes in the pattern
of supply.245 It is also largely reactive; "individuals are free not to
enter some transactions" but, unless they happen to be IBM or the
Department of Defense, generally are not free to require that spe
cific products, services, or features be offered.246 To capitalize on
the structural power of aggregate demand in a conscious fashion,
ordinary consumers must overcome significant collective action and
information costs.247 The same technologies that contribute to the
absence of "friction" may mitigate these problems - by, for exam
ple, reducing the communications costs that attach to organized
243. See Robin Pogrebin, For $19.95, Slate Sees Who Its Friends Are, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30,
1998, at Dl (reporting that Slate's second attempt to charge for subscriptions generated
17,000 paying subscribers in less than a month); Sandburg, supra note 228 (noting that two
years after the start of the Wall Street Journal's experiment, paid subscribers to Interactive
Edition have tripled and the service is expected to tum a profit in 1999). Moreover, the
failure rate for fee-paid online ventures must be assessed relative to the failure rate for print
media ventures aimed at the consumer mass market.
244. Bowles

&

Gintis, supra note 208, at 174.

245. See Samuel Bowles & Herbert Gintis, The Political Economy of Contested Exchange,
in RETHINKING PowER 196, 221 (Thomas E. Wartenburg ed., 1992).
246. See BROMLEY, supra note 36, at 65-66 ("I am free to buy any of the nine brands of
toothpaste that happen to be on the shelf, or to buy none at all. But if I happen to like a
different brand of toothpaste - one that cannot obtain scarce shelf space because of any
number of reasons - then I am not free to buy that brand of toothpaste."). O'Rourke might
respond that IBM and the Department of Defense, as rational consumers, will act in ways
that serve the interests of consumers generally. See O'Rourke, Copyright Preemption, supra
note 5, at 81-87. As the example of software copy protection shows, this is only true to the
extent that large/organizational consumers and small/individual consumers share the same
concerns.
247. See BROMLEY, supra note 36, at 65-66; see generally MANcuR Or.soN, THE Lome OF
COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS 33-36, 43-52, 124-31
(4th ed., 1971).
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protest activity - but they cannot eliminate them.248 Moreover, as
the example of software copy-protection technologies demon
strates, the obstacles to sustained collective action multiply when
the category "consumers" includes multiple constituencies with dif
ferent priorities.
Mobilizing consumer protest would be difficult enough if mar
kets for particular products tended to exist in the equilibrium states
posited by neoclassical theory. Capitalist markets, however, are dy
namic. In order to produce profits over the longer term, firms must
innovate and adapt to changing marketplace conditions.249 The his
tory of software copy-protection suggests that if consumers dislike a
product feature that is considered important to an industry's long
term success, or to increased profits, firms are unlikely to give up
without a fight. They may seek to alter the feature to please impor
tant customers, but they also will try to reeducate consumers as to
its desirability.250 In addition, because the major copyright indus
tries have far fewer producers than consumers, it has been compar
atively easy for producer firms to engage in collective action of
their own to promote their shared interests. Thus, for example, just
as the Software Publishers' Association has persuaded - or, de
pending on one's point of view, coerced - some consumers to
reevaluate software copy-protection, the Association of American
Publishers has taken a leadership role in developing and preaching

248. See Julie E. Cohen, A Right to Read Anonymously: A Closer Look at "Copyright
Management" in Cyberspace, 28 CoNN. L. REv. 981, 1000-01 & n.76 {1996) (noting that "ef
fective lobbying for legal change requires . . . sustained investment of effort and resources,
and some real-world infrastructure to coordinate that effort"); OLSON, supra note 247, at 47
(defining co=unications costs to include costs required "to obtain an agreement about how
the burden will be shared and to coordinate the effort to obtain the collective good").
Digital networks also make it easier for disgruntled consumers to exercise "voice," see
HIRSCHMAN, supra note 215, because it is easier to publicize protests and boycotts widely.
See, e.g., David White, Telefonica to Cut Rates After Protest, Fm. TIMES, Sept. 16, 1998, at 24
{describing successful consumer-organized protest against telephone rate hike in Spain);
Leslie Miller, Dion Concert Drawing Protests: Firm Sponsoring Singer's Tour Said to Trade
with Burma Regime, THE PATRIOT LEDGER (Quincy, Mass.), Aug. 21, 1998, at 5 (describing
use of Internet to organize a boycott of Swedish telecommunications company Ericsson's
consumer products). Hirschman's analysis suggests, however, that even so, only consumers
who feel they have expended significant entry costs will do so. See HIRS CHMAN, supra note
215, at 41-42. For most works, particularly given the low prices the cybereconomists predict,
this perception is unlikely. In addition, consumers who would be inclined to protest must still
overcome the other institutional constraints described in this Part.
249. See BOWLES & EDWARDS, supra note 205; JOSEPH
SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 79-80, 82-91 (3d ed. 1950).

A. SCHUMPETER,

CAPITALISM,

250. Cf. Goldberg, supra note 79, at 482-83 ("[T]he flow of information can be manipu
lated to influence outcomes. . . . The obvious implication of this is that a group should allo
cate resources toward the manipulation of information to induce favorable results.").
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the virtues of digital CMS.251 Consumer organizations have grown
more skilled at sensing and responding to industry initiatives, but
are comparatively underfunded and understaffed.252
This structural producer-consumer imbalance is amplified by
real-world legal and market institutions that discourage consumer
agency. As discussed in section II.A, the legal rules governing stan
dard form contracts presume consent to most terms in most cases,
even as they reduce the likelihood that consumers will know and
understand the terms to which they supposedly have agreed.253 As
Victor Goldberg explains, this regime is not neutral. A societal
choice to delegate most commercial rulemaking to private actors in
markets gives the edge to those groups that organize most effi
ciently in markets - namely, private firms.254 Under such a re
gime, moreover, "the firm's power does not depend on its being
large within a particular market."255 In the non-digital world, the
coercive nature of the standard form is mitigated by the fact that
many consumers simply ignore the restrictions.256 Digital rights
management technologies eliminate that option for most ordinary
consumers. Consumers in aggregate may have (potential) power,
but the individual consumer has the "choice" of submitting to the
commands of the standard-form-as-code or doing without the de
sired work.257 It is not particularly surprising that, although con251. See Hearing on H.R. 2281 and 2280, supra note 33, at 204-12 (statement of Allan R.
Adler, Vice-President for Legal and Governmental Affairs, Association of American Pub
lishers); Hearing on H.R. 2441, supra note 33, at 180-203 (statement of Richard Robinson,
Chairman, President, and CEO, Scholastic, Inc., on behalf of the Association of American
Publishers); BURNS, supra note 5, at 59-62; Gervais, From Rights Trading to Electronic Pub
lishing, supra note 24. For a list of the other industry associations that have advocated the
necessity of digital CMS, see supra note 33.
252. In 1995, the annual incomes of the Association of American Publishers and the Mo
tion Picture Association of America, two of the largest copyright industry organizations,
were $7.4 million and $29.3 million, respectively. In contrast, the annual incomes of various
Digital Future Coalition member organizations were: Electronic Frontier Foundation, $1.1
million; Electronic Privacy Information Center {1997 data), $200,000; Home Recording
Rights Coalition, $94,000. See ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ASSOCIATIONS (1998); NATIONAL DIREc.
TORY OF NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS (1995).
253. See supra text accompanying notes 72-79.
254. See Goldberg, supra note 79, at 474-79, 484-88; see also Samuels, Further Limits,
supra note 36, at 438-39; supra note 79; cf. OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE EcoNOMIC INSTITU
TIONS OF CAPITALISM: FIRMS, MARKE-rs, RELATIONAL CONTRACTING 85-130 (1985)
(describing the efficiency gains derivable from hierarchical organization within markets).
255. Goldberg, supra note 79, at 479.
256. Cf. Goldberg, supra note 79, at 485 n.53 ("The oppressiveness of the standardized
terms is somewhat attenuated by the fact that the firms often do not enforce them."). In
addition, many courts have held "shrinkwrap" license provisions unenforceable. See supra
note 70. On content providers' strategy for responding to this judicial intransigence, see infra
section III.A.2.
257. Cf. Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse: What the Law of Cyberspace Might
Teach, STAN. TECH. L. REv., 'll 88 (draft 1997) <http://stlr.stanford.edu/STLR/Work-
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sumers have been able to convince manufacturers to rethink
specific experiments with rights management technologies, they do
not seem to have succeeded in using market mechanisms to displace
a research, development, and public relations trajectory dedicated
to implementing these techno-contractual regimes in the long
run.258 Indeed, it would seem entirely reasonable to hypothesize
that once copyright owners have developed reliable technologies
and reached sufficiently broad consensus on the level of control to
be implemented, consumers may have difficulty using their "power
to switch" to obtain substantial or qualitative change - even if
many consumers dislike rights management technologies and frac
tional usage rights and believe that they would derive increased
utility from decreased author/owner control.259
ing_Papers/97_Lessig_l/article.htm> ("[I]n fact, these code constraints are not 'contracts.'
Sure, they are 'like' contracts: they are both self-imposed constraints. But 'like' is not 'is.'").
258. See Goldberg, supra note 79, at 484-91; Samuels, Further Limits, supra note 36, at
422 ("Power structure is a partial input and a partial output of the market."). Consumer
advocacy groups have achieved more success on the legislative front. See infra text accompa
nying notes 282-85.
1\vo consumer-driven developments that bear further watching, however, are Linux - a
computer operating system developed by a Fmnish university student who was dissatisfied
with the products then available on the market - and the GNU project - a project to
develop, share, and collaboratively improve non-proprietary, "open-source" computer
software. See Josh McHugh, For the Love of Hacking, FORBES, Aug. 10, 1998, at 94. Both
software systems trace their origins - and their growing popularity - to a dissatisfaction
with proprietary models for software development that emphasize intellectual property rights
and discourage knowledge-sharing. See id.,· Ira V. Heffan, Note, Copyleft: Licensing Collab
orative Works in the Digital Age, 49 STAN. L. REv. 1487 (1997). GNU products, for example,
are distributed under a "General Public License" that requires users to forgo proprietary
rights in their own modifications to the software and dedicate those modifications to the
public domain. See Heffan, supra.
For most ordinary consumers, Linux and the GNU products are esoterica. They require a
certain amount of effort and knowledge to obtain and install; proprietary systems such as
Microsoft Wmdows, meanwhile, come pre-loaded onto personal computers. See Nicholas
Petreley, Down to the Wire: This Happy Linux Camper ls Crying a River Over All the Polit
ical Infighting, INFoWoRLD, Aug. 24, 1998. Since its inception in 1993, however, Linux has
earned extremely high ratings for quality and has achieved an installed base of approximately
5 to 10 million users. See McHugh, supra, at 96; Robert F. Young, Sizing the Linux Market
(last revised Mar. 5, 1998) <http://www.redhat.com/redhat/linuxmarket.html>. While this
number is small compared with the estimated 100 million users of Microsoft Windows 95, it
has doubled every year. Compare Young, supra, at 6 with Microsoft Corporation, Windows
Momentum (visited Nov. 4, 1998) <http://www.microsoft.com/hwdev/presents/respec/melt98/
1_7jima/sld003.htm>. Unlike the vast majority of Wmdows users, moreover, Linux and GNU
users are fiercely loyal to the software and the principles for which it stands. See McHugh,
supra. Whether Linux and GNU can become significant competition for Windows in the
consumer mass market, and in the OEM licensing market that serves the consumer mass
market, \vill be an important test of information consumers' power to demand and receive
different information products and different approaches to intellectual property protection.
259. Of course, if utility is synonymous with wealth, as adherents of neoclassically
grounded law and economics conveniently assume, this simply would mean that consumers
do not value decreased control as much as copyright owners value increased control, and that
the market has reached the efficient equilibrium point. Making wealth the measure of utility,
however, grossly oversimplifies utilitarian theory and ignores substantial empirical and theo-
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Viewed in light of the doubly constrained nature of consumer
sovereignty, Merges's work is both a promising first step toward a
model of exchange in information markets and an excellent exam
ple of the dimensional limitations of neoclassically-grounded mar
ket models.

Merges ' s institutional focus underscores the

significance of endogenous enforcement mechanisms in determin
ing market structure.260 However, he stops short of exploring the
ramifications for power, and appears to presume that market forces

will produce an equilibrium of sorts among collective institutions.261
If every potential reader of a digital work is also a creator and a
member of one of the competing collective enforcement organiza
tions, this model might be appropriate.262 In practice, however, this
is hardly likely to be the case. Many (if not most) readers will par
ticipate in the dynamic process of endogenous enforcement only in
their reactive capacity, as consumers rather than as coequal archi
tects of long-term rights management strategies. In addition,
Merges takes the existing legal and market institution of the stan
dard form as given, and as a result overlooks the power imbalance
that this institution fosters.
One might object, however, that characterizing consumers as
purely reactive overstates the case. The history of software copy
protection also teaches us that some consumers will develop and
market devices designed to defeat rights management technolo
gies.263 Elsewhere, I have argued that the law should not prohibit
consumers from circumventing digital CMS to defend privileges tra
ditionally afforded under the public law of copyright, and that fed
eral copyright law and policy instead should be interpreted
affirmatively to authorize such conduct.264 Considered within the
retical literatures demonstrating that utility cannot be and is not assessed solely in monetary
terms. See supra text accompanying notes 132, 160.
260. See Merges, Contracting Into Liability Rules, supra note 5.
261. See id. at 1319.
262. A similar theory appears to underlie Xanadu, the collective remuneration system
proposed by Internet pioneer Ted Nelson. See Pamela Samuelson & Robert J. Glushko,
Intellectual Property Rights for Digital Library and Hypertext Publishing Systems, 6 HARV.
J.L. & TECH. 237 (1993).
263. See, e.g., Brand, supra note 229; Alison Cunliffe, Toronto Firm Sells Tools for Un
locking Copy-Proof Program, SUNDAY STAR TORONTO, July 27, 1986, at F5; Elmer-DeWitt,
supra note 221; Samuelson, supra note 229, at 59-60.
264. See Cohen, supra note 49, at 1137-42; Cohen, supra note 9, at 178; Lawrence Lessig,
Tyranny in the Infrastructure, WIRED, July 1997, at 96 {labeling this argument the "Cohen
theorem"); supra note 214 (discussing self-help as the endogenous enforcement strategy of
choice for consumers); cf. Cohen, supra note 248, at 1019-30 (arguing that first amendment
should protect individuals who tamper with digital CMS in order to preserve their
anonymity).
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"contested exchange" framework, such technological countermea
sures are simply consumers' way of attempting to restore "bilateral
power" to the contest.265 This, however, does not seem to be the
sort of market competition the cybereconomists contemplate, and
here the existing institutional framework of the standard form con
tract becomes vitally important. Under a private-law regime of
rights in digital works, designed as a technological analogue of the
standard form contract to which consumers have grown accustomed
(or inured) in other contexts, use of consumer-developed technolo
gies to circumvent digital CMS would constitute a breach of con
tract.266 Under such a regime, consumers' power to contest the
terms of exchanges in digital works in the market arena would be
substantially curtailed.
This line of reasoning, however, suggests a more general objec
tion to modeling transactions in digital works as "contested ex
changes," which arises within the model itself. Bowles and Gintis
suggest that "superior" enforcement strategies may develop that
would eliminate short-side power and enable markets to clear.267
Arguably, even if publishers currently have greater bargaining
power than consumers, digital rights management technologies will
eliminate or mitigate this power. As envisioned by copyright own
ers and their supporters in the academy, digital CMS and the pri
vate law of contract will replace the uncertain terrain delineated by
fair use and other statutory exemptions with a menu of neatly de
fined, individually priced usage rights from which consumers may
choose.268 There will be, quite simply, nothing left to contest. This
description, however, conveniently overlooks the fact that, from the
user's perspective, the central issue in the contest over usage rights
is one of institutional design - whether copyright owners should be
allowed to adopt such technologies of control, and the contract
based regime that they effectuate, at all. From this perspective, the
265. See Bowles & Gintis, supra note 208, at 184; supra text accompanying note 210.
266. See Hardy, supra note 5, at 235-36; cf. I. Trotter Hardy, The Ancient Doctrine of
Trespass to Web Sites, 1996 J. ONLINE L. art. 7, 'll'J[ 5-6 (1996) <http://www.wm.edu/law/publi
cations/jol/hardy/html> (suggesting that undesired entry upon digital "property" could be
viewed, by analogy to real property, as trespass). For three years copyright owners have
been seeking legislation at the state level designed to accomplish precisely this result, along
with federal legislation that would make circumventing digital CMS illegal. See Hearing on
H.R. 2281 and 2280, supra note 33. See U.C.C. ART. 2B: LICENSES (Annual Meeting Draft
July 1998), supra note 24, §§ 2B-208, -310, -714, -715; sources cited supra note 33. Thus,
copyright owners themselves do not seem to be relying purely on markets to achieve their
desired goals. This observation and its implications for the cybereconomists' argument about
the appropriate forum for social choice are discussed infra section 111.A.2.
267. See Bowles & Gintis, supra note 208, at 184; supra note 213.
268. See supra text accompanying notes 24-32.
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evolving publisher-consumer struggle over copy-protection and
pay-per-use technologies has been one long contested exchange
concerning institutional choice, the outcome of which is still
uncertain.
Bowles and Gintis also observe that the more powerful party to
a contested exchange will attempt to select production technologies
that maximize its ability to enforce its desired standards, even
though those technologies might not be the optimal ones by some
other measure. Thus, for example, in certain sectors of the labor
market, the assembly line establishes quantitative, automatically
enforced standards for work performance; in others, the technology
of choice is the computer that measures words typed or grocery
items scanned per minute.269 Closer to the institutionalist main
stream, Goldberg observes that it is simply rational for parties to
seek additional profits by altering existing institutions to their ad
vantage.270 The digital rights management movement exemplifies
this type of rational self-interest, but that does not make it the best
solution for society generally. The fact that a technology may en
able market formation is not the sole criterion of merit; technolo
gies also shape markets and entitlements by creating some options
and foreclosing others.271 We are back to the same question that
Hardy's property-rights proposal raises, posed in a slightly different
form: Do digital CMS enable development of the socially optimal
market structure - i.e., the one that optimizes overall or social wel
fare? The answer, once again, depends on the social-welfare func
tion that we are seeking to optimize.

Before turning to that

question, however, it is worth briefly considering how the process of
collective choice through legislation affects, and is affected by, the
dynamic of contested exchange in the market for digital works.

269. See Bowles & Gintis, supra note 208, at 186-87.
270. See Goldberg, supra note 79, at 471-72 ("There is a kernel of truth in the notion that
institutions will adjust to changes in technology . . . . However, it is also clear that these will
not be the only institutional changes that take place. Tue group's incentives are not to maxi
mize the size of the pie for society; the incentive instead is to maximize the rewards to the
group."); id. at 479 ("Why would a[ firm] that is actively seeking profits within the rules of the
game not seek further profits by altering the rules of the game as well - especially when its
structure [as an efficient collective institution] makes it likely that it will succeed?"); id. at
482-83 ("[T]he flow of information can be manipulated to influence outcomes. . . . Tue obvi
ous implication of this is that a group should allocate resources toward the manipulation of
information to induce favorable results."); Goldberg, supra note 104, at 124-28; cf.
PAPANDREou, supra note 132, at 215-16, 225 (suggesting that the development of entitle
ments will be determined in part by the distribution of "power, coercion, and influence" in
society).
271. For further discussion of this point, see infra Part IV.
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Collective Action, "Rent-Seeking, " and Public Choice

The cybereconomists contend that the public-law regime of
copyright and the legislative process that produced it are inefficient
and inherently coercive, and that rights in digital works should be
determined through voluntary, definitionally private, market trans
actions.212 I have argued, however, that private ordering necessar
ily presupposes a prior public commitment to recognizing and
enforcing a particular distribution of entitlements. Attempts to
seek legislative change or clarification may, and often do, reflect
attempts by economic interest groups to capture the public process,
but it does not follow that the existing regime is entitled to any
special presumption of legitimacy. An existing regime also may re
flect the results of earlier interest-group capture. Against the back
drop of contested exchange, it is only reasonable to expect interest
groups to use all available venues to advance their interests.213
When legislative change is sought, the real question is whether
shared conceptions of social welfare warrant reconsideration of the
framework of entitlements and contract rules that supports the ex
isting market.
Copyright owners' current efforts to strengthen their existing
rights suggest that they, at least, are well aware that public and pri
vate realms cannot be so neatly separated. Consistent with their
philosophy of absolute ownership and control, and with Goldberg's
predictions about the causes and directions of institutional drift, or
ganizations representing the major copyright industries have for the
last three years been seeking legislation from Congress that would
make technologies for circumventing digital CMS illegal regardless
of their intended use.274 Simultaneously, at the state level, many of
the same organizations are pursuing revisions to the Uniform Com
mercial Code that would make standard form contract terms im
posed by digital CMS enforceable, even

if

they abrogate the

balance established by copyright law, as long as consumers have the
opportunity to review the terms, and are required to indicate as272. See supra section II.A.
273. See Calabresi, supra note 104, at 1214 ("[I]n mixed systems like ours people will use
their distributional advantage in one medium to overcome their distribution disadvantage in
the other by 'altering' or 'corrupting' that other medium."); Goldberg, supra note 79, at 476·
81; Leff, supra note 36, at 467-69.
274. See S. 2037, 105th Cong. (1998); S. 1121, 105th Cong. (1997); H.R. 2281, 105th Cong.
(1997); S. 1284, 104th Cong. (1995); H.R. 2441, 104th Cong. (1998); NII WHITE PAPER, supra
note 9, at app.; Hearing on S. 1284, supra note 33; Hearing on H.R. 2281 and 2280, supra note
33; Hearing on H.R. 2441, supra note 33; Creative Incentive Coalition, Resources: Key Ques·
tions Answered (visited Sept. 27, 1998), <http://www.cic.org/resources/faq.htm.html>; Cohen,
supra note 9, at 164-71; Samuelson, supra note 9.
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sent, before first using the work.275 Proposed Article 2B of the
UCC also would expressly validate technological restrictions on ac
cess to and use of digital works, including mechanisms that cut off
user access to the work entirely in the event of a perceived
breach.276 Although neither proposal addresses the ultimate ques
tion of copyright preemption, as a practical matter either set of
changes would go a long way toward establishing the private-law
regime that the cybereconomists propose. Indeed, it is difficult to
imagine how their private-law model of rights in digital works could
be implemented fully without some legislative restructuring of the
current system.277
Public-choice analysis predicts that consumers will experience a
comparative disadvantage in the legislative arena. The public
choice critique of the legislative process focuses on the power of
small, well-organized interest groups to extract results more
favorable than they could obtain in the market. The theory posits
that collective action is less likely to occur when an interest group
has many members and the benefits of proposed legislation would
be diffuse. Under those conditions, group members are likelier to
conclude that the costs of collective action outweigh the benefits,
and/or to engage in opportunistic free riding on others' efforts.21s
Consumers are a paradigmatic example of this sort of group. To an
extent, predictions of consumer disempowerment are overstated; as
Peter Schuck points out, consumer advocacy groups have achieved
legislative successes that defied the predictions of public choice the-

275. See U.C.C. ART. 2B: LICENSES (Annual Meeting Draft July 1998) supra note 24,
§ 2B-208. At the NCCUSL's July 1998 annual meeting, the commissioners approved a mo
tion directing the drafting committee to amend Article 2B to allow judges to abrogate terms
that violate "public policies relating to innovation, competition, and free expression." How
ever, the next draft of Article 2B, which was supposed to incorporate the motion, substan
tially alters its language, omitting any mention of "innovation" or "free expression" and
referring only generally to "fundamental public policy." See U.C.C. ART. 2B: LICENSES
(Annual Meeting Draft July 1998), supra note 24, § 2B-105(b) & notes.

276. See U.C.C. ART. 2B: LICENSES (Annual Meeting
§§ 2B-310, 715; Cohen, supra note 49, at 1096-1101.

Draft July

1998), supra

note

24,

277. This is certainly true for Hardy's proposal, as Hardy acknowledges. See Hardy,
supra note 5, at 257-58. He does not explain why legislation establishing a private-property
regime would be less coercive than the current Copyright Act. It is conceivable that a
private-law regime based solely on the use of contract to opt out of the copyright system
could be implemented via judicial refusal to hold such contracts preempted. See supra text
accompanying notes 80-88 (discussing the Copyright Act's preemption of "equivalent" state
law rights). As noted above, however, courts have differed on the enforceability of "shrink
wrap" license terms as a mat,t_er of contract law. See supra note 70. Proposed Article 2B
would effectively overrule decisions denying enforceability.

278. See OLSON, supra note 247,

at

33-36, 43-52, 124-31.
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ory.279 Certainly, however, there is no reason to think that consum
ers are more likely than copyright owners to exert undue influence
over the content of copyright legislation.280 As noted above, copy
right owners have a long history of seeking, and receiving, ex
panded rights and other special protections from Congress.281
Consumers' power to affect the positive content of rules gov
erning the distribution of entitlements may be greater in the legisla
tive arena than in the market, however. As an initial matter, we
have seen that collective action also plays an important strategic
role in the consumer mass market; consumer groups face the same
obstacles to organization in either venue. But, as discussed above,
consumer power in the marketplace flows largely from the negative
"power to switch" as exercised by individuals. Consumers cannot
claim the right or authority to participate in decisions about product
development, or in the selection and drafting of standard form con
tract terms, in the same way that they can assert a right to be heard
by their elected representatives.282 Second, just as digital communi
cations technologies can reduce consumers' collective action costs
in markets, they also can reduce the costs of collective action di
rected at government. Due to a combination of these two factors,
the Digital Future Coalition, a coalition of public interest and con
sumer groups that has made extensive use of the Internet, kept the
proposed legislation banning circumvention technologies stalled in
committee for over two years.283 During that time, the coalition
279. See Peter H. Schuck, Against (and for) Madison: An Essay in Praise ofFactions, 15
L. & PoLY. REv. 553, 566-67 (1997); see also id. at 576 (noting that group size and
funding are not the only advantages that count).
280. The cybereconomists do not argue this expressly, but only that the legislative process
is comparatively costly and therefore less efficient than the market. As in the Lochner-era
cases, however, the clear implication is that legislation intended to protect "have-nots" is no
less invasive of economic liberty - and indeed, very likely more so - than legislation in
tended to protect "haves." See supra note 115.
281. See supra text accompanying note 100.
282. See also Schuck, supra note 279, at 576-78 (cataloguing potential sources of advan
tage, other than group size and funding, for interest groups in the legislative arena). Repre
sentatives of consumer groups have had greater difficulty penetrating the UCC drafting
process, which does not involve public officials. See U.C.C. ART. 2B: LICENSES (Annual
Meeting Draft July 1998), supra note 24 (listing members of drafting committee); id. at Pref
ace: Part I (describing drafting process); Gail Hillebrand, The Uniform Commercial Code
Drafting Process: Will Articles 2, 2B and 9 Be Fair To Consumers?, 15 WASH. U. L.Q. 69, 8193 (1997). The default rules that govern consumer transactions also are one step removed
from copyright concerns. It seems reasonable to suggest that with each degree of removal,
the benefits of collective action become more difficult for individual consumers to value, with
the result that the barriers to collective action are even harder to overcome.
283. See Angela Drolte Gregorits & Jennifer B. Lucas, Most Information Age Legislation
Stalled By Lack ofConsensus, Hill Sources Say, 66 PAT., COPYRIGHT & TRADEMARK J. 2259,
2261 (1997); Cohen, supra note 9, at 164-71; Digital Future Coalition, Collected Position Pa
pers, Letters, and Press Releases (visited Nov. 4, 1998) <http://www.dfc.org/>.
YALE
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and its members worked with sympathetic legislators to submit
competing legislation and to propose amendments to the opposing
bills - steps that they would not have been able to take in the
consumer mass market.284 As a result of this input, the anti
cireumvention legislation ultimately enacted differs significantly
from that originally proposed.285
Nonetheless, the fact that consumers may have slightly more
power, or a different kind of power, in the legislative arena than in
the market does not take us very far toward understanding whether
their influence on the legislative process is "undue." Deciding how
much influence is "proper" for a particular group requires refer
ence to what Einer Elhauge has described as "normative baselines"
concerning the rules of decision in social choice situations.286 For
the cybereconomists, as for public choice theorists generally, the
implicit normative baseline is that legislative outcomes should not
differ from those obtainable in the (existing) market, and that the
efficient outcome in either venue is that which maximizes private
284. See Digital Era Copyright Enhancement Act, H.R. 3048, 105th Cong. (1997); Digital
Copyright Clarification and Technology Education Act of 1997, S. 1146, 105th Cong. (1997);
Digital Future Coalition (visited Oct. 11, 1998) <http://www.dfc.org/>.
285. Different versions of the proposed legislation were passed by the Senate on May 14,
1998 and by the House on Aug. 4, 1998. See Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, S.
2037, 105th Cong. (1998); WIPO Copyright Treaties Implementation Act, H.R. 2281, 105th
Cong. (1997); Senate Approves Digital Copyright Act; Similar Proposal Moving Through
House, 66 U.S.L.W. (BNA) 2710 (1998). The Senate version - essentially the same as the
version backed by copyright owner groups - would have imposed an outright ban on cir
cumvention of digital CMS, with a few narrow exceptions. The House version - essentially
the version adopted - instead imposes a two-year moratorium on the anti-circumvention
provision and requires ongoing oversight by the Librarian of Congress to determine the pro
vision's impact on access to and fair use of digital works. Compare S. 2037, supra, § 103 with
H.R. 2281, supra, § 3; see DMCA, supra note 114. Although the Act includes a ban on cir
cumvention technologies that is not directly subject to the moratorium and oversight provi
sions, it also contains exceptions for software reverse engineering and encryption research.
See DMCA, supra note 114, at § 103. Fmally, it provides that the extra rights granted to
copyright owners shall not be construed to "enlarge or diminish any rights of free speech or
the press for activities using consumer electronics, teleco=unications, or computing prod
ucts." See id. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act is by no means an unqualified "victory"
for consumers; for example, it does not contain the across-the-board fair use exemption to
the anti-circumvention provision that consumer groups had proposed. See H.R. 3048, supra
note 284; S. 1146, supra note 284. Nonetheless, the Act contains important safeguards that
were not in the bill as originally proposed.
Particularly in light of this example, it is important to stress the narrowness of the argu
ment made in the text. The claim is not that consumers have equal or even substantial bar
gaining power in the public arena, but only that the potential exists in that arena, as it does
not in the market, for consumers to exert power in a mode that is other than purely reactive,
and thus to shape policy. In that respect, consumers appear to be slightly better off. Cf.
Goldberg, supra note 79, at 491 ("The point is that as badly as the consumer is likely to fare
in the legislative arena, he is likely to be relatively better off than if he were 'free' to negotiate
voluntary agreements to determine liability."). Ultimately, the distinction may not count for
much; on that question, it is too soon to tell.
286. See Elhauge, supra note 102, at 49-52.

538

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 97:462

wealth.287 Thus, should consumers manage to obtain legislation
that limits copyright owners' "liberty of contract" or derogates from
their control of their property, the cybereconomists probably would
find a prima facie case of abuse. But, as section II.B discussed, in
the case of copyrighted works one cannot simply assume that pri
vate wealth and social welfare are equivalent.288 Once one allows
for a broader conception of overall social welfare than that re
.fleeted in markets, it is at least possible that nonmarket mechanisms
for collective choice may bring us closer to achieving it. The legisla
tive process operates differently than the market by design; it is in
tended to maximize votes, not wealth, and re.fleets a considered
judgment that vote-maximization is often the better test of a pol
icy's validity.289 Whether the legislative process or the existing mar
ket is the better arena for determining the scope of rights in digital
works depends on how the societal goals of access and progress are
understood.290 To that question we now turn.
B. Information and Social Welfare
Because the cybereconomists assume that maximizing the mon
etary reward to copyright owners will produce the greatest gain for
society as a whole, they leave unexplored the question whether so
cial interests and social welfare might be better served by a limited
entitlements regime that enables some uncontrolled access to and
use of digital content. In fact, there is reason to doubt that the
cybereconomists' market-based model captures the total social
value generated by transactions in creative and informational
works. Recent work in the economics of information suggests that
287. See id. at 53-56; cf. Hovenkamp, supra note 98, at 98-104 {discussing public choice
theorists' presumption of inefficiency in "political markets"); supra text accompanying notes
112-16.

288. Nor, I would argue, can one do so in most other cases. See BROMLEY, supra note 36,
at 175-83; Veljanovski, supra note 104, at 19.
289. See Hovenkamp, supra note 98, at 81-89, 94-106; see also BROMLEY, supra note 36, at
224 ("[I]f markets do not perform well in a given situation, is it valid then to judge non
market processes by market performance indicators?"); Leff, supra note 36, at 468 ("[I]t is at
least plausible that the 'weaknesses' in the political system, such as its frustration of alloca
tional efficiency, are really complementary to, or even corrective of, 'weaknesses' in the eco
nomic system, such as its tendency to distribute power in proportion to wealth . . . . ");
Steams, supra note 102, at 1240-45 (showing that legislatures are better suited than markets
to correct for some types of market failure); cf. Goldberg, supra note 79, at 481 ("The voting
power of the poor might be relatively stronger than its financial power.").
290. Cf. Herbert Hovenkamp, Exchange on Public Choice, 57 U. CHI. L. REv. 840, 842

(1990) ("It is easy to begin with the observation that policymaking is indeterminate, and

conclude by finding fault with the democratic institutions or procedures that we use for mak
ing policy decisions. But often the failure is not in the institutions or procedures, but rather
in our inability to produce objectively correct answers to policy questions.").
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these transactions generate shared positive externalities that must
be considered when comparing the existing limited-entitlements re
gime with possible alternatives. Many of these benefits are exper
ienced as public goods and likely would be underproduced under a
private-law regime of rights in digital works. Thus, under such a
regime, the mix of benefits and costs generated by creative and in
formational works would be different than it is now.
To value these alternatives accurately, we must define the appli
cable social welfare function. How should "access" and "progress"
be understood, and why? Which combination of benefits and costs
is optimal? A more comprehensive understanding of individual
preferences and motivations requires that we consider both market
and nonmarket answers to these questions. Creative and informa
tional works affect individual and social self-determination in a va
riety of ways, many of which are not registered, much less
measured, by markets. It would be reasonable and entirely legiti
mate to conclude that the current limited-entitlements regime, or
something like it, is best-suited to promote our society's distinctive
blend of market and nonmarket values.

1.

Externalities in Information Markets

Assessment of the social value produced by a given digital intel
lectual property regime would be incomplete without inquiry into
the externalities generated by transactions in creative and informa
tional works. Yet the cybereconomists' market model for digital
property rights leaves the topic of externalities almost entirely
unexplored.291 In part, this may be due to a curiously circular ap
proach to analyzing externalities that has emerged within the
neoclassically-grounded branch of the new institutional econom
ics.292 In his pioneering work in the study of property-based institu
tions, Demsetz argued that private institutions will evolve in the
way that maximizes overall efficiency, and defined externality as
any activity the internalization of which is precluded by transaction
costs.293 As Papandreou observes, "[i]t would seem then that exter
nality poses no efficiency problems, since taking beneficial and
harmful effects into account where transaction costs are too high
would lead to efficiency losses. In fact, at any given time, the eco291. In keeping with the metaphor of Newtonian physics, and in the spirit of efforts to
move beyond it, perhaps we might characterize externalities as electro-magnetic emanations
arising from (and undermining) the assertedly frictionless interactions of online co=erce.
292. See supra note 50.
293. See Demsetz, supra note 121, at 348.
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nomic system would seem to be tautologically efficient."294 Thus,
one might expect new institutional scholarship in the Demsetz mold
to devote scant attention tb the question whether a particular exter
nality (here, uncompensated benefits to information consumers)
might require or justify a particular institutional structure (here, di
vided or "incomplete" entitlements)

despite

higher transaction

costs.
Possibly, though, the cybereconomists may have failed to con
sider externalities relating to a pure property-and-contract ap
proach to digital works because it is difficult to understand what
externalities in information markets might look like. The externali
ties treated in the economics literature tend to be the kind that have
perceptible effects on the physical world - pollution, overfishing,
and so on.295 Information, by contrast, is intangible; as a result, its
effects on society and social structure are poorly understood.296 In
addition, as James Boyle has observed, because the neoclassical
market model presumes perfect information, it is particularly un
suited to analyzing transactions of which information is the ob
ject.297

Might there be identifiable externalities in information

markets, and if so, what can they tell us about the appropriate insti
tutional structure(s) for such markets?
These questions are complicated by the fact that the precise def
inition of "externality" is unclear. Leading candidates include the
failure of markets to form, the Demsetz transaction-cost approach
(which modifies the market-failure test), coercion (in the sense of
costs or benefits imposed upon third parties in an interdependent
system), and what Papandreou terms a "phenomenological ap
proach" that focuses on specific events such as pollution or over
harvesting of a natural resource.298 Papandreou distills from these
294. PAPANDREOU, supra note 132, at 198.
295. See, e.g., CooTER & ULEN, supra note 25, at 38-40, 139-46; Demsetz, supra note 121.
296. Although there is a substantial political theory literature addressing these questions,
economists studying the effects of information have tended to focus more narrowly on infor
mation about the objects of transactions, rather than on information as the object of transac
tions. See BOYLE, supra note 168, at 29, 35-41 (discussing the conundrum that the
neoclassical "perfect-information" model for market transactions presents for transactions in
information). But see R.H. Coase, The Economics of the First Amendment: The Market for
Goods and the Market for Ideas, 64 AM. EcoN. REv. 384 (1974). For recent efforts to address
the unique theoretical problems posed by an information-based economy, see DeLong &
Froomkin, supra note 40; Danny T. Quah, The Invisible Hand and the Weightless Economy,
London School of Economics, Centre for Economic Performance, Occasional Paper No. 12
(Apr. 1996) <http:/lcep.Ise.ac.uk/papers/occasional/downloacl/op0012.pdf>.
297. See BOYLE, supra note 168, at 29, 35-41; see also DeLong & Froomkin, supra note
40.
298. See PAPANDREou, supra note 132, at 13-68 (describing debate over correct defini
tion and summarizing the leading approaches).
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definitions two potentially conflicting senses of "externality":

541

(1)

a

consequentialist sense, which he interprets as identifying the failure
of a current system/institution to optimize an agreed-on social
welfare function; and

(2)

an intrinsic-characteristic sense, which he

interprets as identifying only those failures to optimize that flow
from the absence of an intrinsically valued institutional structure for example, the absence of private property rights.299 He demon
strates that both senses are present to some degree, and in tension,
in each definition.
Returning briefly to the Demsetz approach, it should be obvious
that, from a societal perspective, whether entitlements should be
reconfigured to internalize a particular extemallty depends on
much more than the parties' perception of the tradeoff between the
extemality and the transaction costs. Concluding that private as
sessment of transaction costs will produce the optimal institutional
structure requires at least two counterfactual assumptions.

One

must assume that overall or social benefits and costs are simply the
sum of private monetary benefits and costs, and that private parties
will not engage in rent-seeking behavior designed to alter the rules
to their advantage.300 As the discussion in Part II and section III.A
suggests, in the context of copyright each of these propositions is
debatable, to say the least. That copyright owners have discovered
a way to reconfigure transactions that currently generate significant
uncompensated benefits in order to capture those benefits for
themselves says nothing about whether the result will be efficient
from a societal perspective; indeed, there is good reason to believe
otherwise. Moreover, rent-seeking behavior by copyright owners is
the rule rather than the exception.

The cybereconomists, like

Demsetz before them, escape the uncertainties that these observa
tions introduce into the efficiency analysis by resorting (implicitly)
to Papandreou's second definition of "extemality," and positing the
normative superiority of private property and contract rights.
The pure (non-neoclassical) institutionalist approach to exter
nalities avoids these difficulties, but at the price of indeterminacy.
Institutional theory begins by recognizing that individual choice is
constrained by both the individual's resources and the menu of op
portunities presented by existing legal institutions. In this sense,
individual choice is always (to a degree) coerced.301 Externalities,
299. See id. at 169-81.
300. See id. at 200-02.
301. See Samuels, Welfare Economics, supra note 36, at 9, 11-15; see also BARTLEIT,
supra note 102, at 43-44.
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therefore, are the costs and benefits that a particular regime of enti
tlements and resource distribution imposes on individuals via the
constraints it places on their choices.302 Because institutional the
ory expressly acknowledges the contingency of costs and benefits, it
is ultimately less contingent and broader in scope than the Demsetz
approach; rather than taking the existing legal and market frame
work as given, it allows consideration of alternative entitlements
structures and distributive concerns. One cannot choose between
different systems of entitlements and their corresponding externali
ties, however, without some

a priori

notion of value.303 Thus, an

agreed-on social welfare function - as required under either of
Papandreou's

two

definitions

- becomes

central to further

analysis.
Finally, Papandreou's two senses of externality raise a defini
tional problem of their own concerning the concept of positive ex
ternality, or uncomp ensated b enefit.

Using Papandreou's

consequentialist formulation, one might define a positive external
ity as overperformance, or optimization to a degree that exceeds
expectations, by a current system/institution. Using his intrinsic
characteristic formulation, one might say that "positive externality"
refers to the presence of an intrinsically valued institutional struc
ture even where that structure is not necessary to optimize social
welfare. It is hard to see how either of these definitions differs from
a conclusion that the current system/institution is performing well
with respect to the agreed-on criterion of social welfare, even
though the benefit in question is not the subject of a market ex
change.304 If so, perhaps the social-welfare function requires modi
fication t o encompass n onmarket indicia of s a tisfactory
performance. With these definitional issues in mind, I turn to the
specific problem of externalities in information markets.

It has long been recognized that certain types of high
technology informational works create a species of externality char
acterized as "network effects." Network effects arise when consum
ers derive increased utility from a good as other consumers
302. See BARTLETI, supra note 102, at 43-44; Ezra J. Mishan, The Effects of Externalities
on Individual Choice, 1 INn.. REv. L. & EcoN. 97 (1981); Samuels, Welfare Economics, supra
note 36, at 52-53; cf. Victor P. Goldberg, Production Functions, Transactions Costs and the
New Institutionalism, in ISSUES IN CONTEMPORARY MICROECONOMICS 395, 399-400 (George
Feiwel ed., 1984) (defining "transactions costs" as "a shortfall from what could have been
achieved if [existing] institutions worked perfectly").
303. See Samuels, Welfare Economics, supra note 36, at 61.
304. One might seek to avoid this difficulty by characterizing the effect's absence under
alternative institutional structures as a negative externality; however, this too merely seems a
convoluted way of acknowledging the current structure's success.
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purchase the same or compatible goods.305 Computer operating
systems are one example of such a good. As a particular operating
system becomes more prevalent, software developers write more
applications for that operating system, which in turn gives consum
ers a greater range of options.306 Computer applications programs
and user interfaces also generate network effects as they become
more popular. Consumers benefit from the ability to share files and
migrate them between platforms, and from decreased retraining
costs as applications and interfaces become standardized among
employers.307
Less attention has been paid to the question of whether other
types of creative and informational works also generate network or
other extemality effects. From time to time, judges and scholars
writing about fair use have referred to the "external" or societal
benefits generated by a particular use of copyrighted content.308
305. See Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Network Externalities, Competition, and Com
patibility, 75 AM. EcoN. REv. 424 (1985); Lemley & McGowan, supra note 225, at 6 (citing
Katz & Shapiro, supra, and Joseph Farrell & Garth Saloner, Standardization, Compatibility,
and Innovation, 16 RAND J. EcoN. 70 (1985)); see also S.J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis,
Network Externality: An Uncommon Tragedy, J. EcoN. PERSP., Spring 1994, at 133 (arguing
that the concept of "network externality" should be narrowed to exclude so-called "pecuni
ary" externalities or indirect network effects, which merely reflect the ordinary functioning of
markets).
306. See Katz & Shapiro, supra note 305, at 424-25; Lemley & McGowan, supra note 225,
at 496-97; Mark A. Lemley & David W. O'Brien, Encouraging Software Reuse, 49 STAN. L.
REv. 255, 287 (1997); Peter S. Menell, Tailoring Legal Protection for Computer Software, 39
STAN. L. REv. 1329, 1340-45, 1357-58 (1987). It is worth noting that consumers also may
experience negative network effects if "lock-in" perpetuates a particular software platform or
standard even after more desirable alternatives have emerged. See Lemley & McGowan,
supra note 225, at 505-06; Menell, supra, at 1342-43.
307. See Philip H. Dybvig & Chester S. Spatt, Adoption Externalities as Public Goods, 20
J. PUB. EcoN. 231, 231-32 (1983); Lemley & McGowan, supra note 225, at 497; Lemley &
O'Brien, supra note 306, at 287; Peter S. Menell, An Analysis of the Scope of Copyright
Protection for Application Programs, 41 STAN. L. REv. 1045, 1066-71 (1989).
308. See, e.g., Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 478
(1984) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (observing that scholarly use of a prior work "produces
external benefits from which everyone profits"); Fisher, supra note 26, at 1768-74; Gordon,
supra note 28, at 1630-32; Adrienne J. Marsh, Fair Use and New Technology: The Appropri
ate Standards to Apply, 5 CARDozo L. REv. 635, 672-73 (1984) ("[F]air use has often been
associated with 'nonmonetizable' values for which market situations do not exist or with
'external benefits' for which compensation is difficult to realize." (footnotes omitted));
M.B.W. Sinclair, Fair Use Old and New: The Betamax Case and its Forebears, 33 BUFF. L.
REv. 269, 282-83 (1984) ("Taking into account the externality of societal interest and benefit
is a crucial aspect of fair use analysis - indeed, it is the cornerstone of American copyright
law."); Jeremy Waldron, From Authors to Copiers: Individual Rights and Social Values in
Intellectual Property, 68 Cm.-KENT L. REv. 841, 861 (1993); Anastasia P. Wmslow, Rapping
on a Revolving Door: An Economic Analysis of Parody and Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music,
Inc., 69 S. CAL. L. REv. 767, 793 n.143 (1996) (noting that when "society reaps a benefit from
which the transacting parties do not profit," private transactions "will fail to produce the
optimal amount of the benefit-generating activity"); see also Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Lotus v.
Borland: Copyright and Computer Programs, 70 TuL. L. REv. 2397, 2416-17 (suggesting that
copyrightable characters in fictional works generate "substantial" network externalities).

544

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 97:462

However, until very recently, none has attempted to develop a
more detailed economic model of these benefits.309 As a result, the
understanding of the positive externalities generated by creative
and informational works remains vague, in contrast to the seeming
elegance and precision of the cybereconomists' "Newtonian" model
of a frictionless trading environment.

It is possible, however, to conceive of an economic model in
which the shared benefits of information are the central focus
rather than a peripheral concern. Technologist Philip Agre notes
the importance of discursive spaces within which cultures define
values and set policy agendas.310 He observes that, in addition to
facilitating Newtonian markets, information and networked infor
mation technologies constitute, and are constituted by, knowledge
communities.311 (In fact, this phenomenon has always existed consider, for example,

Das Kapital,

or

The Wealth of Nations, The Federalist Papers,
Mein Kampf but it is quite possible that digital
-

networks amplify its effects.) It is through this irreducibly reflexive
process, manifested in the public sphere as well as in the market,
that the social meanings and structural roles of information are cre
ated and defined.312 Agre's analysis of the role of information and
the centrality of the public sphere in the process of social self
definition suggests that where information is concerned, the neo
classical market model gets notions of value exactly backwards. So309. The notable recent exceptions are Mark Lemley and Lydia Loren. See Lemley,
supra note 6, at 1056-58; Loren, supra note 111, at 49-56. Much earlier, in 1988, \Vtlliam
Fisher articulated a comprehensive taxonomy of the social benefits generated by creative and
informational works, but did not attempt to formulate this taxonomy in the discourse of
economics. See Fisher, supra note 26, at 1768-74; see also Fisher, supra note 38, at 10-12;
Weinreb, supra note 104, at 1242 (characterizing human interactions that center around intel
lectual and artistic activity as public goods and observing that the "market model" cannot
measure this sort of benefit).
Wendy Gordon's influential article acknowledged the existence of external social benefits
resulting from certain uses of copyrighted works, and noted that often these external benefits
"are not easily monetized." See Gordon, supra note 28, at 1631. Rather than attempting to
incorporate nonmonetizable social benefits into an economic theory of fair use, however, she
cautioned courts not to use nonmonetizability as an excuse "to make the copyright law an
instrument of income redistribution." See id. at 1632. Gordon's later work ascribes more
importance to nonmonetizable values in copyright law. See, e.g., Wendy J. Gordon, An In

quiry into the Merits of Copyright: The Challenges of Consistency, Consent and Encourage
ment, 41 STAN. L. REv. 1343, 1351 (1989); Gordon, supra note 35; Gordon, supra note 128, at
1042-43.
310. See Philip E. Agre, The Internet and Public Discourse, 3 FIRST MONDAY {1998)
[hereinafter Agre, Public Discourse]; Philip E. Agre, Mixed Metaphors: Inscribing Social
Visions in Networked Computers (1997) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (here
inafter Agre, Mixed Metaphors].
311. See Agre, Mixed Metaphors, supra note 310, at 15-16.
312. See id. at 15-17; cf. Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI.
L. REv. 943 (1995); Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 CoLUM. L. REv. 903
(1996).
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cietal benefits (and costs) from the dissemination of information
and the spread of information networks are not "an artifact of mar
ginal 'externalities' "; rather, they are central elements in the social
welfare equation.313 What is needed is an economic model that
takes these elements into account.
One place to begin constructing such an economic model is a
provocative theory about the extemality effects of information ad
vanced by media scholar Benjamin Bates.314 B ates takes as his
starting point the generally-accepted observation that information
goods fail to satisfy "basic economic and optimality conditions"
such as the equality of marginal cost and marginal revenue.315
Bates argues that this observation resUlts from failure to identify all
of the costs and benefits associated with information exchange. In
particular, the use of information creates "ancillary value" for par
ties other than the immediate user, and Bates contends that this
value should be factored into an economic model of. the informa
tion market. The model should include not only "ancillary private
value," but also the "ancillary social value" that accrues to society
generally.316 Examples of the latter include the benefits to society
that flow from the use of information goods in education.317 Bates
suggests that markets recognize certain types of ancillary value, but
that ancillary social value generally is not recognized by markets,
and so is realized as a positive extemality.318 If so, then absent
some form of government involvemen! in information markets,
"firms and individuals are more likely to overconsume information
goods with high ancillary social costs and underconsume those with
high ancillary social benefits. "319
313. See Agre, Mixed Metaphors, supra note 310, at 16-17; cf. T.G. LEWIS, THE FrucnoN
MARKETING STRATEGIES FOR A WIRED WORLD 2-20 (1997) (arguing that
digital information markets do not obey neoclassical microeconomic principles); Quah, supra
note 296, at 7-10.

FREE ECONOMY:

314. See Benjamin J. Bates, Information as an Economic Good: Sources of Individual
and Social Value, in THE PoLmCAL EcoNOMY OF INFORMATION 76 (Vmcent Mosco & Janet
Wasko eds., 1988).
315. See id. at 79. Neoclassical microeconomic theory holds that the supplier of a good
will set the price so that, at a given level of demand, marginal revenue equals marginal cost.
See CooTER & ULEN, supra note 25, at 25-26.
316. See Bates, supra note 314, at 81-84.
317. See id. at 81-84. Bates defines "ancillary private value" as a benefit that accrues to
the information supplier. See id. This approach seems too narrow. One might also include
under this heading benefits that flow to other identifiable private parties, as distinct from
benefits that flow to society as an undifferentiated whole.
318. See id. at 84-85.
319. Id. at 86; see also Coase, supra note 296, at 389-90 ("[I]f we . . . use for the market of
ideas the same approach . . . [as] for the market for goods, it is apparent that the case for
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A second source of insight into the diverse kinds of value gener
ated by transactions in information is C. Edwin Baker's pioneering
exploration of the patterns of supply and demand in mass media
markets.320 Baker identifies ten categories of externalities pro
duced by mass media products, including the "quality of public
opinion and political participation"; recipients' interactions with
others; recipients' impact on the information products available to
others; "exposing and deterring abuses of power"; diffusion of in
formation to nonpaying recipients; and positive and negative effects
on the information's subjects and sources.321 Some of these exter
nalities accrue to distinct third parties, but many constitute ancillary
social value (or loss). Nor should this surprise us. Logically, the
nature and quality of the information available within a community
will affect the nature and quality of human choices and interactions,
individual and collective, in both the market and the public
sphere.322 Like Bates, Baker reasons that mass media products that
generate net social benefits will tend to be underproduced. He also
demonstrates that the demand for mass media products is shaped
by the priorities of advertisers and thus presents a distorted picture
of actual audience demand even without regard to externalities.323
He concludes that the demand expressed in mass media markets
cannot possibly be a reliable or complete indicator of information
products' value, or of audience needs and desires.324
government intervention in the market for ideas is much stronger than it is, in general, in the
market for goods.").
320. See C. Edwin Baker, Giving the Audience What It Wants, SS OHIO ST. L.J. 311
(1997).
321. See id. at 350-66; see also Mishan, supra note 302, at 134-35 (classifying intellectual
and cultural goods as "merit goods" or "demerit goods" based on the "interdependent utili
ties" they produce); cf FISher, supra note 26, at 1769-74 (identifying education, public debate,
cultural diversity, and public access to information as among the social benefits produced by
copyrighted works); Loren, supra note 111, at 49-54 (focusing on the socially-valued activities
enumerated in § 107, the Copyright Act's fair use provision).
322. See Agre, Mixed Metaphors, supra note 310; Agre, Public Discourse, supra note 310;
Baker, supra note 320, at 352-58; Cohen, supra note 248, at 1006-07; Niva Elkin-Koren, Copy

right Law and Social Dialogue on the Information Superhighway: The Case Against Copy
right Liability ofBulletin Board Operators, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 345, 400 & n.284
(1995); Netanel, supra note 36, at 347-51.
323. See Baker, supra note 320, at 328-29, 333-37, 336 (showing that "the success of
advertiser-supported media will result in failure of more differentiated, competitive daily
newspapers, of some general audience magazines, and of magazines that appeal to groups
whose interests do not overlap with use of any particular set of consumer products" (empha
sis added)); id. at 337-46 (showing that, in advertiser-supported media, competition among
media products designed for the same demographic group wastes resources, drives out media
products that might appeal more strongly to diverse groups, and thus produces less overall
value); see also BAGDIKIAN, supra note 226, at 111; BAKER, supra note 226.
324. Baker is skeptical about the value of the market as a measure of social value in any
event. See Baker, supra note 320, at 385-97; infra text accompanying notes 337-51.
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These arguments about the importance of "ancillary" effects are
based on the inherently transformative nature of information.325 It
is likely, however, that some ancillary social value also results from
the current common-ownership structure of creative and informa
tional content, which facilitates cross-pollination - which in turn
amplifies information's transformative effects. In a related vein,
both Mark Lemley and Lydia Loren have suggested that certain
uses of copyrighted works that produce uncompensated social ben
efits "may not be efficiently produced under a property rights li
censing scheme."326 This is so, they argue, because the would-be
user cannot capture the full value of his or her use as revenue. Ac
cordingly, he or she will tend to undervalue the use, and will be
unwilling to pay the price that the copyright owner demands.327 A
particularly clear example is the reverse engineering of copyrighted
software, which benefits competition in the abstract.328 In other
cases, such as news reporting, public criticism and comment, schol
arly research, and classroom instruction, users may be disinclined
(or simply unable) to pass increased license fees through to their
customer base because of limitations imposed by other institutional
and social values - for example, the value placed on the free ex
change of ideas in education, scholarship, and public debate, or the
value placed on access to free public libraries and schools.329
In sum, the foregoing analysis suggests that the current market
for creative and informational works generates at least two differ
ent kinds of ancillary social benefit. First, society - and all of the
individuals who comprise it - realizes benefits from the content of
certain works. Creative and informational works educate and in
form the public, shape individual and community perceptions of the
world, and set the parameters of public debate.330 Because positive
325. See Bates, supra note 314, at 81 {"The use of information changes the system, not
only for the individual using the information, but for others as well. Clearly, such changes in
the system can result in changes in the status, relationships, and opportunities of others
within the system . . . . ) ; Baker, supra note 320, at 349 ("Many, probably most, of the me
dia's effects on third parties occur through media content's effect on its audiences' thinking,
beliefs, preferences . . . . ) .
326. Lemley, supra note 6, at 1056; see also Loren, supra note 111, at 51-53; Weinreb,
supra note 104, at 1242.
327. See Lemley, supra note 6, at 1056-58; Loren, supra note 111, at 51-53; see also
Gordon, supra note 128, at 1042.
328. See Lemley, supra note 6, at 1057-58; see also Lemley & McGowan, supra note 225,
at 71-73 (describing social benefits accruing from reverse engineering of industry standard
software platforms).
329. See Elkin-Koren, supra note 6, at 111-13; Lemley, supra note 6, at 1056-57; Netanel,
supra note 36.
330. See Agre, Public Discourse, supra note 310; Agre, Mixed Metaphors, supra note 310;
Baker, supra note 320, at 350-66; Cohen, supra note 248, at 1006-07; Elkin-Koren, supra note
"

"
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externalities, by definition, are not compensated in the market, one
would expect most of the demand for many works that generate
positive externalities - most scholarly books and many specialized
or _technical journals, as well as the textbooks and other materials
used in elementary, secondary, and university classrooms - to
arise in the public and educational sectors.331 Second, social benefit
accrues from the rights to access and use unprotected, public do
main elements of existing works, and to re-use and transform ex
isting works in certain settings and circumstances. These rights and
practices lead to the development of creative and scholarly talents
and, ultimately, to the creation of new works - from which society
may benefit further.
In part, of course, information goods fail to satisfy what Bates
identifies as "economic optimality conditions" because of the exist
ence of intellectual property rights, which are expressly designed to
allow pricing above marginal cost.332 Thus, the intellectual prop
erty system accepts as inevitable a certain amount of "deadweight
loss."333 The argument that monopoly pricing is sufficient to ex
plain the peculiarities of information economics, however, begs the
question. If the public is willing to pay the prices set by copyright
owners, we must ask what the public believes it is paying for, and
what copyright owners believe they are selling. Any answer to that
question must take existing statutorily-mandated public access and
use rights into account. Individuals do not buy copyrighted works
out of an abstract sense of economic efficiency or authorial desert;
322, at 400; Fisher, supra note 38, at 10-12; Fisher, supra note 26, at 1768-74; Netanel, supra
note 36, at 347-51.
331. Consider, as well, public television, public radio, and public arts funding programs
- all of which are perennially challenged by those who believe the market is the best deter
minant of public benefit. Bates's theory casts additional doubt on that view. See generally
BAKER, supra note 226; CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE
SPEECH {2d ed. 1995); Baker, supra note 320.
Indeed, for these reasons, Baker suggests that the incentive system established by copy
right is perverse. He contends that by placing a premium on entertainment value and afford
ing low protection to primarily factual works, copyright encourages the production of \Vorks
with low social value. See Baker, supra note 320, at 326; see also Breyer, supra note 26, at
286-87 (suggesting that other, nonmarket systems for funding original expression might be
better tailored to encourage the production of "serious" works); Lunney, supra note 6 (argu·
ing that strong copyright protection for works with primarily entertainment value creates an
unacceptable opportunity cost for society); Weinreb, supra note 104, at 1240-41 (noting the
potentially market-distorting effect of the legislative grant of copyright). That result is less a
consequence of copyright's protection of original expression, however, than of the market·
and advertiser-driven system that (as Baker so well explains) rewards popularity more highly
than critical acclaim. See Baker, supra note 320, at 328-46. Moreover, as Baker realizes and
as this Article attempts to show, extending property-like protection to facts and ideas in an
effort to right any perceived imbalance would most likely make matters worse. See id. at 327.
332.
333.

See Elkin-Koren, supra note 6,
See Elkin-Koren, supra note 6,

supra note 26, at 1700-04.
supra note 26, at 1700-04.

at 98-99; Fisher,
at 99; Fisher,
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they buy them for the benefits they expect to receive under the ex
isting entitlements regime.334 Public and university libraries and
school systems purchase works that they believe will generate bene
fits for their user communities, and count among those benefits
those that the public law of copyright guarantees. Copyright own
ers consider both types of demand and the full range of expected
uses of their works when setting prices. In short, both types of un
compensated positive extemality are woven into the fabric of the
existing market for creative and informational works; they are the
background conditions against which the market operates.
The cybereconomists recognize that creative and informational
works may generate benefits that are not captured by market trans
actions. From their point of view, that is precisely the problem with
the current incomplete-entitlements regime. Digital CMS, in con
trast, will allow copyright owners to internalize benefits that are
properly "theirs."335 The above analysis suggests, first, that public
access and use privileges do not in fact represent a tax on copyright
owners to subsidize the reading public, as copyright owners have
claimed.336 If anything, they represent a tax on the reading public
to subsidize the creative public, both present and future.337 More
important, it sheds further light on the discussion in section II.B,
above, of the relation between public goods, private goods, and
progress.
I have argued that the shift to a private-law model of intellectual
property may substantially change the nature of progress. Consid
eration of the ancillary or extemality effects of information suggests
why. A positive externality that corresponds to a

social benefit

-

334. Cf. Meurer, supra note 38, at 881 (arguing that consumers will pay more for copy
righted works if they know that they can share them with family and friends).
335. See Hardy, Proper Legal Regime, supra note 46, at 1025-26 (characterizing private
copying as an uncompensated extemality); supra text accompanying notes 152-79; see also
GOLDSTEIN, supra note 28, at 178-79; John Cirace, When Does Complete Copying of Copy

righted Works for Purposes Other Than for Profit or Sale Constitute Fair Use? An Economic
Analysis ofthe Sony Betamax and Williams & Wilkins Cases, 28 ST. Lours U. L.J. 647 (1984);
Gordon, supra note 28, at 1630-32. See generally Netanel, supra note 36, at 323-24. This
perspective underscores the institutional economists' point that coercion is in the eye of the
beholder. See supra text accompanying note 301.
336.

See supra text accompanying note 34. See also supra text accompanying notes

156-

58.
337. Cf. Ginsburg, supra note 34, at 15 (characterizing the fair use doctrine, when applied
to "transformative" uses of copyrighted works, as "a hidden tax for critical creativity").
Ginsburg argues that the "hidden tax" is unjustified when fair use is invoked to excuse purely
"consumptive" uses such as private copying. See id. at 15-16. She overlooks, however, that
there may be a real, though indirect, relationship between present consumption and future
creativity, that even purely consumptive use may produce valuable social benefits, and that it
may in any case be difficult to differentiate ex ante between those consumptive uses that will
generate future creativity and those that will not. See supra text accompanying notes 117-28.

550

Michigan Law Review

(Vol. 97:462

as opposed to an uncompensated benefit to a distinct third party or
parties - is simply a public good by another name.338 The same
public good analysis that is conventionally applied to creative and
informational works applies equally to the access and reuse privi
leges afforded by the public law of copyright. These privileges are
non-excludable; if the law and the "state of the copying art" afford
them to one, they afford them to all. They are non-rivalrous; one
consumer's exercise of his or her right to reverse engineer software
or parody a creative work does not prevent others from doing so,339
Within the market arena, the ordinary consumer is unlikely to value
the privileges provided for future creators highly enough to pay for
them - particularly if he or she has been reeducated to believe in
the importance of paying for the right to use intellectual property,
whatever the circumstances.340 But the ordinary consumer benefits
immensely from these and other privileged uses - from access to
creative and informational works in public schools and libraries,
from increased competition and greater product variety in software
markets, and in countless other ways.
It follows that allowing copyright owners to internalize uncom
pensated benefits, as the cybereconomists recommend, would not
simply reallocate a fixed, immutable surplus from consumers to
producers. Instead, the property-and-contract-based model prof
fered by the cybereconomists would fundamentally alter the social
welfare equation. The change would be both (re)distributive and
qualitative; some shared social benefits would be replaced by
privately-appropriated ones. The cybereconomists contend that
their model would increase the value realized by both producers
and consumers of information by enabling the formation of mar;.
338. Cf. Baker, supra note 320, at 316 n.14 ("[N]onexcludability as an aspect of a public
good is usually thought of as referring to situations where any purchaser and each nonex
cluded beneficiary get roughly the same type of benefit from the good, while the concept of
externalities is more commonly used where the benefit or burden on nonexcluded third par
ties is of a different sort than that which enticed an individual purchase."). For that matter,
so is a negative externality that corresponds to a social loss. The analysis in this Part focuses
on the need to identify "social" externalities, or public goods, that inhere in the existing
regime of entitlements in creative and informational works, and assumes some basis for dis
tinguishing between "good" and "bad" public goods after they have been identified. For
consideration of the latter question, see infra section III.B.2.
339. See supra note 25 (defining "public goods"); Baker, supra note 320, at 316 n.14.
340. Cf. Cohen, supra note 248, at 999 (applying public-goods analysis to the right to
remain anonymous when accessing and viewing online material, and noting that "the per
ceived costs of forgoing access to desired reading material will rise, and the likelihood of
reader hold-out will fall, as more reading material is technologically protected"). On the
endogeneity of consumer preferences, and their responsiveness to norms inculcated by legal
and political institutions, see infra text accompanying notes 351-55.
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kets.341 That may be so. The analysis offered here suggests, how
ever, that the correct question to ask is not whether the proposed
changes in digital intellectual property rights will increase the value
realized

by markets.

Rather, the question is whether the changes

will increase the overall value realized by society - including the
value realized both within and outside markets - under the current
system.342

If society believes that the continued existence of certain public
access and use rights is necessary to promote access and progress
most effectively, and that the gains to society are thus greater under
a regime of limited entitlements in digital works than they would be
under a regime of "strong" private-law rights, then digital rights
management technologies and digital shrinkwrap licenses are a
market failure waiting to happen. In that case, we might plausibly
conclude that divided ownership (or some equivalent adjustment) is
necessary to offset private parties' failure to internalize fully the
ancillary social value of information. More simply, in Papandreou's
terms, we might conclude that given the special nature of creative
and informational works, the current institutional structure does a
better job of optimizing social welfare. At any rate, without a bet
ter understanding of these nonmarket effects and their relation to
our conception of social welfare, we cannot say with any confidence
that the cybereconomists' proposal is the right one.

2. Defining Social Welfare
Regardless of whether we begin the effort to model the market
in digital works by positing the inefficiency of common ownership,
by inquiring into the distribution of bargaining power, or by focus
ing on the ancillary value generated by creative and informational
works, we discover that the model is indeterminate without an un341. See Bell, supra note 5, at 587-90, 601-08; Hardy, supra note 5, at 242-52, 254-58;
O'Rourke, Copyright Preemption, supra note 5, at 62, 70-71; see also GOLDSTEIN, supra note
28, at 178-79 ("The logic of property rights dictates their extension into every comer in which
people derive enjoyment and value from literary and artistic works. To stop short of these
ends would deprive producers of the signals of consumer preference that trigger and direct
their investments.").
342. Even assuming that some degree of proprietary protection is needed to induce a
work's creation, my analysis has suggested that, above a certain level of proprietary protec
tion, market value and nonmarket value are inversely related. Basic mathematics dictates
that where two variables are inversely related, it is impossible to maximize for both at the
same time. Thus, another way of framing the problem is that we should set the level of
proprietary protection for digital works in such a way as to maximize the sum of the market
and nonmarket or public good value that would result. If, at some point, a further increase in
the scope of protection would produce a drop in public good value that exceeds the increase
in market value, we should decline to allow the increased protection. I am indebted to Phil
Agre for suggesting this train ·of thought.
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derlying conception of social welfare or utility. Something must be
optimized, but what? And how should it be measured? The neo
classical model holds that overall utility is determined by aggregat
ing the preferences expressed through the market, and is optimized
when goods and resources are thereby allocated to those who value
them the most. However, the notion that the market affords a com
prehensive and reliable account of all relevant human desires and
supplies an accurate measure of their fulfillment has been thor
oughly and convincingly discredited. In particular, creative and in
formational works implicate preferences

about individual and

collective self-definition that are fundamentally external to the
market.
As an initial matter, the neoclassical market-based lexicon of
personal preferences and interests is radically incomplete. Numer
ous scholars have demonstrated that people have preferences and
interests concerning many matters - including (for example) work
ing conditions and interpersonal interactions - that are nonmone
tizable and wholly external to the market.343 It follows that the
market is not capable of registering these desires, let alone measur
ing the extent to which they have been satisfied. Moreover, con
sumers qua citizens may recognize hierarchies of preferences. That
is, citizens may have preferences about the sorts of preferences that
the law should privilege or burden, even though (or because) they
would not act on these preferences as consumers.344 In other
343. See, e.g., G. PETER PENZ, CoNSUMER SOVEREIGNTY AND HUMAN INTERESTS (1986)
(summarizing nonmarket interests); Baker, supra note 36, at 34-35; Martha C. Nussbaum,
Flawed Foundations: The Philosophical Critique of (a Particular Type of) Economics, 64 U.
Cm. L. REv. 1197, 1206-12 (1997); Amartya K. Sen, Rational Fools: A Critique ofthe Behav
ioral Foundations ofEconomic Theory, 6 PHIL. & PuB. A.FF. 317 (1977); see also Ian Shapiro,
Richard Posner's Praxis, 48 Omo ST. L.J. 999, 1001-08 (1987); Veljanovski, supra note 104.
"Law and economics" scholarship in the neoclassical mode recognizes these preferences, if at
all, as anomalies that need not be built into economic models precisely because the market is
incapable of measuring them. See, e.g., Hardy, supra note 5, at 221-22 (arguing that
nonmonetizable motives for creativity need not be factored into the copyright incentives
analysis); Steven Shavell, Contingent Valuation of the Nonuse Value of Natural Resources:
Implications for Public Policy and the Liability System, in CONTINGENT VALUATioN: A CRIT·
ICAL AssESSMENT 371 (J.A. Hausman ed., 1993) (arguing that economic models for public
decisionmaking should not include the nonmonetizable value placed on natural resources
because such value is difficult to measure accurately).
344. See JoN ELSTER, ULYSSES AND THE SIRENS: STUDIES IN RATIONALITY AND IRRA·
TIONALITY (rev. ed. 1984); PENz, supra note 343, at 41-58; Sen, supra note 343, at 313-15;
Baker, supra note 320, at 401-03; Sen, supra note 343, at 335-44; Cass R. Sunstein, Disrupting
Voluntary Transactions, in NoMos XXXI: MARKETS AND JusTICE 279, 285-87 (John W.
Chapman J. & Roland Pennock eds., 1989); Cass R. Sunstein, Legal Interference with Private
Preferences, 53 U. Cm. L. REv. 1129, 1133-35, 1140-45 (1986) [hereinafter Sunstein, Legal
Interference]. An example is a preference for affirmative action in hiring or school admis·
sions. Individuals might support affirmative action policies precisely because they believe
that without such policies, they would tend - either consciously or subconsciously - to
favor candidates of the majority race. See id. at 1153-54.
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words, citizens may have preferences about what constitutes a just,
fair, and equitable system of social ordering. The public process of
lawmaking, which neoclassical economists view as interference with
market-based expression and satisfaction of preferences, in fact af
fords citizens the opportunity to express and satisfy preferences
that the market ignores, undervalues, or disserves.345

In addition, individual preference-formation and decision pat
terns are subject to multiple sources of error and inconsistency.346
Since the future is unpredictable, individuals may miscalculate
when deciding how to act on their preferences, or be unable to fore
cast how their preferences

will

change over time.347 Alternatively,

due to incomplete or incorrect information or to "framing effects"
produced by context-dependent reference points, individuals may
be mistaken about what their own preferences are, or how strongly
they are held.348 Bell's argument that consumers who want to re
tain the current fair use rules are simply mistaken as to their cost
seems to be offered in this spirit.349 Bell, however, does not con345. See Baker, supra note 36, at 34-40 ("A right to define and determine one's being
must include equal and real opportunities to participate in collective constitutive decisions as
well as certain liberties pertaining to individual development and expression."); Baker, supra
note 320, at 400-01; Sunstein, Legal Interference, supra note 344, at 1140-45. Of course,
reaching a policy decision requires a method of aggregating these preferences, which in turn
requires some way of making interpersonal comparisons. Neoclassically-oriented economists
are right to regard this task as difficult, and public-choice theorists are right to see the poten
tial for bias. Nonetheless, the method employed by the neoclassicists - using dollars as
evidence of consumer preferences - does not seem prima facie more accurate or unbiased
than the legislative method - using the votes of elected representatives as proxies for con
stituent preferences, and then aggregating the votes. See Hovenkamp, supra note 98, at 8189, 94-106; Richard H. Pildes & Elizabeth Anderson, Slinging Arrows at Democracy: Social

Choice Theory, Value Pluralism, and Democratic Politics, 90 CoLUM. L. REv. 2121, 2145-83
(1990); supra text accompanying notes 273-90. The two methods are simply different, and

might reasonably be expected to be useful in different sets of circumstances. In particular,
given the constraints on positive consumer action discussed in section III.A, supra, and given
that the market does not register certain preferences at all, voting seems a more useful
method for making collective decisions based on the second-order preferences discussed in
the text. See Hovenkamp, supra note 98, at 81-89, 94-106; Pildes & Anderson, supra, at 214586; id. at 2187 ("Voting aggregates individual choices - not individual preferences.");
Stearns, supra note 102, at 1240-45. If the current system of voting is imperfect, looking for
ways to improve it would seem a better route than abandoning entirely attempts to respond
collectively to preferences of this type. See Pildes & Anderson, supra, at 2188-213.

346. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Behavioral Analysis ofLaw, 64 U. CHI. L. REv. 1175
(1997) (summarizing the insights of behavioral theory into human preference formation and
decision making).

347. See PENZ, supra note 343, at 69-77.
348. See id. at 63-68; Robert C. Ellickson, Bringing Culture and Human Frailty to Ra
tional Actors: A Critique of Classical Law & Economics, 65 Cm.-KENT L. REv. 23, 35-40
(1989); Sunstein, Legal Interference, supra note 344, at 1166-68; Amos Tversky & Daniel
Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 Ser. 1124 (1974); Amos
Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions, 59 J. Bus. S251
(1986).
349. See Bell, supra note 5, at 580-81.
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individuals might prefer the current fair use structure for

nonmonetizable reasons. The consumer, it seems, is right except
when she wants to modify existing or emerging market institutions,
in which case she is wrong. Without better information about why
people feel as they do about fair use, that conclusion is premature.

It is worth noting, too, that citizens' preferences also may be incon
sistent due to the perceived incommensurability of different, some
times competing, goods.35o
Finally, neoclassical theories of consumer sovereignty take con
sumer preferences as given.351 Modern economic theorists, in con
trast, recognize that preferences are endogenously determined by a
variety of factors, including imitation of others, advertising, and a
variety of workplace, social, and political institutions that seek to
inculcate particular behaviors.352 A particularly salient example of
the latter, in the context of digital works, is the recent call for a
program of elementary and secondary education designed to ex
pose children to the importance of intellectual property and of ask
ing - and, presumably, paying - for permission to use it.353 The
distribution of power in a contested exchange also will affect prefer
ence formation and expression. To the extent that transactions pro
duce or constitute people, those who wield power will be able to
shape the wants and habits of those who do not.354 It is this dy
namic - altered preferences followed by altered behavior - that
the Software Publishers' Association was hoping to trigger when it
threatened to sue its members' licensees who engaged in unauthor
ized copying.355 This suggests, further, that the costs of collective
350. See Nussbaum, supra note 343, at 1199-1203; Pildes & Anderson, supra note 345, at
2145-75. Radin's "incomplete commodification" proposal, see supra text accompanying note
109, with its commitment to a broadly defined conception of "human flourishing," addresses
the incommensurability of market and nonmarket values. See RADIN, supra note 64, at 6275.
351. See, e.g., George J. Stigler & Gary S. Becker, De gustibus non est disputandum, 67
AM. EcoN. REv. 76 (1977).
352. See BARTLETT, supra note 102, at 84-89; BoWLES & G1NTis, supra note 205, at 92120; GALBRAITII, supra note 205, at 24-37; CHOMSKY & HERMAN, supra note 226; DOUGLASS
C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 7, 22, 4243 (1990); PENZ, supra note 343, at 89-113; Baker, supra note 320, at 404-11; Dugger, supra
note 205; Lessig, supra note 312; Sunstein, supra note 312.
353. See NII WHITE PAPER, supra note 9, at 201-10; see also Peter Jaszi, Caught in the Net
of Copyright, 15 OR. L. REv. 299 (1996); Litman, Coyright Legislation, supra note 100.
354. See BAGDIKIAN, supra note 226, at 223; BARTLEIT, supra note 102, at 89-97; BowLES
& GINTis, supra note 205, at 128-35; GALBRAITH, supra note 205, at 131-43; Baker, supra
note 320, at 408-09; Bowles & Gintis, supra note 245, at 206-07; Dugger, supra note 205;
Goldberg, supra note 104, at 125.
355. See supra text accompanying note 234.
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action noted in section III.A, above, may be exacerbated by accul
turation to the status quo.

In sum, markets are not only incomplete indicators of what peo
ple want, but there is also reason to be skeptical of what markets
tell us about the fraction of human interests that they can purport
to describe.356 Also, the term "market failure" is inescapably con
tingent. Its meaning depends on the indicia of social welfare that a
market is supposed to optimize, and these goals are not predeter
mined and may change over time. Market failure, properly under
stood, encompasses not only cases in which the parties fail to
transact, or find it too expensive, but also cases in which consensual,
relatively costless transactions nonetheless fail to produce particu
lar outcomes that have been defined to be socially valuable. When
market institutions fail, use of the public process of lawmaking to
reshape them is entirely appropriate. Market institutions are in and
of human society, not a fixed axis around which human society re
volves.357 Their structure, like the structure of nonmarket institu
tions, is necessarily a matter for collective choice.
How might these insights apply to the problem of rights in digi
tal works? First, since information is so crucial to the construction
of preferences (as any advertiser knows), transactions in informa
tion may have especially significant influence on the construction of
both first- and second-order preferences. Information - including
the information contained in works of art, fiction, and popular en
tertainment - mediates not only perceptions about what one wants
to buy, but also beliefs about what sort of person one wants to be
come and what social outcomes one values.358 Access to informa356. At least one economic theorist, Peter Penz, has concluded that subjective measures
of consumer preferences - including the neoclassical "revealed preferences" criterion,
which holds that whatever consumers want, defined by what they actually buy, is what will
maximize their welfare - are suspect. As a way out of the thicket, Penz advocates reliance
on an objective, or "human interests," criterion of consumer welfare. See PENZ, supra note
343, at 139-225.
357. See BARTLEIT, supra note 102, at 195 ("Markets may be driven by an invisible hand,
but the hand is attached to an arm of socially defined rights."); supra text accompanying
notes 104-08; cf. Baker, supra note 166, at 786-88 ("[I]f the market controls resource use,
human freedom requires that we be able to control the market structure. Because laws and
societal norms are key elements in any market structure, the ability to control the structure,
and hence freedom, requires collective decisionmaking.").
358. See Baker, supra note 320, at 402-03; Cohen, supra note 248, at 1006-07, 1014; Elkin
Koren, supra note 6, at 112; Netanel, supra note 36, at 347-51; Phan, supra note 175, at 20810; cf. BowLES & GINTis, supra note 205, at 121-51 (arguing that individuals are not simply
the rational "choosers" recognized by liberal economic theory, but also, and more fundamen
tally, "learners" through the iterative processes of market choice, interpersonal association,
and democratic self-governance); Nussbaum, supra note 343, at 1203-06 (arguing that eco
nomic theory must acknowledge human agency).
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tion, in short, is important for both individual self-actualization and
collective self-definition.
Self-actualization is an unpredictable process, however, for both
individuals and societies. It is a truism that the desire for more in
formation will depend on whether the perceived benefits of the in
formation outweigh its costs, but it is difficult to assess either
benefits or costs before the fact.359 This is particularly so in the case
of more complex creative or informational works. The process of
discovery and retrieval of information introduces additional compli
cations. The human mind does not always, or even usually, proceed
in a linear fashion, but exploits chance discoveries and pursues un
expected links. The first person to imagine a web of information
interconnected by associational (now hypertext) links - an infor
mation resource at once so sophisticated and so intuitive in opera
tion that very young children can use it - did so with these
characteristics in mind.360 It is possible to begin a search without
having any idea what will prove important, and to end it with a
collection of materials suggested by connections made along the
way.
The existing public-law regime of copyright mitigates the uncer
tainties and path-dependencies that attend the discovery and acqui
sition of information by allowing individuals to browse before or
instead of purchasing and to share and re-use acquired informa
tion.361 The cybereconomists, in contrast, suggest that individuals
should be required to search for and evaluate creative and informa
tional resources with the meter running. Individuals might plausi
bly believe that a degree of fortuitous, nonmetered access to
information advances their development, both as consumers and as
citizens, better than Bell's system of "fared use" or Hardy's regime
359. See GREEN & SHAPIRO, supra note 98, at 19 (citing JoN ELSTER, RATIONAL CHOICE
19-20 (1986) ).
360. See GEORGE P. LANDow, HYPERTEXT: THE CONVERGENCE OF CONTEMPORARY
CRITICAL THEORY AND TECHNOLOGY 14-16 {1992); Vannevar Bush, As We May Think, THE
ATLANTIC MONTHLY, July 1945, at 31-35.
361. The Copyright Act gives copyright owners exclusive rights to make and distribute
copies of works and to authorize public performances and displays, not rights to control all
reading and viewing of their works. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 {1994); Litman, The Exclusive Right,
supra note 100, at 39-43. Statutory privileges to share and re-use works include the first sale
doctrine, the fair use doctrine, and provisions governing library copying. See 17 U.S.C.
§§ 107-109; supra text accompanying notes 27-31. Last, but by no means least, the Copyright
Act expressly withholds protection from certain types of information, including facts, ideas,
functional principles, and creative works whose term of protection has expired, on the
ground that these things belong in the public domain where they may serve as building blocks
for future works. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 102{b), 302-304; Litman, supra note 6; supra text accom
panying note 32.

November 1998]

557

Lochner in Cyberspace

of strong, undivided property entitlements.362 Certainly, there is in
sufficient evidence to conclude that they do not, or that such a pref
erence would be irrational.
Second, in the case of copyright, there is an express constitu
tional mandate that the chosen system of exclusive rights promote
"progress." As has been frequently observed, the degree to which
any particular arrangement of rules is better or worse than any
other arrangement at promoting progress, objectively defined, is an
empirical question that may be inherently untestable.363 That for
mulation, however, begs the question whether progress is a wholly
measurable quantity. As the recent debates about the desirability
of cloning higher mammals attest, progress is at least in part a so
cially-determined construct.364 In addition, progress refers to a
journey as well as a destination; hence (for example) the stringent
rules regarding informed consent in medical experimentation, and
the doctrine that precludes copyright protection for facts and ideas
in order to ensure a robust public domain.365 The definition of pro
gress in these latter two senses is something that individuals and the
community constituted by them may have legitimate preferences
about.
The resolution of the digital copyright problem will affect pro
gress in unquantifiable ways. If libraries may not make digital
works available to the public free of direct charge, there are some
potential creators who will never see them.366 Similarly, some
would-be authors who wish to use digital works in ways that copy
right law considers fair uses will not do so, either for economic rea362. See Elkin-Koren, supra note 6, at 112; cf. BoWLES & GINTis, supra note 205, at 12736 ("The ontology of a democratic economic theory must encompass learning as well as la
bor, the production and reproduction of people as well as the production of things.");
Netanel, supra note 36, at 344-63; Phan, supra note 175, at 208-16.
·

363. See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 6; George L. Priest, What Economists Can Tell Lawyers
About Intellectual Property, 8 REs. L. & EcoN. 19 (1986).
364. See, e.g., Brent Staples, Editorial Notebook; Turning People into Product, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 28, 1997, at A34; George F. Will, The Moral Hazards of Scientific Wonders,
WASH. Posr, Feb. 26, 1997, at Al9; see generally LATOUR, supra note 7 (challenging the
constitutive modem paradigm of scientific objectivity); Agre, Mixed Metaphors, supra note
310 (arguing that information technologies and society constitute one another); Chon, supra
note 192, at 114-34 (1993) (rejecting the view that "progress" consists of accumulating objec
tive "knowledge" for its own sake); Phan, supra note 175, at 208-13.
365. See 10 U.S.C. § 980 (1994); 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1994); 42 U.S.C. § 3515b (1994); Feist
Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991); Litman, supra note 6.
366. See John Browning, Excerpt from "What Is the Role of Libraries in the Information
Economy?, " in INTERNET DREAMS: ARCHETYPES, MYTHS, AND METAPHORS, supra note 24,
at 55, 57 ("[I]f the books on a library's electronic shelves are not free . . . what is left of the
library's traditional raison d'etre: namely, making information available to those who cannot
afford to buy it?").
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sons or because· the license that governs usage rights forbids it. The
locus of control over progress will shift slightly, toward existing au
thors and away from poorer (or simply younger) authors.

One

could believe, as do the cybereconomists, that the system is simply
adjusting to cure a pervasive and troublesome market failure, or to
allocate future uses of digital works to those who are willing to pay
for that privilege. As discussed above, however, one could also
conceive the noncommoclified "breathing space" the current system
allows

citizens for browsing, public domain use,

and fair use to be a

public good worth preserving - notwithstanding the fact that most

consumers

do not plan to reverse engineer software or publish a

parody or critical essay directed at a literary work and would see no
need to bargain in the market for the right to do so.367
Finally, instituting a regimented system of usage rights may un
dermine societal norms that have developed over time to mediate
the boundary between private and public rights in creative and in
formational works.368 Two examples of such norms are the practice
among research scientists of photocopying colleagues' professional
journal articles that are relevant to their current or contemplated
research, and the practice among university professors of preparing
coursepacks for their students that contain photocopied excerpts
from a variety of academic sources.

Both norms currently are

threatened as a result of appellate court decisions that the copying
is not a fair use of the copyrighted content.369 According to both
courts, this is so regardless of accepted practice in scholarly and
research communities, because there now exist market mechanisms
to license photocopying rights.370 Thus, both decisions rest on the
same narrow view of the fair use doctrine espoused by the cyber-

367. See supra text accompanying notes 330-42; cf Cohen, supra note 9, at 182; Elkin
Koren, supra note 6, at 110; Madison, supra note 49, at 6-7 & n.14 (developing "open space"
metaphor for this noncommodified aspect of the public law of copyright).
368. See, e.g., ELLICKSON, supra note 210, at 58-64 (discussing academic community
norms regarding photocopying of copyrighted works); cf Samuel Bowles & Herbert Gintis,
The Revenge of Homo Economicus: Contested Exchange and the Revival of Political Econ
omy, 7 J. EcoN. PERSPECTIVES 83, 95-96 (1993); Sen, supra note 343, at 331-32. This appears
to be exactly what advocates of the private-law approach intend. See, e.g., NII WHITE PA
PER, supra note 9, at 201-10 (recommending education as to "what is 'mine' versus what is
'not mine' " beginning at the elementary school level); supra text accompanying note 355.
369. See Princeton Univ. Press, Inc. v. Michigan Document Serv., Inc., 99 F.3d 1381 (6th
Cir. 1996) (en bane); American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir.
1994).
31.

370. See Princeton Univ. Press, 99 F.3d at 1387-88; American Geophysical, 60 F.3d at 929-
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economists; their implicit premise is that the fair use doctrine is a
cure for market failure and nothing more.371
Norms favoring information-sharing in research and classroom
settings are valuable both instrumentally, in that they advance
thriving traditions of scholarship and social commentary, and intrin
sically, in that they foster a climate of openness and intellectual ex
change.372 The switch to a system of strong property rights might
jeopardize these social accomplishments and values by rendering
them superfluous given the practical realities of access to creative
and informational content.373 In addition, of course, a private-law
regime of rights in digital works would make many information
sharing practices unlawful.374 It would be legitimate and entirely
rational for the public to decide that these practices and the values
they serve are, instead, important and worth preserving.
The question what preferences the public has regarding rights in
digital works has many possible answers. It is plainly incorrect,
however, to foreclose many of these answers at the outset, on the
ground that we cannot look to markets to measure their impor
tance. The cybereconomists' proposal would have us do precisely
that. At worst, this approach ignores or trivializes important public
values and priorities. At the very least, it is simply premature.
Before adopting a private-law regime of rights in digital works on
the ground that it would best promote social welfare, we must reach
a considered, collective decision about what social welfare means.
Contrary to the cybereconomists' arguments, there is ample basis
from which to conclude that a public-law, limited-entitlements re
gime is best-suited to promoting our individual and collective
development.

IV.

CODA: OF MARKET FAILURES

AND TECHNOLOGICAL

IMPERATIVES

As this Article has shown, the neoclassical market model for
digital property rights ignores or assumes away issues of immense
theoretical and practical significance. A realistic model for the
371. See supra text accompanying notes 27-29.
372. On the importance of information-sharing norms in research, see Rebecca S.
Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and Experimental Use, 56 U.
Cm. L. REv. 1017 (1989); Robert P. Merges, Property Rights Theory and the Commons: The
Case of Scientific Research, 13 Soc. PHIL. &-PoL. 145 (1996); J.H. Reichman, Computer Pro
grams as Applied Scientific Know-How: Implications of Copyright Protection for Commer
cialized University Research, 42 VAND. L. REv. 639 (1989).
373. See BOWLES & GINTis, supra note 205, at 95-96.
374. Cf. Richard Stallman, The Right to Read, 40 CoMM. ACM 85, Feb. 1997.
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market in digital works should explore the effect of legal rules on
the formation of market institutions, as the cybereconomists (in
particular Merges) do. However, it also must attempt to under
stand the ways in which the existing distribution and social con
struction of property rights, and the convenient presumption of
particularized assent to standard form contract terms, are them
selves institutional choices that shape market outcomes. In addi
tion, a model that attempts to relate "property" to "progress" must
consider the public-good nature of creative and informational
works, and cannot assume equivalency between private wealth and
social gain. Like the jurists of the

Lochner era, the cybereconomists

assume too much and prove too little about the rightness of their
desired regime.
The broader spectrum of economic research and theory suggests
that in order to determine the optimal system of rights in digital
works, we must inquire into the potential asymmetries of power
that may inhere in technologically-mediated transactions in usage
rights. In addition, we must attempt to assess all of the benefits and
costs - including externalities - generated by our current regime
of incomplete property entitlements in creative and informational
works, in order to determine whether a digital CMS regime would
result in a net gain or a net loss for society, as distinct from a net
gain to participants in markets. And we cannot do either of these
things without a considered, societal decision regarding the market
and nonmarket purposes a system of rights in digital works is sup
posed to serve, and the extent to which author/owner control fur
thers or disserves those purposes.

It is worth reflecting, finally, on the role of technology in effec
tuating an economic vision of digital intellectual property rights whether it be the simple, Newtonian model proffered by the cyber
economists or the more complex, post-Newtonian model for which
I have attempted to lay the groundwork. I have argued that the
choice between more :flexible access policies and digitally metered,
fully-commodified usage rights is not a simple choice between mar
ket failure and (by implication) market success. Digital technolo
gies, and in particular digital CMS, unquestionably have the
potential to eliminate certain market failures recognized as signifi
cant within the neoclassical market-centered paradigm.

Yet by

maximizing the economic return to the digital content owner and
externalizing the costs of decreased accessibility to members of the
public, digital CMS may create or exacerbate other, arguably more
significant, types of market failure.
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For the cybereconomists, however, the move to a digital CMS
regime is both desirable and technologically inevitable. Digital
technology enables the complete determination of property rights
and facilitates their exchange in relatively frictionless Coasean mar
kets not just because it should, but because it must. Critics of
private-law models for digital intellectual property rights have
largely acceded to this description of the direction in which digital
rights management technologies will take us.375 This is so, I sus
pect, because the cybereconomists' "technological imperative" res
onates with deeply-held social b eliefs in the inexorable,
rationalizing force of technical advance - beliefs that, like so much
else in our economic and political theory, trace back to the period
of the Enlightenment and the Industrial Revolution.376
The power of this narrative is such that one hears surprisingly
little about the possibilities of designing technological alternatives
for managing rights in digital works. Digital technology is theorized
as politically neutral and developmentally linear; the problem, if
there is one, lies in humanizing its presumptively inhuman face.377
Yet surely that is too simple; technology is not destiny. Rather, our
perception of possible technological solutions is coloreq by our ap
proach to market and legal institutions, and vice versa.378 The fully
commodified approach to digital rights management gains norma
tive force from the narrative power of the neoclassical market
model, and the neoclassical market model demands, in return, to be
implemented via technologies that minimize friction and internalize
uncompensated benefits. The economic ideology that produced

Lochner

has embraced digital CMS as a means of achieving frui

tion. A social commitment to "incomplete commodification" or to
reconceiving fair use privileges as publicly-owned property rights
would suggest a different approach to structuring technologically
mediated transactions in digital works.379
375. I include myself in this group. See Cohen, supra note 9, at 177.
376. See ELLUL, supra note 7; MUMFORD, supra note 7; LANGDON WINNER, AUTONO
MOUS TECHNOLOGY: TECHNICS-OUT-OF-CoNTROL AS A THEME IN PoLIDCAL THOUGHT

(1977); supra text accompanying notes 17-19.
377. See James Boyle, Foucault in Cyberspace: Surveillance, Sovereignty, and Hard-Wired
Censors, 66 U. CIN. L. REv. 352 (1998).
378. See BOYLE, supra note 168; Agre, supra note 310; Lessig, supra note 264, at 96;
Lawrence Lessig, The Zones of Cyberspace, 48 STAN L. REv. 1403, 1408 (1996); Lawrence
Lessig, What Things Regulate Speech 38 JURIMETRics J. 629 (1998); cf. Stefil:, Shifting the
Possible, supra note 24, at 156 ("Trusted systems do not exist in a vacuum. They exist in a
social framework. The search for balance involves the design of appropriate social
institutions.").
379. See supra text accompanying notes 100-16.
.

562

Michigan Law Review

(Vol.

97:462

The question what a different, more multi-faceted rights man
agement system might look like is a subject for another article. The
problems involved in the design of such a system are complex - all
the more so because existing rights management systems have been
designed to preempt the :flexible, equitable, context-sensitive judg
ments that constitute our current system of fair use.380 Effectuating
a noncommodified or incompletely-commodified approach to digi
tal intellectual property rights requires a new trajectory for policy
and technology alike. Digital systems capable of making or assist
ing such contingent, nonprogrammatic policy judgments are a long
way from reality, and we have at best an imperfect understanding of
what such systems might look like.381 This does not mean, however,
that digital rights management technologies and equitable access
rules are necessarily incompatible. It simply means that there is
much work to be done in creating the discursive space within which
the desired regime can fiourish.382
The notion of designing digital systems to incorporate a degree
of superficial transactional inefficiency is less unusual than it seems.
One notable recent example is the installation of "circuit breakers"
in the trading systems at the New York Stock Exchange following
the October 1987 stock market crash. Investigators concluded that
the crash was caused in part by automated "program trading" by
high-volume investors, in part by existing computer systems' inabil
ity to handle the large volume of orders, and in part by the panic
and communications breakdowns that ensued when the market be
gan to drop rapidly as both individual traders and automated trad
ing programs tried to sell and found no buyers.383 The circuit
380. See supra text accompanying notes 30-32.
381. A promising start is Stefik & Silverman, supra

note 136, at 13-14. Stefik and
Silverman suggest a Digitlll Property Trust that would grant "fair use licenses" to qualified
parties, who could then "exercise privileged rights on the digital work not normally avail
able." See id. at 13. Their fair use licensing system also would include insurance designed to
protect digital publishers against the possibility of abuse by professed fair users. See id. The
proposal intentionally leaves a number of important questions unanswered - should there
be a charge for the fair use license? who may qualify for a license? who decides what uses are
"fair"? who pays for the insurance? what measures will be taken to be protect fair users'
privacy rights? - and fails to note others - might the system be designed to permit certain
uses without pre-screening? is insurance for publishers really necessary?. Nonetheless, it rep
resents precisely the kind of innovative thinking that will be required to solve the fair use
problem.

382. See supra text accompanying

notes

310-12.

383. See REPORT OF THE PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE ON MARKET MECHANISMS (1988)
(hereinafter REPORT ON MARKET MECHANISMS]; KURT EICHENWALD & JoHN MARKOFF,
Wall Street's Souped-Up Computers, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 1988, at Cl. "Program trading" is
automated portfolio trading executed by computers programmed to respond to designated
price fluctuations. See REPORT ON MARKET MECHANISMS, supra.

November 1998]

Lochner in Cyberspace

563

breakers are designed to "slow the action on turbulent days and
give cooler heads a chance to prevai1";384 they accomplish this by
halting computerized program trading for a preset time period
when the Dow Jones industrial average falls a specified amount in a
single trading session, and by halting all trading if the Dow falls too
far.385 The market has fallen far enough to trigger the circuit break
ers on several occasions since their installation, and none have be
come panics.386 This example suggests that "friction" in human
transactional systems may sometimes serve valuable collective ends.
It is clear that some hard thinking is needed to tailor intellectual
property paradigms to the digital world. It also should be clear,
however, that the most commodified solution is not necessarily the
best one, and that the search for the best solution should involve all
affected interests. Technological changes that will have distributive
consequences are a proper subject of attention for policymakers
and the public as well as for owners and technologists. The appro
priate entitlements structure for digital works should be chosen not
just because technology enables it, or because it comports with a
familiar story about the nature of property rights and markets, but
because it represents a sound and wise policy for managing our so
ciety's creative capital.

384. John J. Phelan, Jr., Setting
Nov. 6, 1989, at C19.

Controls on Volatility in the Securities Market, Cm. TRIB.,

385. See Kurt Eichenwald, Black Monday Crash: 'A Blessing in Disguise' - On Fifth
Anniversary, Markets Healthier, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 1992, at D2; Floyd Norris, Stocks Fall
554 Points, Off 7%, Forcing Suspension in Trading, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 1997, at Al.
386. See Norris, supra note 385; Eichenwald, supra note 385. Although some naysayers
believe that the circuit breakers would be unnecessary if trading systems were seamlessly
integrated to provide perfect, real-time information, see, e.g., Roy C. Smith, NYSE Riskily
Clings to People Over Electronics, NEWSDAY, July 14, 1991, at 30, scientists who study chaos
theory have concluded that "panics" and other "irrational" responses are inevitable in any
system so complex see Eichenwald & Markoff, supra note 383. This is consistent 'vith
Polanyi's historical argument, made fifty years before, that money is a "fictitious commodity"
and that the market in money will periodically require stabilizing interventions to avoid so
cial disruption. See PoLANYI, supra note 189, at 71-75; supra text accompanying notes 19598; see also REPORT ON MARKET MECHANISMS, supra note 383, at 66 (arguing that circuit
breakers are "inevitable" because of "natural limits to market liquidity").

